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ABSTRACT
Increasing population, economic development, and environmental changes imply that
maintaining the water supply-demand balance will remain a top priority. Water resource
systems may need to be expanded in order to respond to demand growth. Capacity
expansion studies can be used to answer the question of what the optimal expansion
size, timing and location of new infrastructure should be. This thesis develops and
applies capacity expansion optimisation modelling approaches. We begin with the
'Economics of Balancing Supply and Demand’ (EBSD) planning framework used by the
water industry since 2002 in England. The base model is formulated as a mixed integer
linear programming optimisation model that selects the least cost annual schedule of
supply and demand management options that meet forecasted demand over the planning
horizon. Custom water saving profiles are allowed for demand management options.
Multiple demand scenarios are considered to ensure the supply-demand balance is
preserved under different demand conditions and that operating costs of selected options
are accurately assessed. The base deterministic EBSD model is applied to the water
companies of South East England (the WRSE area). Various extensions to the EBSD
framework are then proposed and implemented. The model formulation is first
expanded to incorporate a generic cost estimate for options not yet proposed in water
company resources management plans. This allows to extend the WRSE network with
new inter-company transfers for which costs are represented by a concave cost curve
approximated by a piece-wise linear function. Considering additional interconnections
allows evaluating the financial implications of further interconnectivity in the WRSE
area. Next, an extension is proposed to improve the application of the stochastic version
of the EBSD approach. The proposed method allows to identify the set of future
capacity expansions that withstand uncertainty of supply and demand estimates and still
achieve a required reliability. The method consists of an iterative process: at each
iteration the EBSD optimisation model is run and the reliability of the solution set
(supply-demand schedules) is tested under Monte Carlo simulation. Ad-hoc model
constraints are introduced at each iteration to enable the EBSD model to exclude
unreliable solutions identified at previous iterations. Next, the English price-cap
regulatory process is represented within a modified EBSD model formulation. The
model identifies future capacity expansions that maximise water company profit under
constraints on the maximum price that can be charged to customers and on the allowed
rate of return. The incentive schemes that the regulator uses to reward (or penalise)
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companies for out- (or under-) performance, are also represented. The goal is to help
explain how the current regulatory system of incentives motivates water company
investment decisions. Two further extensions are then presented in the appendixes. The
first one allows the EBSD model formulation to be extended so that costs of activated
schemes are accounted over the schemes’ useful life, beyond the typical 25-30 year
planning horizon. This eliminates biased comparisons of schemes with different
economic lifetimes. With the second extension, a diverse set of supply-demand
schedules are generated, that solve the capacity expansion problem and are sufficiently
‘close’ (in terms of costs) to the least-cost solution. Generating multiple near-optimal
solutions gives an idea of what alternative plans are available in addition to the least-
cost one. This allows the consideration other un-modelled factors or strategic priorities
in the decision making process.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1 Background
Increasing demand for water, higher exploitation of resources, and excessive water
pollution due to agricultural and industrial expansions have caused a social and political
alarm (Mohammad Karamouz et al., 2003). Water is not always fairly distributed: there
is often ‘too much or too little or what exists is too polluted or too expensive’ (Daniel P.
Loucks et al., 1981). In addition to this, global change drivers such as climate change,
population growth and land use changes will create new challenges in the near future. In
areas where pressures on water supplies are high, maintaining the supply-demand
balance at an economically and ecologically sustainable level is the priority for all
decision-makers involved in the water resources planning process. Planning for
sustainable development of water resources may include new supplies, but also strategic
actions such as water conservation measures, leakage reduction, reduced water
abstraction within the limits of the system. Water resource systems may need to be
expanded to take account of the growing demand for resources and services. Capacity
expansion studies are undertaken when existing facilities for withdrawing, storing and
transferring water between different users become insufficient or cannot meet the
existing or projected demands. Since the 1950s capacity expansion models have been
used for various public services where substantial capital investments are needed such
as heavy process industries, communication networks, electrical power services, schools
and roads and water resource systems (Luss, 1982). Given the time it takes to plan,
fund and build new infrastructure capacity expansion planning is of vital importance for
answering the question of what the optimal expansion size, timing and location of new
production facilities should be.
This thesis aims to assess and address some key issues related to the capacity expansion
problem applied to the English water supply industry. The starting point is the
'Economics of Balancing Supply and Demand’ (EBSD) planning approach used by the
water industry in England since 2002. The thesis is structured with an introduction
followed by five technical Chapters, a conclusion Chapter and two appendices. The
introduction sets the context, introduces and justifies the methodology used, outlines the
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research problem and thesis objectives and summarises the scholarly contributions of
the technical Chapters. The literature review is split between the introduction, where the
main modelling approaches for water resources planning are introduced, and each
technical Chapter where the specific literature relevant to each contribution is reviewed.
The thesis finishes with a conclusion summarising what has been learned and gained by
this work, and provides directions of future inquiry.
1.1 Water resources systems and their planning
Water resources systems consists of two different environments: a physical, chemical
and biological environment which includes interrelated water bodies and structures
(each element may impact on the performance of other system’s components), and a
cultural environment which includes our political, economic and social interrelation
with the environmental system (White I.D., 1992). The two environments are
inseparable.
Water resources systems analysis is the activity of managing and planning water
resource systems and frequently consists of four main consecutive steps: a. problem
definition and data collection; b. modelling; c. decision making; d. implementation of
the project (Mohammad Karamouz et al., 2003) as shown in Figure 1.
Models are a simplified representation of the system and commonly consist of breaking
down the complexity of the system into its main component parts. (Daniel P. Loucks et
al., 1981) refers to modelling as a tool that allows abstracting from the real word the
components that are important for the decision making process. Modelling approaches
can be broadly classified into the following categories: deterministic versus stochastic,
optimisation versus simulation. Their detailed description is introduced in paragraph 1.3
of this Chapter.
In the following phase stakeholders and decision-makers analyse the model solution ((in
deterministic simulation or single objective optimisation) or set of alternative solutions
(with stochastic simulation or multi-criteria optimisation). In optimisation methods,
alternative solutions can be generated through an approach called ‘modelling to
generate alternatives’ (also applied in this thesis, see Appendix II). Decision makers and
stakeholders typically evaluate one or a set of alternatives and select one based on their
preferences. The last phase of the planning process consists on the construction or
implementation of the selected strategy. The work conducted in this thesis falls within
26
the ‘modelling' phase highlighted in the dashed red box of Figure 1, although the
decision-making phase is also relevant.
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Figure 1: The water resources planning process, adapted from (Mohammad Karamouz et al., 2003)
1.2 Capacity Expansion problems
Choosing an appropriate schedule of infrastructure upgrades and investments is a classic
water resource systems analysis problem (Olaoghaire and Himmelblau, 1974, Loucks et
al., 1981, Mays, 2005, Loucks, 2006). Capacity expansion planning consists of
determining future expansion in time, size and locations of the existing assets as the
demand of a specific commodity increases. A classical objective function minimises the
net present value of the total cost of the expansion (see section 1.3 for net present values
evaluation). Decision makers often impose constraints to the problem, these can be
budgetary limits or upper bounds on expansion sizes, excess capacity and capacity
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shortages (Luss, 1982). Expansion polices are considered over time for a planning
horizon (typically 20 to 100 years for civil infrastructure). Some capacity expansion
problems allow for capacity shortage at certain shortage costs. This means that the
demand can remain temporarily unsatisfied or temporarily satisfied by renting the
commodity from an external source.
One of the earliest work on capacity expansion problems is from Manne (1961). The
simplest application of the problem considers a deterministic demand that grows
linearly over time at a constant yearly rate of X/t’where X is the expansion size at time
t’ (see Figure 2). If we suppose that whenever demand reaches the existing capacity (see
for example point A in Figure 2) ‘X’ units of new capacity are installed, and that the
installed capacity has an infinite economic life, then the course of demand over capacity
can be plotted over time as in Figure 2. In Figure 2 terms X0, X1, X2 and X3 represent the
expanded capacity at time steps t0, t1, t2 and t3 respectively.
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Figure 2: Optimal capacity expansion problem (adopted from Manne, 1961).
By plotting the evolution of the excess capacity X over time, we obtain Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Excess of capacity over time (adopted from Manne, 1961).
Each time any capacity X is added there are fixed costs (setup costs required to initiate
an activity) and variable costs (related to the level of the activity) occurring. The cost
function of a capacity expansion problems therefore typically exhibits fixed costs and
substantial economies of scale (the average cost per unit of capacity decreases with the
expansion size) as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Typical cost function (includes fixed and variable costs) for additional capacity, adapted
from (Daniel P. Loucks et al., 1981)
The installation costs that results from a capacity increment of size X can be typically
represented by a power function C(X)=kXα where k is a positive constant, while α is the
economy of scale factor defined between zero and one. Typical values of α for water
and waste water treatment facilities change between 0.6 and 0.8 (Daniel P. Loucks et
al., 1981). α is equal to 0.35 for canals and storage dams which have high economies of
scale and can be closer to 1 for large systems such as municipal waste-water treatment
plants (Revelle, 1999).
Due to the shape of the cost function there is the incentive to build large facilities now
rather than a sequence of smaller ones in the future (Revelle, 1999). However, if
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expenditures are sustained in the future, their present worth value decreases. A trade-off
must therefore be found between the economies of scale of saving large expansion sizes
versus the cost of installing capacity before it is needed (Manne, 1961, Manne AS,
1967). This problem was first analysed by Manne (1961): Figure 5 shows that the
expansion in size X increases as α decreases (more economies of scale) and that the 
higher the discount rate r (a percentage defining the time value of money, see following
section 1.3 ‘Engineering economics’) the smaller the optimal size of each installation.
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Figure 5: variation of the optimal expansion X with the economy of scale factor α, from (Manne, 
1961).
1.3 Engineering economics
Before explaining how the net present value of a future series of payments can be
calculated (for example to embed it in the cost function of a capacity expansion
problem), the economic engineering concept of ‘time value of money’ needs to be
introduced.
‘Money itself is a commodity, and like other goods that are bought or sold, money costs
money’ (Park S. C., 1997). The cost of money is measured by an interest rate: a
percentage applied to an amount of money over a time period. The interest is the charge
that the borrower pays to use the lender’s property, or can be seen as the benefit that the
lender gains by providing the property to another person (Park S. C., 1997). Money can
also be invested now to generate more money in the future and this is accounted for in
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the discount rate, an annual percentage that reflect for the ‘productive uses of money
and the effect of inflation’ (Willis R. and Finney B. A., 2003). A higher discount rate
implies that a greater weight is placed on current costs and benefits relative to those
occurring in the future.
We review below how the future or present worth value of a single payment or a series
of payments can be calculated, as this concept appears in later Chapters of this thesis.
The future value F of a single cash flow P can be calculated by using the compound
interest method (Park S. C., 1997). According to this method, given an initial cost or
benefit P at time zero, the interest I earned in each period is calculated based on the total
amount at the end of the previous period. Concisely, if you invested an amount of P at
interest rate ic, you would have P+(icP)=P(1+ic) at the end of the first period.
Continuing over n periods, the total value of F will grow to F=P(1+ic)n (equation a) as
shown in Figure 6.
P
P(1+ic)+ic(P+Pxic)
=P(1+ic)P+I
=(P+Pxic)=P(1+ic)
2
P(1+ic)3 F=P(1+ic)
1 2 3 n-1 n
n
F=P(1+ic)
1 2 3 n-1 n
n
lender's point of view
P
borrower's point of view
P(1+ic)+i(P+Pxic)
=P(1+ic)
P+I
=(P+Pxic)=P(1+ic)
2
P(1+ic)
Figure 6: Single cash flow formula, using the compound interest method.
Suppose now that costs or benefits A are uniformly spread over a period of n years. In
this case, the future worth value can be expressed as the sum of future worth values of
each individual cash flow A (see Figure 7): F=A+A(1+ic)n-1+….+A(1+ic)2+ A(1+ic) +A
(equation b). Multiplying this expression by (1+ic) returns: F(1+ic)=
A(1+ic)n+….+A(1+ic)2+ A(1+ic) (equation c). By subtracting equation ‘c’ from
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equation ‘b’, the future value of a series of equal payments A is given by: F=A[(1+ic)n-
1/ic] (equation d).
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Figure 7: Future worth of an equal payment series A expressed as the sum of future worth values of
each individual cash flow.
The present worth value P can then be obtained in two steps: 1. F in equation ‘d’ is
replaced by P(1+ic)n (see equation a). This gives: A=P[i(1+ic)n/((1+ic)n -1)] (equation
e) where term [i(1+ic)n/ ((1+ic)n -1)] is called capital recovery factor; 2. equation ‘e’ is
rearranged, to return the present worth value P as a function of A. That is: P=A[(1+ic)n-
1]/[ic(1+ic)n] where [(1+ic)n-1]/[ic(1+ic)n] is the present worth factor.
1.4 Modelling approaches
Water supply planning is a classical problem of water resources engineering (Maass et
al., 1962). Because of the variety and the complexity of the elements involved, such as
the hydrological, institutional and environmental features, there is no single way to
approach or such problems. Water resource system management and planning analysis
methods can broadly be classified into simulation modelling, optimisation modelling or
hybrids. Before explaining each modelling approach in detail, a description is provided
bellow about the main differences between simulations versus optimisation models and
stochastic versus deterministic methods.
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1.4.1 Simulation versus optimisation
Simulation and optimisation models perform complementary roles (Loucks DP et al.,
1981 , Loucks et al., 1985, Rogers and Fiering, 1986). Simulation models are used to
analyse the impact of a finite number of proposed planning strategies on the
environmental system by answering the question ‘what if’. Each strategy is in turn
simulated with a mathematical model with rules expressed as mathematical statements
to describe the response of the system to a set of environmental, political or
management conditions.
Optimisation models identify the solution to a problem, among an infinite number of
possible alternatives, by answering the question ‘what’s best’. Among the optimisation
modelling approaches, mathematical programming determines the value of a set of
decision variables, by optimising an objective function (or set of objectives) subject to a
system of mathematical constraints (Castillo, 2002). Decision variables define the
variables can be changed by managers to address a management or planning problem.
Constraints represent limitations such as on budgets, environmental standards, or
resource availability. Since the number of equations is lower than the number of
decision variables, the system of constraints is undetermined, meaning that there are
infinite solutions to the problem. The objective function helps select among the feasible
set of solutions the one that ‘best’ fit the objective function (e.g. minimum cost,
maximum profit, etc.). Mathematical optimisation techniques can produce difficulties;
in presence of non-linear constraints and objectives, required computational resources
may increase and nonlinearities can complicate the identification of a ‘global optimum’
solution (Thomas F. Edgar et al., 2001) meaning that the optimised solution may not be
the actual ‘true’ solution to the problem. In contrast to the global optimum, a ‘local
optimum’ is a solution which is ‘good’ but not the ‘best’ to a defined problem, where
the notion of ‘good’ or ‘best’ relates to the metric specified in the model objective
function. In mathematical optimisation modelling there is a class of nonlinear
problems, called ‘convex programming’, for which a global solution can be guaranteed.
The concept of convexity and its meaning is explained below as it appears later on in
this thesis (see Chapter 3).
To explain what ‘convex programming’ problems are it is first necessary to briefly
define a ‘convex set’ and a ‘convex function’. Concisely f(x) is a convex function if it is
always curving ‘upwards’, or more precisely if for any pair of points x1 and x2 on the
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graph of f(x), the function does not have any value larger than the one obtained by the
linear interpolation between the two points (see example in panel A of Figure 8 for a
function of a single variable). In mathematical terms f(x) is convex if, for any scalar γ
between zero and one, the following relation holds: f [γ x1 + (1-γ) x2] ≤ γ f(x1) + (1- γ)
f(x2). If in this mathematical statement only the inequality sign holds, than f(x) is
‘strictly convex’. Similarly if the ‘≤’ sign is replaced by ‘≥’ then f(x) is ‘concave’ (see
panel B in Figure 8). A linear function is both convex and concave (but not strictly
concave or strictly convex) since for any 0≤γ≤1, the equation above is always valid, 
whether a ‘≤’ or a ‘≥’ sign is adopted. Figure 8 in panel C shows the example of a 
function defined on a single variable x which is neither convex nor concave because it
alternates between curving ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’. These intuitive definitions of
convex and concave functions are stated with further elaboration in (Thomas F. Edgar et
al., 2001).
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Figure 8: Example of a convex (panel A) and concave (panel B) function of a single variable. Function
in panel C is neither convex nor concave. Adopted from (Lieberman, 2004).
If the nonlinear mathematical optimisation problem has no constraints, and the objective
function is concave, then a local maximum is also a global maximum (Thomas F. Edgar
et al., 2001). At the same way, if the objective function is convex, then a local minimum
is also a global minimum. If there are constraints, one more condition is necessary to
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guarantee global optimality: the feasible region (region of permissible values for x that
satisfy the constraints of the optimisation problem) has to be a ‘convex set’. A set of
points is defined as a ‘convex set’ if, for any pair points in the set, the line segment
joining the two points is inside the feasible region. In general a feasible region is a
‘convex set’ if each inequality constraints is convex function (Willis R. and Finney B.
A., 2003).
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Figure 9: Example of a convex set (panel on the left) and concave set (panel on the right), for a
nonlinear programming maximisation problem with two variables (X and Y). Adopted from
(Lieberman, 2004).
When it is not possible to solve for a global optimal solution, heuristic methods are
commonly used in place of classical mathematical optimisation techniques. A heuristic
method search starts with a current trial solution and explores all solutions in the
neighbourhood of that point until a better solution if found. If the solution dominates all
other solutions in the feasible decision space, then it is a ‘global’ solution, otherwise it
is a ‘local’ solution. Heuristic search methods cannot always guarantee global
optimality (Willis R. and Finney B. A., 2003), nor it is usually possible to demonstrate
that the solution is a global optimal one (Thomas F. Edgar et al., 2001). Metaheuristic
methods provide a general structure to develop a specific heuristic search method
(Lieberman, 2004) and mainly include: simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983),
tabu-search (Glover, 1986), and evolutionary algorithms (Zitzler and Thiele, 1999). A
popular technique used in the field of water resources systems is represented by genetic
algorithms (Deb et al., 2002), a sub-class of evolutionary algorithms. Genetic
algorithms replicate strategies found in nature, such as the process of crossover,
selection and mutation (Willis R. and Finney B. A., 2003). Genetic algorithms are
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‘population-based’: they work with a ‘population’ of solutions (rather than a single trial
solution at a time), and update the ‘population’ when better solutions are found.
1.4.2 Stochastic versus deterministic
Both simulation and optimisation models can be stochastic or deterministic.
Deterministic models simplify the problem of incomplete or erroneous data often faced
in real word systems. In the deterministic approach, input data are fixed and predictable
quantities, and uncertainty of future outcomes is not considered probabilistically,
although it can be accounted for with safety factors. In stochastic models some or all
input data are random variables and therefore the output is obtained with some range of
uncertainty (Lieberman, 2004) as illustrated in the figure below.
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time t
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Figure 10: Deterministic and stochastic process, from Lieberman (2004).
The section below reviews the major theoretical simulation and optimisation approaches
in the literature, with particular focus on studies conducted on water resources systems
planning problems. Benefits and limitations of each method are discussed.
1.4.3 Capacity expansion optimisation modelling
Mathematical optimisation models vary depending with the use of linear or non-linear
mathematical formulations, real or integer variables and according to the type of model:
static or dynamic (evolving with time) (Revelle, 1999).
Linear programming (Dantzig G. B. and N., 2003) is one of the most popular
optimisation methods for the optimal allocation of water resources (Cheng et al., 2009,
Hsu et al., 2008, Mousavi and Ramamurthy, 2000, Han et al., 2011). An important
characteristic of linear programming is its applicability to large scale problems and the
secure convergence to a global optimal solution. In addition to this, linear programming
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can be implemented through a wide number of available modelling systems like GAMS
(Brooke A et al., 2010), LINDO (INC., 2010), LINGO (Schrage, 1999), CPLEX
(ILOG, 2007) and MINOS (Bruce A. Murtagh and Saunder, 1983). Linear
programming is limited to only using continuous decision variables. In many practical
problems some or all of the decision variables may make sense only if restricted to
integer values (Lieberman, 2004). An example is when the model decisions are ‘yes-or-
no’ type and are represented in mathematical optimisation by zero/one variables (Mays,
2005). This issue can be overcome by using integer programming (if all the variables
have integer values) or mixed integer linear programming (if only some of the variables
are integer). Mixed integer programming conveniently allows representing yes/no
decisions at each time step and has been widely applied to solve water resources
systems capacity expansion problems (Elimam and Girgis, 2012, Labadie, 2004,
Labadie et al., 1986, Randall et al., 1997b, Beh et al., 2014).
A limitation of linear programming and mixed integer linear programming techniques is
the restriction to use only a linear objective function and linear constraints (Mahmoud,
2006). Even if the assumption of linearity helps avoiding numerous computational
difficulties (Mahmoud, 2006), often it does not hold: many water resources systems
problems present nonlinearities due to the complex relationships among different
physical and hydrological variables or due to nonlinear objectives such as benefits and
costs functions. Given the difficulty to incorporate into a linear model all the
complexity of the system and all the objectives considered important to the
stakeholders, nonlinear programming methods have often been applied to water
resources systems planning problems (Kim and Hopkins, 1995, Barros et al., 2008).
Non-linear programming however may presents numerical difficulties related to the
research of the global optimal solution (see ‘convex programming’ in section 1.4.1).
Such issues may be overcome through linear approximation of the nonlinear constraints
and the nonlinear objective function (Willis R. and Finney B. A., 2003). A commonly
used method is the piecewise linear approximation which is also implemented in
Chapter 3.
Dynamic programming is an optimisation approach well suited to tackle nonlinearities.
Dynamic programming is a method introduced by Bellman (1957) and consists of
decomposing a complex multistage problem into a series of simple sub-problems then
solving them recursively. Dynamic programming is one of the most frequently used
techniques in water resources systems analysis (Braga et al., 1985, Chou et al., 2013,
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Dandy et al., 1984, Hsu et al., 2008, Luo et al., 2007, Mahmoud, 2006), however its
application to large scale problems may be limited due to the ‘curse of dimensionality’
problem (Bellman, 1957): the computational difficulty of these algorithms quickly
increase with the number of state variables. (Yakowitz, 1982) reviewed the application
of dynamic programming for water resources development and management problems.
The optimisation techniques described above have proven valuable to address a wide
range of practical capacity expansion problems, however when applied to large scale
systems, optimisation models can face challenges (Fiering et al., 1986, Yates et al.,
1984). The computational complexity may depend on several different factors, such as
size and topology of the network, and the type of hydraulic relationships involved in the
problem (Cembrano et al, 2000). When this is the case heuristic optimisation techniques
can be used to search for good feasible solutions reasonably ‘close’ to the optimum.
These methods cannot guarantee the convergence to a global optimum solution,
however are most commonly used to overcome complexities such as non-linearity,
discontinuity and discreetness which often limits the application of traditional
optimisation techniques. Application of this technique to water resource systems
planning problems can be found in (Savic and Walters, 1997, Deb, 2001, Farmani et al.,
2005).
1.4.4 Capacity expansion optimisation under uncertainty
Water resource systems are often associated with many uncertainties due to the
stochastic nature of metrological processes such as evaporation, rainfall and
temperature. In addition, future populations and economic forces, priorities for water
uses and irrigation patterns cannot be known with certainty (Daniel P. Loucks et al.,
1981, Lempert et al., 2006, Lempert and Collins, 2007). Consideration of uncertainty in
water resource systems is essential under climate change and increasing water scarcity.
To consider uncertainty stochastic approaches can be used where some data elements
are ‘random’ and the output is obtained with some range of uncertainty (Lieberman,
2004).
Sensitivity analysis is a ‘reactive’ method to control uncertainty: it measures the
sensitivity of the solution as the input data change under uncertainty (it quantifies
locally the stability of the solution with respect to data perturbation) but does not
provide any mechanism to control such sensitivity (Mulvey et al., 1995). Contrary to
sensitivity analysis, stochastic programming is a ‘proactive’ approach: a set of decision
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variables are used to adjust the model solution once the uncertain parameters are
observed. Two main approaches to optimisation under uncertainty are used: stochastic
programming, also known as recourse models, and robust stochastic programming.
Programming with recourse dates back to Dantzig (1955). Under this approach the
decision variables are subdivided into a first-stage and a second-stage set. The first-
stage variables are defined prior to the realisation of the uncertain parameters, while the
second-stage or recourse variables are used to improve, at certain cost, the model
solution once the uncertain parameters are observed. The recourse variables can
therefore be considered as ‘corrective measure’ against the infeasibilities that may arise
under uncertainty (Sahinidis, 2004). Because of the uncertainty, the second-stage cost is
a random variable. The objective function then minimises the sum between the first-
stage costs and the expected value of the random second-stage costs. Concisely,
recourse models determine a solution that can be adjusted under uncertain events at
minimum cost.
When uncertainties are unpredictable, cautious decision-makers should look for ‘robust’
planning solutions that are that are ‘good’ under a wide range of scenarios. Robust
stochastic programming can therefore be used to return a solution which remains close
enough to optimality when input data change. In robust optimisation, the objective
function of the recourse model is augmented by a term, such as the variance, which
measures the variability of the second stage costs. Such a term is then multiplied by a
non-negative scalar ‘omega’. Large values of ‘omega’ produce solution with a lower
variance, while smaller values of ‘omega’ reduce the expected costs. By executing
multiple runs with different values of ‘omega’, a trade-off curve can be obtained which
tracks the cost of the solution versus its robustness (Mulvey et al., 1995). Robust
optimisation was first introduced by Soyster (1973) for linear programming problems.
The main limitation of the Soyster method was its over-conservatism: the method
admits the highest protection against uncertainty by considering all uncertain parameters
taking their worse value (Bertsimas and Sim, 2004). Further extensions to the method
were developed by (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 1999, Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2000, El
Ghaoui et al., 1998, ElGhaoui and Lebret, 1997) to address this issue. These lead to the
definition of new non-linear, although convex, models which are more computational
demanding than the Soyster method (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2000). A different
approach to robust optimisation was proposed by Bertsimas and Sim (2004) for solving
mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problems under data uncertainty. The
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method claims to retain the advantages of the approach proposed by Soyster, without
changing the type and complexity of the problem. It assumes that the uncertain
parameters follow an unknown but symmetrical distribution, bounded by an internal
variable called ‘the price of robustness’.
Stochastic optimisation (recourse models and robust stochastic programming) has found
numerous applications for capacity expansion problems (Malcolm and Zenios, 1994,
Laguna, 1998, Bai et al., 1997) (Ahmed and Sahinidis, 2003, Bean et al., 1992, Berman
et al., 1994, Shabbir Ahmed et al., 2001) and water resource systems capacity expansion
under uncertainty (Chung et al., 2009, Cunha and Sousa, 2010a, Cunha and Sousa,
2010b, Watkins and McKinney, 1997, Guo et al., 2009, Sechi and Sulis, 2009, Li et al.,
2008, Maqsood et al., 2005, Rosenberg et al., 2008).
1.4.5 Simulation modelling and its use in capacity expansion problems
Simulation models are used to analyse the impact of a finite number of pre-defined
proposed strategies. Analysts first identify a list of portfolios using engineering and
economic considerations. Each portfolio is then simulated with the simulation model.
User-defined operating rules that describe the behaviour of the environmental system
are included (from which the name of ‘rule-based simulation’ models). The model
results return a detailed description of how the system is affected under each plan.
Traditional measures of system performance, such as reliability, resilience and
vulnerability (Hashimoto et al., 1982) can be evaluated during the simulation and
compared over the different portfolios. Scenario analysis can determine whether or not
the strategy is ‘robust’, that is if under a range of scenarios the tested plan works
acceptably.
Simulation models provide only localised information about the analysed system: only
one set of conditions is considered in the analysis. Simulation rules can quickly become
complicated often requiring thousands lines of computer code to be described in detail.
In presence of a large number of option configurations and operating rules, repetitive
applications of the model can be time consuming (Willis R. and Finney B. A., 2003). To
overcome this problem simulation models have often been used in combination with
optimisation techniques in order to screen the many possible system implementations
(Rani and Moreira, 2009). Another hybrid use is called ‘optimisation-driven
simulation’, where an optimisation model is used to solve the allocation problem at each
simulated time-step. Previous studies on large scale networks showed that linear
programming based simulation models can simplify the simulation process (Chaturvedi
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and Srivastava, 1981, Labadie, 1993). (Randall et al., 1997a) use a mixed integer
programming model to simulate the long-range planning of the Almeda County water
district in California.
Besides traditional mathematical optimisation techniques, metaheuristic methods, such
as evolutionary algorithms, have also been used in combination with simulation models
(Jamieson and Fedra, 1996). In this case, each time the heuristic search algorithm
evaluates a solution, the simulation model is run to determine the solution’s
performance.
Simulation models have a long history in water resources planning problems and are
often incorporated in ‘decision support systems’. Decision support systems are defined
as interactive computer based systems that enable the decision-maker to use data and
models that search for a solution to a ‘poorly or insufficiently structured problem’ (de
Kok and Wind, 2003). A wide range of water resources modelling software exist for
rule-based simulation such as IRAS (Matrosov et al., 2011, Loucks et al., 1995),
Aquator (Oxford Scientific Software, 2008, Vamvakeridou-Lyroudia et al., 2010),
WaterWare (Jamieson and Fedra, 1996) and ‘optimisation-driven simulation’
approaches such as MISER (Fowler et al., 1999), WEAP (Yates et al., 2005) and
CALSIM (Draper et al., 2004). Further information about this type of ‘decision support
systems’ can be found in (Wurbs, 2005). A WaterWare extension (Cetinkaya et al.,
2008) and Aquator-GA (Vamvakeridou-Lyroudia et al., 2010) use water resources
simulation models imbedded into heuristic optimisation.
Each modelling approach has advantaged and disadvantages. Choosing which of the
above models to apply can be linked to specific modelling requirements or to the
institutional context which may determine which approach is more appropriate to a
particular application. For example, ‘rule-based simulation’ and ‘optimisation-drive
simulation’ may not explicitly support capacity expansion decisions and are usually
adopted for modelling system operations in detail (such as reservoirs releases and water
allocation).
1.4.5.1 Monte Carlo simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is a type of stochastic simulation usually adopted when system
inputs can be described by probability distribution functions (PDF). With the Monte
Carlo method the system can be simulated by sampling from the PDF. This process is
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repeated many times and a distribution of outcomes is obtained. The accuracy of results
improves as the number of repetitions increases. Monte Carlo simulation has been
applied for several capacity expansion planning problems of several public sector
utilities (Renna, 2013, Tekiner et al., 2010, Yang and Wen, 2005, Hasani-Marzooni and
Hosseini, 2011). This method is also established for water resources planning problems
(Maass et al., 1962). Prudhomme et al. (2003) used Monte Carlo simulation to randomly
generate climate change scenarios and analyse their potential impact on five catchments
in Great Britain; Zhang and Kennedy (Zhang and Kennedy, 2006) applied Monte Carlo
simulation to reduce uncertainty on the yields of groundwater resources in Beijing.
Monte Carlo simulation can also be used with equiprobable ensembles (Lopez et al.,
2009) when PDFs are unknown.
1.5 Capacity expansion planning in the English water industry - the
EBSD framework
Since 1989 England is served by 22 privatised water companies (utilities) which operate
asregulated natural monopolies. Their abstraction from the environment is controlled by
theEnvironment Agency (EA), while the companies’ consumer prices and investments
are regulated by Ofwat (the water services regulation authority). Water companies must
demonstrate regulators their plans to meet future demands are best value and maintain
environmental standards or justify other considerations that move away from these
criteria. Companies ‘Water resource Management Plans’ (WRMPs) must follow
regulatory guidance (EA et al., 2012a, EA et al., 2012b) and typically use the 'Economics
of Balancing Supply and Demand' (EBSD) framework to generate sociallyefficient least
economic cost water resources supply plans (UKWIR, 2002a, UKWIR, 2002b).
Water companies apply the EBSD approach individually, but in some cases also
collectively in regional applications. Early on in this PhD project an opportunity arose
to work with a group of companies looking at regional infrastructure investment
(described in Chapter 2). We discuss this application below before providing more
background on the EBSD approach.
The water companies operating in South East England (see Figure 11) have a history of
working together as the Water Resources in the South East (WRSE) Group (von Lany et
al., 2013). South-East England is the driest part of the UK with the largest and fastest
growing population. The WRSE Group includes: the Environment Agency, Ofwat the
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Consumer Council for Water and Defra (Department for Environment Food and rural
Affairs).
Figure 11: Water companies and water resource zone in the ‘Water Resources of the South East’
network.
The WRSE group’s aim is to explore new opportunities for water companies to share
resources through new bulk supply agreements and other joined up investments. The
group undertakes capacity expansion modelling for their combined area following the
EBSD framework (EA, 2005b, EA, 2010b, R. Critchley and D. Marshallsay, 2013). The
idea behind the WRSE model is to encourage water companies to adopt the solution to the
region supply-demand balance problem identified by the optimisation model (EA, 2010b).
Regional modelling carried out in 1990 led to the implementation, by 2005, of four new
inter-company interconnections. In 2010 the WRSE group identified that a possible savings
of £M 501 could be reached by 2035 if a greater level of sharing of resources was allowed
in the South East (EA, 2010b). In 2013, the WRSE group has carried out a new phase of
regional modelling (R. Critchley and D. Marshallsay, 2013). The 2013 WRSE model
was developed by the thesis author and is introduced in Chapter 2.
The EBSD planning framework outlined in the sections below provides the structure
within which the WRSE model operates.
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1.5.1 Estimating supply and demand
The water supply planning process in England and Wales considers a 25 to 30 year
planning period and uses a Water Resource Zone (WRZ) spatial scale. The
Environment Agency (EA et al., 2012a) has defined a WRZ as:
‘The largest possible zone in which all resources, including external transfers,
can be shared and hence the zone in which all customers experience the same
risk of supply failure from a resource shortfall.’
The firm yield (referred to in England as ‘deployable output’) of existing and potential
future sources of supply is defined (EA et al., 2012a) as:
‘The output of a commission source or group of sources or of bulk supply as
constrained by the environment, licence if applicable, pumping plant and/or
well/aquifer properties, raw water mains and/or aquifers, transfer and/or output
main, treatment, water quality’.
Deployable output is therefore an annual volume per source that companies opine they
can rely on even under worse-case conditions. Water companies estimate deployable
outputs by using detailed water resource system simulation models that track flow and
storage at regular intervals of time (e.g. daily or weekly). Such models are used to
represent the complex aspects of water resources systems such as hydrology and system
operating rules, minimum environmental flows and other relevant hydrological,
engineering, and institutional factors. Yields are assessed by looking at long-records data
of rainfall, direct river flow, groundwater levels or any other information available.
Historical records must looks back at least till year 1920 so to include a ‘sufficient variety
of conditions and most of the known severe droughts in the last one hundred years’(EA,
2008, EA et al., 2012a). When estimating the deployable output, water companies assume
a certain level of service (frequency of supply failures) which they are meant to have
agreed on with their clients. Companies’ deployable output is therefore dependent on the
system’s reliability (probability of water deficits). A higher reliability corresponds to
lower values of the deployable output. Once the deployable output is estimated, a number
of adjustments are made to determine the ‘water available for use’ as shown in Table 1.
Among these adjustments, the outage allowance is a temporary loss of deployable output
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(UKWIR, 2002a) due to unplanned or planned events (such as maintenance or an
unexpected pollution incident), while sustainability reductions are reductions in the
deployable output imposed by the Environment Agency to meet statutory and
environmental requirements (see Table 1).
Water companies estimate future demands by methods such as regression based on
historical trends, micro-component analysis or expert judgment (UKWIR, 2002a,
UKWIR, 2002b). Water companies are usually able to provide reasonably accurate
estimates for the non-household demand as the majority of these users are metered. A
range of information is available about past trends of demand for measured households
and this data can be used as guide to generate future trends (McDonald et al., 2003). A
greater level of uncertainty surrounds estimates of unmeasured household demands.
Most companies estimate unmeasured household demand by conducting domestic
consumption studies, whose ‘scale, purpose and design’ changes from company to
company (McDonald et al., 2003). Often ‘micro-component analysis’ is used to analyse
water usage (frequency, volume, uses) for different household types and generate future
trends based on population forecast (UKWIR, 2002a, UKWIR, 2002b). Demand
estimates are done on an annual basis, considering dry year scenarios (periods of low
rainfall without demand restrictions), normal weather patterns (EA et al., 2012a) and any
other scenarios the company considers relevant to the supply-demand planning problem.
Two levels of dry year demands are usually quantified: dry year annual average demand
(DYAA) and the dry year critical period (DYCP) demand (see Figure 12). The DYCP
demand is included in the companies’ capacity expansion planning problem only if it
drives the need to implement new supply or demand management measures (EA et al.,
2012a) and is defined as the average demand over a ‘peak demand period’, typically a
week (see Figure 12). The normal year annual average (NYAA) demand represents the
average demand over a year with normal weather patterns. Another scenario usually
considered is the minimum deployable output (MDO) which applies when supplies are
expected to be at their minimum (see Figure 12). This normally occurs in autumn when
river flows and/or groundwater levels are at their lowest level and sources operate close
to their minimum deployable output.
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Figure 12: Definition of annual demand scenarios (NYAA, DYCP, MDO and DYAA) [adapted from
(Southeast Water, 2009)]. DYDI is the dry year daily demand as quantified by distribution input (DI), i.e.
what companies input to their networks, NYDI is an example of normal year daily demand.
Components of demand and supply that must be estimated per WRZ are listed in Table
1.
Water delivered and billed
(measured and unmeasured household
and non household demand)
+Distribution system operation
+Distribution losses
+water taken unbilled
(legally and illegally)
=Total demand(distribution input)
Deployable output
-Sustenability reductions
- Outage allowance
+bulk imports
-bulb exports
=Water available for use
Table 1: Elements of demand (left) and supply (right) balance as relevant in the water industry of
England and Wales (UKWIR, 2002a).
In the table above, the distribution system operation in the left box is the ‘water
knowingly used by the company to meet its statutory obligations particularly those
relating to water quality’ (EA et al., 2012a) such as main flushing and air scouring. The
distribution losses are the sum of losses in trunk and distribution mains, service
reservoirs and communication pipes (EA et al., 2012a).
1.5.2 Treatment of costs
The 2012 from the Environment Agency (EA et al., 2012a, EA et al., 2012b) requires
companies to estimate costs of assets over their whole useful life, and not only over the
25 to 30 years planning horizon. For example, given a 25 year planning period, if an
asset with an 80 year economic life is activated at the 25th year then the EBSD model
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would have to consider a total period of 105 years to embed such costs in the net present
value calculation.
1.5.3 Dealing with uncertainty
Because current and future supply and demands are uncertain, the EBSD method
considers a safety factor called ‘headroom’, which aggregates all sources of supply and
demand uncertainty into an annual estimate per WRZ (UKWIR, 2002c). Headroom is
the difference between the water available for use and the estimated demand for each WRZ.
Target headroom values are estimated by water companies in the following way. First
the company identifies, for each WRZ, all sources of uncertainty on supply and
demand estimates, following the UKWIR report (2002c). Specifically, the UKWIR
report identifies nine supply-related (S1 to S9) and four demand-related (D1 to D4)
sources of uncertainty (see Table 2). These are referred to as ‘headroom components’.
Current guidelines exclude components S1, S2, S3 and S7 from the final assessment of
headroom (Hall et al., 2011).
Headroom component of uncertainty
Description
Type Headroom
component
S1 Vulnerable surface water licences
S2 Vulnerable groundwater licences
S3 Time-limited licences
S4 Bulk imports
Supply related S5 Gradual pollution of sources causing a
reduction in abstraction
S6 Accuracy of supply side data
S7 Single source dominance
S8 Uncertainty of impact of climate change
on source yields
S9 Uncertain output from new resource
development
D1 Accuracy of sub-component data
Demand related D2 Demand forecast variation
D3 Uncertainty of impact of climate change
on demand
D4 Uncertain outcome from demand
management measures
Table 2: Headroom components listed in ‘an improved methodology for assessing headroom’ (UKWIR,
2002c)
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Probability distribution functions (PDF) of uncertainty are then assigned to each
headroom component (UKWIR, 2002d). PDFs can take the form of a triangular
distribution or any other function that best fits the available information (such as
normal, log-normal exponential, discrete distributions). The combined headroom
uncertainty (HU) in equation 1.1 (UKWIR, 2002d) is then estimated by using Monte
Carlo simulation.
HU= S4+S5+S6+S8+S9+D1+D2+D3+D4 1.1
The Monte Carlo simulation, randomly selects values from the PDFs assigned to each
headroom component. The sampling is executed for each year of the planning horizon
and for each WRZ and is stopped after a determined number of iterations, set by the
user. A typical number of 5000 trials is usually considered (UKWIR, 2002d).
When sampling from PDFs, possible correlations among the data values must be
considered. UKWIR (UKWIR, 2002d) provides guidelines for assessing the correlation
coefficients when there are no data available to calculate it directly. A typical list of
correlated headroom components is also reported in the UKWIR report (2002c). These
include: 1. positive correlation between the S1 components of two sources belonging to
the same catchment and affected by the same licence loss issue; 2. negative correlation
between the S1 and S2 components of two sources in the same catchment: the greater
the licence loss on S1, the less likely is S2 to suffer from a licence loss 3. positive
correlation between the S8 and D3 components as both supply and demand might be
influenced by the same process such as climate change.
Results from the Monte Carlo analysis for each year and WRZ, return the overall
headroom uncertainty in the form of percentiles (see Figure 13). Each point in time on
the x axes represents a unique PDF that describes the uncertainty at that time.
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Figure 13: Headroom uncertainty from Monte Carlo simulation and target headroom profile (from 90%
percentile falling to 60% percentile), adapted from (Southeast Water, 2009).
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Each percentile Y of the headroom uncertainty (say the 90th percentile), ensures that
there is a Y% (that is the 90%) likelihood that the supply-demand balance will not be in
deficit. A target headroom risk profile (see red line in Figure 13) is then chosen by the
water company. In the early years of the planning period, values corresponding to
higher percentiles of the headroom uncertainty are usually chosen than in later years: in
the short term period companies are usually prepared to accept a low level of risk about
their capability to maintain the security of supply because there is a little lead time for
supply and demand management schemes to be completed. Also, short term
uncertainties are more ‘realistic’ than long term ones since in the short term predictions
there is a higher level of supporting evidence (Southeast Water, 2009).
1.5.4 Least-cost solution to the planning problem
Analysis of supply and demand over the planning period may identify supply-demand
imbalances (see Figure 14). If there are imbalances, planners must then identify the
widest possible range of feasible options to re-establish the supply-demand balance.
Next, costs of each proposed option are estimated. Financial, environmental and social
costs must be considered. Financial costs are divided into capital expenses (‘capex’)
and operating expenses (‘opex’). Capital costs can include the purchase or disposal of
fixed assets (e.g. pipeline and storage tanks), land purchases and the replacement of
physical structures. Operating costs can be fixed (e.g. fixed operation and maintenance
costs, ‘fopex’) or variable (e.g. pumping, treatment and labor costs, ‘vopex’) as stated in
(UKWIR, 2002a). For practical reasons companies are asked to cost and size discrete
schemes rather than use continuous cost curves.
At this stage, an algorithm must be selected to choose the least financial, social and
environmental cost solution (schedule of supply and demand management measures to
meet any supply-demand imbalances). AISC is a simple method that does not guarantee
an optimal (least cost or maximum benefit) solution. The average incremental cost
(AIC) of an option is defined as the net present value of all option costs, divided by the
net present value of the options capacity, or forecasted output (UKWIR, 2002a,
UKWIR, 2002b).. If the option costs include also the environmental and social costs,
the result is the Average Incremental Social Cost (AISC). Ranking the individual
options in ascending AISC order provides the indication of the least-cost solution to the
identified planning problem.
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Figure 14: The supply demand balance as considered in the England water planning [adapted from
(UKWIR, 2002c)]. Demand plus target headroom must be greater than water available for use (yield of
‘deployable output’, minus losses, outage and sustainability reductions).
Another technique proposed in the EBSD guidelines is to formulate linear/integer
programming optimisation models. When there is a combination of integer and real
variables a mixed integer linear program (MILP) can be used. In practice MILP is the
most frequently used search method for EBSD applications.
1.5.5 Choice of EBSD modelling framework
Different modelling frameworks within the EBSD approach can be applied. The
‘Current Framework’ is the most used in industry practice. In the ‘Current Framework’,
supply and demand estimates are fixed and all sources of uncertainty are included into
the annual safety factor called target headroom (THR). Target levels of service are also
fixed, and the method is deterministic – only one version of the supply/demand future is
evaluated to select options. Target levels of service, agreed between the companies and
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their customer, set out how frequently a water company expects to impose restrictions
in the use of hose-pipes, sprinklers and other non-essential uses. Target levels of service
are usually stated in terms of the maximum likelihood that a particular restriction will
need to be imposed (e.g. a particular restriction will need to be imposed no more than
1/N years). This approximates to an annual probability of less than 1/N that a particular
restriction in supply will need to be applied.
An expansion of the ‘Current Framework’ is the ‘Intermediate Framework’ that can be
used to test the reliability of a solution set provided by the deterministic EBSD model
using Monte Carlo simulation. The reliability of a water system is the probability that,
under a given plan, supply will fail to meet the demand. In such a situation, customers
might experience a restriction on the supply of water, the severity of which depends on
the size of the shortfall in supply. Monte Carlo simulation uses random sampling from
known or estimated probability distributions functions of uncertainty applied to the
supply and demand values of the solution set provided by the EBSD model. The
sampling is repeated many times and a distribution of outcomes (imbalances between
supply and demand) is obtained. This provides a measure of the level of service that the
options in the solution set should provide. The predicted level of service is then
compared against the company’s target level of service. If they are equal or sufficiently
close, the EBSD model’s solution (investment plan) stands. If the predicted level of
service is too high, then target headroom is decreased and the algorithm is run again. On
the contrary, if level of service is too low, headroom is raised and the EBSD model is
run again.
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Figure 15: The Current and intermediate framework, adopted from UKWIR (2002a).
1.6 EBSD framework discussion
1.6.1 EBSD benefits
The EBSD framework is currently used by water companies in England to identify
‘socially efficient and least-cost’ investment decisions (UKWIR, 2002a, UKWIR,
2002b). It has some clear benefits that are discussed below.
The EBSD framework has been widely adopted by the water industry in England
because of its relative simplicity, parsimony and applicability to large scale systems
with complex interdependencies. Capacity expansion models are typically hard to solve
because building new infrastructure has economies of scale which makes the
optimisation model non-convex with potentially complications for solving it in practice
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(see section 1.4.1). Non-convex problems arise when costs are represented as a concave
function of capacity. Within the EBSD framework this problem is overcome by fixing
the design capacity and costs of proposed schemes, i.e., considering discrete costed
schemes rather than continuous capacities. An optimisation model is then used to select
the least-cost schedule of discrete system upgrades. Considering discrete schemes in
place of the original cost function can lead to sub-optimal results as the truly optimal
level of option implementation is unlikely to be present in the pre-specified set of
discrete options. This would be a limitation except for the fact that water companies and
regulators prefer costing discrete schemes as they are unwilling or unable in many
instances to generate continuous cost curves, which in practice can be challenging to
generate accurately.
Perhaps the main strength of the EBSD approach is its institutional appropriateness; the
EBSD framework allows water companies to defend their investment decisions to
regulators who require them to maintain the supply-demand balance at least economic
cost. Given the challenges encountered in using optimisation models for real-world
water resource planning (Fiering et al., 1986), the fact that EBSD is embedded into
national planning is an unusual success in water resource system optimisation. The
simplicity and parsimony of the framework contribute to its wide application. EBSD
uses available data and its results are readily understood. EBSD models consider large
numbers of feasible options just as they are presented to regulators and estimated by
companies: one price linked to one capacity. Furthermore, in addition to deriving the
least-cost portfolio considering all proposed options, it also provides the least-cost
annual schedule of system upgrades over the planning period, exactly what financial
planners and regulators ask for.
The benefits listed above mean that EBSD is a worthy starting point for water supply
system capacity expansion modelling in England. Next we describe EBSD limitations
and some issues related to its application in order to motivate the thesis research.
1.6.2 EBSD issues and limitations
Work in Chapter 2, a full scale regional application of EBSD, allowed to identify some
EBSD limitations and issues which are summarised below to justify the subsequent
thesis research questions. The EBSD issues and limitations addressed in this thesis are
listed below in the same order as they are presented in the following Chapters. Issues
introduced in sections 1.6.2.1 and 1.6.2.2 are addressed in Chapter 2. Issues in section
1.6.2.3 and 1.6.2.4 are discussed in Chapters 3 and 0 respectively. Finally EBSD issues
53
in 1.6.2.5 are dealt in Chapter 5. Appendixes I and II introduce the work to address
issues presented respectively in sections 1.6.2.6and 1.6.2.7.
1.6.2.1 Dealing with demand management options
A sustainable water resources balance can more easily be achieved through a
combination of new supplies and demand management programmes (Froukh, 2001,
McDonald et al., 2003). Demand management is typically a low-regret adaptation
measure (both financially and environmentally) ‘given large uncertainties about future
non-climate and climate pressures’ (Parker and Wilby, 2013). Even though regulators in
England encourage companies to give high priority in reducing leakage and promoting
efficient use of water among customers (EA et al., 2012a, Ofwat, 2009b), traditionally
water management in England has been ‘supply-side dominated’ (Parker and Wilby,
2013). This also reflected in past EBSD models where demand management measures
have not been included or not with sufficient detail. Below two explanatory examples:
A. The 2010 ‘Water Resources of the South East (WRSE)’ regional EBSD model
does not explicitly include demand management options. Demand management
schemes are only embedded into water company estimated demand, which is input
data to the model. This means that the model does not explicitly estimate the cost of
achieving lower consumptions through demand management schemes (such as
metering, tariffs, water efficiency, and leakage reduction), nor does it evaluate their
least-cost schedule implementation (optimal timing of activation).
B. Water companies usually consider a constant level of annual savings for demand
management schemes. If savings profiles are included to represent the schemes’
deterioration over time, these profiles are accounted starting from the scheme’s
activation, which is fixed (a model input data). For example Southern Water
Company considers that water efficiency schemes have saving profiles which first
increase during their 5-year implementation programme (starting from year 2009 in
Figure 16) and then decrease for the remaining of the planning horizon to take
account of ‘breakdowns, lack of maintenance, removal or replacements’(Southern
Water, 2009). Fixing the first year implementation for demand management schemes
means that the optimisation model does not have the flexibility to determine ‘when’
(which year) it is more cost-effective to implement such options.
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Figure 16: Company target water efficiency activity through the planning period, adopted from (Southern
Water, 2009)
Previous literature work on demand management measures and their inclusion into
water supply modelling is limited. Examples in include: 1. simulation models (Loukas
et al., 2007, Wang et al., 2011) that don’t consider scheduling (timing of activation) nor
user-defined savings profiles for demand management schemes; 2. cost-effectiveness
analysis (Aulong et al., 2009) which rank options based on their economic efficiency;
and 3. optimisation models (Zarghami et al., 2008) where savings are calculated as a
percentage of the total water supplied in the network.
Since water companies determine their own savings profiles based on experience and
local information, a new EBSD model formulation should be developed that: 1. allows
embedding companies’ pre-defined saving profiles into the EBSD model formulation; 2.
allows the optimisation model to evaluate when (which year) to implement a demand
management option over the planning horizon.
1.6.2.2 Dealing with infeasibilities
When applied to real-word studies, least-cost optimisation models are frequently
infeasible. Infeasibilities may arise from errors in the modelling process or because of
conflicting constraints (Fiering et al., 1986). Many studies have been conducted in the
literature for developing new algorithms able to detect (Obuchowska, 2012) and solve
(Bockmayr and Pisaruk, 2006, Fischetti and Lodi, 2008) infeasibilities in mixed integer
linear programming (MILP) problems (used in this thesis, see 1.8). Even if these
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methods are valuable tools for detecting infeasibilities, they have limitations when
dealing with the quality of the identified feasible solution. Bockmayr and Pisaruk
(2006) developed an algorithm that identifies model infeasibilities and returns a feasible
solution whose quality, as the author states, strongly depends on the number of non-zero
binary variables in the solution. Fischetti and Lodi (2008) adopted a two-stage process;
artificial variables are first introduced to relax the model constraints and detect
infeasibilities. Then, a penalty is added to the costs in the objective function. Such
penalty counts the number of the violated constraints. A proper balancing of the two
terms (costs and infeasibility penalty) may not be easily achieved as numerical errors
may occur when mixing very large with very small numbers.
In the case of water supply planning problems, infeasibilities often arise due to: 1.
limitations on existing supplies for environmental protection reasons; 2. constraints on
the availability of new resources (conservation measures can be implemented quickly,
whereas building a new reservoir takes several years). Below we describe two real-
world case examples where infeasibilities have occurred in EBSD models:
A. In 2008 Thames Water company submitted a draft Water Resource
Management Plan (WRMP) with significant deficits occurring in the London area
over the 2007-2035 planning horizon. Even if deficits were starting at year 2007,
the minimum date for implementing new schemes was set to year 2010, with
proposed options able to cover such deficits only starting from year 2014.
B. Modelling from the 2013 WRSE project revealed infeasibilities in 7 out of the
34 demand areas included in the region (R. Critchley and D. Marshallsay, 2013)
In EBSD models, infeasibilities can be tracked with the mass balance equation, that is
when the companies’ available supply is lower than the forecast demand (see points A
and B above). Other constraints such as upper bounds on resource usage, options
availability, exclusivity or prerequisite conditions, may cause some level of
infeasibility; these often represent practical, political or environmental restrictions that
cannot be easily ‘relaxed’. Therefore, rather than identifying the set of constraints
critical to feasibility, as in the literature above, working on the mass balance equation
would be advisable. In place of using an EBSD model that minimises costs under the
‘supply equals demand’ mass-balance condition, a new approach should be developed,
able to: 1. quantify the level of infeasibility 2. return a feasible solution that satisfies ‘as
much demand as possible’ at minimum cost. The method should avoid using a weighted
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objective function to prevent numerical errors from occurring and worsening the quality
of the identified feasible solution.
1.6.2.3 Inter-company transfers
In a 2010 regional EBSD study (EA, 2010b) the WRSE group showed that, by only
considering schemes proposed in water company resources management plans, by 2035
some water resource zones will have deficits while others will remain in surplus. This
means that water resources in the South East are not equally distributed and that
existing infrastructure constrain their transfer (EA, 2010b). In addition to this, the
presence of regulatory penalties for not meeting expected level of service may
incentivise water companies to rely on their own resources rather than imports from
other companies (Severn Trent Water, 2010). Furthermore, according to the 2010-2014
regulation, if a company invests in a new resource, a return can be earned on the
associated capital expenditure, while if the company imports water from an external
area, the associated expenditure is classified as operating cost and no return can be earn
on it. This may have refrained water companies from developing new bulk transfers
(Ofwat, 2010c).
In this context, the WRSE group carried out EBSD modelling to identify new sharing
opportunities within the South East of England (EA, 2005b, EA, 2010b, Padula et al.,
2013, R. Critchley and D. Marshallsay, 2013). However the model’s ability to identify
new inter-company transfers is limited to only considering those proposed by water
companies. This may overlook transfers schemes that could contribute to a lower cost
solution.
1.6.2.4 Issues with Intermediate framework implementation
EBSD models are deterministic: only one least-cost schedule of options is provided, the
one that meet deficits under the worst case scenario. This means that under a broad
range of plausible future supply-demand conditions, an EBSD solution may not be
optimal or feasible. An improvement would be to use the ‘intermediate framework’
where uncertainties are handled using Monte Carlo simulation. The ‘intermediate
framework’ consists of an iterative procedure: company target headroom values are
increased every time the reliability of the EBSD model solution (frequency of system
failure) is lower than a pre-defined target level of service (company chosen maximum
frequency of failure).
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In practice the EBSD ‘intermediate framework’, by re-evaluating companies’ headroom
values, has led to some confusion which has generally discouraged its application. This
is because water company target headroom estimates follow an already established
regulatory guideline (UKWIR, 2002d) and therefore it is not clear by how much the
target headroom values should be increased. An extension of the EBSD ‘intermediate
framework’ could be developed to overcome confusion around its implementation.
1.6.2.5 Representing regulatory drivers
EBSD is applied in a regulatory context: companies in England make profits by
outperforming the regulatory assumptions on the cost of capital or on operating
expenditure. When deciding which option to propose in their plans a potentially
significant factor is whether a company thinks it is more likely to be able to outperform
the assumptions on capital expenditure or on operating costs. In the last years a
preference towards capital cost intensive solutions (e.g. reservoirs) has been noted
(Ofwat, 2011, Severn Trent Water, 2010) in lieu of some-times more cost-effective
schemes (e.g. demand management measures or bulk transfers) that are operating
expenditure based. This phenomenon is often referred to in the industry as ‘capital bias’.
Reasons for the bias may be the relative strength of incentives that the regulator places
on expenditure on capital assets compared to those related to day-to-day operating
expenditure (Ofwat, 2011, Severn Trent Water, 2010). If there were an EBSD extension
able to represent major regulatory drivers of water companies’ investment decisions this
could be used as a tool to test different regulations.
1.6.2.6 Accounting for the residual costs
EBSD models in England typically consider a 25 to 30 year planning horizon within
which investment decisions are made and costs are accounted for. Expenditures beyond
the planning horizon are not included. ‘Residual costs’ (i.e. the proportion of the
scheme’s cost to keep the scheme operational beyond the planning horizon), should be
accounted to avoid biased comparison of schemes with varying economic life: capital
costs intensive schemes with long economic lives may be preferred to short-term
operating cost based schemes. This may happen because not all annualised capital costs
may be accounted for by the model within the planning horizon. Therefore the EBSD
model may consider as least-cost a capital cost-intensive scheme. Also if a scheme has a
long economic life, spreading its capital cost over the entire life may return a lower cost
than an operating cost-based scheme where costs are closely tied in for each year
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(operating costs are in k£/year, while capital costs are in k£). Recent guidelines from the
Environment Agency, (EA et al., 2012a, EA et al., 2012b) request companies to account
for the asset’s whole life costs.
1.6.2.7 Single-objective optimisation
EBSD is a least-cost single-objective framework; it requires all aspects of system
performance to be translated into costs. This can give an incomplete picture of the
benefits and limitations of certain schemes which are difficult to monetise and include
in the model.
There are metrics of system performance which are important for decision makers and
that are not monetary such as engineering or environmental performance (Fagan et al.,
2010). Technical engineering metrics can refer to the likelihood of system failure
(reliability), the system rapidity to recover from a failure (resilience), or the magnitude
of the system failure (vulnerability). These tangible measures can be used to
demonstrate more detailed assessment of different strategies (Asefa et al., 2014,
Hashimoto et al., 1982). The EBSD framework does not use such metrics. System
reliability is considered but as a constraint (through the choice of a level of service at
which to estimate supply yields – ‘DO’).
Even though EBSD model cannot quantify these and other metrics, planners often have
a feel for how different schemes would perform and may have preferences regarding
scheme types (e.g. prefer demand management measures over transfers, etc.). Given the
uncertainty around projected scheme capital and operating costs, it could be said that the
least-cost package identified by an EBSD model is in some ways arbitrary and the ‘best’
solution to a water resource planning problem may not coincide with this ‘optimal’
solution. Given the uncertainty of cost estimates and the inability of the EBSD models
to embed metrics that quantify important non-monetary metrics of system performance,
it would be valuable to identify a diverse (in terms of portfolio composition) set of near-
optimal (close to least-cost) plans and present these to decision-makers. For example
some near-optimal plans may allow decision-makers to delay or avoid the
implementation of controversial assets which present technical risk or political
challenges.
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1.7 Research questions
Despite its limitations, EBSD is the current framework for infrastructure planning in
England. Given it is likely that the EBSD approach will remain the used in the near and
mid-term, this thesis asks what extensions could improve it and address some of its
issues and limitations? The objective of this thesis is to apply, asses and extend the current
English supply-demand water planning framework using real-world case-studies. Various
mathematical programming formulations are proposed built and applied using mixed
integer linear programming techniques.
Specifically, in this thesis we seek to answer the following questions:
1. Is it possible to embed in EBSD pre-defined annual saving profiles for demand
management schemes? Such profiles should be accounted starting from the
schemes’ first year of implementation.
2. Is there an EBSD extension that can be developed to quantify network
infeasibilities and return a feasible solution? The approach should not use a
weighted objective function (costs plus penalty terms for infeasibilities) as this
could affect the quality of the model solution.
3. Is it possible to expand the 2013 WRSE model formulation (proposed in Chapter
2) to identify new inter-company transfers in the South East region beyond the
one already proposed in water company resources management plans?
4. Can the EBSD ‘intermediate framework’ be amended by a new iterative
approach which does not require varying company headroom values to identify a
‘reliable’ set of schemes? Or if headroom values are varied, can a suggestion be
made regarding how much these should be increased at each iteration?
5. Is it possible to develop an EBSD-based model formulation to investigate how
regulation in England influences water companies’ investment decisions? The
model should answer the following questions: does regulation drive companies
towards certain types of investments (e.g. capital-intensive schemes rather than
schemes with higher operating expenditure)? If yes, what are the key regulatory
drivers for such a ‘bias’?
6. Is it possible to expand the EBSD model formulation to account for costs of
selected options over their useful life?
7. Rather than finding a single least-cost solution, is it possible to use the EBSD
model to generate a diverse set of near-optimal solutions that provide both
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company decision makers and regulators with a wider range of alternatives for
solving the capacity expansion problem?
This thesis answers the above questions in the following Chapters: questions 1 and 2 are
addressed in Chapter 2, questions 3 in Chapter 3 and question 4 in Chapter 4. Finally
Chapter 5 answers question 5, while Appendixes I and II address questions 6 and 7
respectively.
1.8 Discussion of the methodology
To address the research questions, we review below why we consider the selected
research methods are appropriate.
This thesis develops and applies capacity expansion optimisation modelling approaches
for large-scale regional water supply systems. The starting point is the English EBSD
water supply planning framework. Merits of EBSD, that justify its application to this
thesis, include: a) its applicability to large-scale networks with complex
interdependences as the WRSE region, b) its institutional appropriateness: EBSD allows
water companies to demonstrate their investment decisions at least economic cost,
which is what regulators require, c) its suitability to capacity expansion problems:
EBSD models not only define ‘what’ combination of options should be built to meet
future deficits, but also provides the options’ year of activation (scheduling) over the
planning horizon. The objective of this thesis is to address some EBSD issues and
limitations.
1. This thesis uses optimisation techniques to support capacity expansion decisions
within EBSD. If a simulation approach were used, a list of portfolios should have been
pre-defined which would have been a challenging task because:
- EBSD models are applied to large-scale systems: the 2013 WRSE network contains
1065 of options, water companies’ networks can be composed up to hundreds of
options.
- Even if, out of the hundreds of options, water companies identified a plausible set of
portfolios, and applied simulation to select one portfolio among these, it is not possible
to demonstrate that the selected portfolio is least-cost or that it does not deviate
unreasonably from the least-cost solution. This is an important consideration if we
consider EBSD is applied in a regulatory context: the privatised water companies in
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England must demonstrate regulators their water resources management plans are
‘socially efficient and least cost’(UKWIR, 2002a, UKWIR, 2002b);
- Finding a plausible portfolio to a capacity expansion problem, not only requires
identifying ‘what’ to build but also ‘when’ over a long term planning horizon. Deciding
‘when’ each combination of options must be implemented, is not an easy task as there is
a trade-off to consider between the economies of scale (it is less expensive building
large facilities earlier in the planning horizon rather than a sequence of smaller ones in
the future) and the cost of installing capacity before it is needed (if expenditures are
pushed into the future their present worth value decreases).
2. Among all optimisation methods, this thesis adopts mathematical programming
techniques, specifically ‘mixed integer linear programming’ (MILP). MILP is a
straightforward choice for solving EBSD models because:
- EBSD models are linear as the complex relationships among the physical and
hydrological variables in the water system are estimated by water companies using
external simulation models. Further nonlinearities due to the non-convex cost functions
are dealt in EBSD by fixing the design capacity and costs of proposed schemes: for
optional schemes few discrete possible capacity and costs values are proposed (each
occurring in a separate node of the EBSD model network – see Chapter 2). Dealing with
discrete schemes rather than continuous cost curves leads to sub-optimal solutions as
the ‘real’ solution to the problem likely lays between two discretised options. However
this limitation is mitigated by the fact that companies and regulators are often unwilling
or unable to generate continuous cost curves reliably;
- Linear optimisation techniques have the advantage to guarantee convergence to a
global optimum solution. Since EBSD models are used by water companies in England
to demonstrate regulators their plans are ‘socially efficient and least-cost’ (UKWIR,
2002a, UKWIR, 2002b), being able to guarantee global optimality or the vicinity to
optimality (see near-optimal solutions in paragraph 1.4.2 and Appendix II) is important.
- Capacity expansion formulations within MILP do not need to be custom-coded but can
be solved using the ‘off-the-shelf’ generalised software and solvers which reduces the
complexity of solving, maintaining and improving such models.
62
1.9 Summary of Thesis structure and research contributions
This section outlines the main contributions of each Chapter.
The introduction lays the foundation for the report. The research problem and the
research issues are introduced to justify the scope of this thesis. The methodology is
described by summarising the modelling techniques available in the literature for
solving capacity expansion problems, with a particular focus on water resources
systems. The research methods were introduced and their appropriateness to the specific
research problem was justified.
In Chapter 2 an EBSD deterministic capacity expansion optimisation model is
formulated and applied to the WRSE regional water supply system. This model was
developed for and used by the actual ‘Water Resources in the South East’ (WRSE)
stakeholder group. User-defined annual water saving profiles are allowed for demand
management schemes. These profiles are accounted starting from the option’s first year
of activation. A two-step optimisation approach is introduced to prevent the
infeasibilities that inevitably appear in real applications. The approach does not use a
weighted objective function (because real schemes’ costs are added up to penalty costs
for flow injected at infeasible water resource zones) where numerical errors may arise
by mixing very large and small numbers. Multiple water demand scenarios are
considered simultaneously to ensure the supply-demand balance is preserved across
different demand conditions and that variable costs are accurately assessed. A wide
range of supplementary constraints are also formulated to consider the
interdependencies between schemes (pre-requisite, mutual exclusivity, etc.).
In Chapter 3 the model formulation of Chapter 2 is expanded to evaluate the benefits
from a fully interconnected regional system. The model is applied to the WRSE area: in
addition to companies’ proposed transfers, inter-company transfers are allowed to
connect neighbouring demand areas in surplus, with those in deficits. The capital
expenditure for the additional inter-company transfers is calculated using a non-convex
cost curve estimated by Ofwat, the economic regulator, in a recent study. The non-
convex cost curve is approximated through a piecewise linear function.
In Chapter 4 the EBSD ‘intermediate framework’ (referred to as ‘THR-strategy’) is
implemented and compared with a new iterative procedure referred to as ‘CUT-
strategy’. The ‘CUT-strategy’ identifies a ‘reliable’ schedule of options to a supply-
demand balance problem without having to modify company target headroom values.
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This overcomes the uncertainty around upgrading companies’ target headroom values
which has often prevented the ‘intermediate framework’ from being applied in practice.
Both the ‘CUT-strategy’ and the ‘THR-strategy’ use Monte Carlo simulation to identify
the level of service (probability of failure) of the solution set identified by the
deterministic EBSD model. If the level of service is lower than the company’s target
level of service, than under the ‘CUT-strategy’ new constraints are added at the next run
of the EBSD model to avoid this solution (schedule of options) from being selected
again in the next run of the EBSD model. This procedure is repeated many times until a
combination of options is found whose level of service is equal or higher than the target
level of service.
Chapter 5 introduces an EBSD modified capacity expansion formulation. The new
formulation is built to analyse the incentives offered to regulated water utility
monopolies by regulatory constraints on their rate of return and maximum prices. The
model is applied to the case of price control in England adopted for the 2010-2014
period. Particular emphasis is placed on understanding how regulation influences water
company investment decisions such as their desire to engage in transfers with
neighbouring companies. The model finds the schedule of new schemes that maintains
the annual supply-demand balance and maximise companies’ profit under the 2010-
2014 price control process. The profit-maximising investment solution is then compared
with the least-cost solution (social optimum); differences in the two sets of results leads
to a discussion.
Appendix I presents an extension to the EBSD model formulation that accommodates
recent Environment Agency guidelines (EA et al., 2012a) which require companies to
consider costs over the whole assets useful lives. In Appendix II multiple supply-
demand schedules are generated for the WRSE network which are ‘sufficiently close’ to
the one identified by the fully deterministic version of the EBSD model (‘current
framework’). It is argued that exploring a diverse set of nearly optimal solutions is more
appropriate than only considering the single least-cost solution or the optimum under a
few scenarios. The generated set of nearly optimal solutions are displayed in parallel
axis plots to show their diversity in terms of frequency of selection, extent of use, and
timing of activation. Results show that near-optimal plans within a few percentages
from the global optimal solution present a high diversity in terms of schemes’ selection
and extent of use. For example a 6% more expensive near-optimal plan is found that
uses reservoirs at a 24% higher extent and transfer options at a 30% lower extent.
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Parallel axis plots can also be used to identify schemes that represent low-regret
decisions (if the scheme appears in most near-optimal solutions) or to investigate
whether it is possible to delay the implementation of some problematic investments
(e.g. a reservoir causing landscape or heritage issues).
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Chapter 2
LEAST ECONOMIC COST REGIONAL WATER
SUPPLY PLANNING
2 Introduction
In this Chapter, the EBSD capacity expansion model is developed. The proposed model
poses the capacity expansion problem in a form easily tractable by a mathematical
program by boiling the problem down to a supply-demand balance per water resource
zone. Such ‘water resource zones’ (WRZ) aggregate interconnected supply areas where
residents face the same likelihood of supply shortfalls. User-defined annual water
saving profiles for demand management (water conservation) schemes are enabled.
Multiple water demand scenarios are considered simultaneously to ensure the supply-
demand balance is preserved across high demand conditions and that operating costs are
accurately assessed. A wide range of supplementary constraints are formulated to
consider the interdependencies between schemes (pre-requisite, mutual exclusivity,
etc.). Finally, a two-step optimisation process is introduced to prevent the infeasibilities
that inevitably appear in real applications.
The Chapter is structured as follows: section 2.1 shows the model formulation, section
2.2 describes the water planning context in England and Wales as well as the model
application to a regional system composed of six water companies. Section 2.3
introduces the branch and bound algorithm adopted to solve the optimisation problems
presented in this Chapter and in later ones. Section 2.4 shows the model’s results.
Discussion of results is presented in section 2.5 followed by the conclusions in section
2.6.
2.1 Model Formulation
2.1.1 Nomenclature
Indices of Sets
i,j nodes (source, junction, demand)
t time periods (years)
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θ 
scen
generic time index
demand scenarios
Sets
I set of nodes
T set of time periods (years) T={t : t is any year ∧ 1 ≤ t ≤ tmax=25}
Θ set of generic time periods
Θ={θ : θ is a generic time index ∧ 1 ≤ θ ≤ θmax =25}
SCEN set identifying the demand scenarios
EXDO set of existing sources
OPTSOU set of optional nodes; these include supply-side schemes and demand
management schemes
DM
SUPPLYN
set of new demand management schemes
set of all existing and optional supply schemes (i.e. includes sets EXDO
and OPTSOU )
DEM set of demand nodes
LEX set of existing links
LFT
LINK
CONN
set of new links/transfers
set of all existing and optional links (i.e. includes sets LEX and LFT)
network connectivity
Parameters
afccsi annualised capital costs for new nodes
afccli,j annualised capital costs for new links
sfixi fixed annual costs for new nodes
lfixi,j fixed annual costs for new nodes
carbsi,t annual capital carbon costs emissions for optional sources
carbli,j,t annual capital carbon costs emissions for optional links
offsi one-off fixed financial operating costs for demand management
schemes
vopexsi,t variable costs incurred at nodes
vopexli,j,t variable costs incurred at links
svari,t unit variable costs incurred at nodes
lvari,j,t unit variable costs incurred at links
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sri,t,scen reductions in deployable output applied to each demand node i, during
year t and scenario scen
dii,t,scen distribution input applied to each demand node i, during year t and
scenario scen
thri,t,scen target headroom applied to each demand node i, during year t and
scenario scen
smini/smaxi minimum/maximum supply from source i during year t
lmini,j/lmaxi,j minimum/maximum supply from link i,j during year t
savi,θ,scen maximum saving from a demand management option i during year t
and scenario scen
dm_avali first year of availability for demand management schemes
first_yr first year of the planning horizon
tscenscen average annual scenario duration in number of weeks.
penalty_cost cost to inject flows flow at infeasible WRZs (infeasibility flow
procedure)
dr discount rate
Binary Variables
ASi,t 1 if source i is active during year t, 0 otherwise.
ALi,j,t 1 if link i,j is active during year t, 0 otherwise.
FSi,t 1 at first year t of activation of selected schemes i, 0 otherwise.
Positive Variables
Si,t,scen supply from source i at year t and scenario scen to meet demand
plus target headroom
Qi,j,t,scen supply from source i at year t and scenario scen to meet demand
plus target headroom
Suti,t,scen supply from source i at year t and scenario scen to meet demand
Quti,j,t,scen supply from source i at year t and scenario scen to meet demand
αi,t,scen demand satisfaction level for node i at year t and scenario scen.
INFEAS_FLOWi,t,scen fictitious flow that can be injected to infeasible WRZs
2.1.2 Basic model formulation
A minimum cost capacity expansion optimisation model formulation for water supply
systems is described which can be solved by off-the-shelf mixed integer linear program
(MILP) solvers. The model identifies the least discounted economic cost annual
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schedule of capacity expansions to maintain the system’s supply-demand balance over a
T-year planning horizon.
The model makes two kinds of decisions: the extent of annual use of supply and
demand management options (for both existing and optional schemes) and annual
investment decisions on optional schemes. The model has a network structure: water
demand nodes (Water Resource Zones, WRZs) are connected to supply and demand
management options within their WRZ, or to other demand nodes (to represent
transfers). To represent supply schemes that can be shared between more than one
WRZ, ‘source-junction’ nodes are used to connect supply options to the demand nodes.
The model is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) optimisation
problem. A single objective is used: minimisation of discounted capital, fixed and
variable costs (Equation2.1). Inclusion of carbon, social and environmental economic
costs means the model can be considered an economic-engineering tool (Lund et al.,
2006) rather than an engineering (financial cost minimising) model. One-off financial
costs are also included. These incur just once over the planning period, when an option
is selected.
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2.1
In the equation above dr is the discount rate, tmax the final year of the planning period,
CON is a set which defines the connections among nodes i, j in the network, SUPPLYN
is the set of all supply nodes (both existing sources EXDO and optional schemes
OPTSOU). A discount factor equal to 1/(1+dr)t assumes all costs are incurred at the
year-end. afccsi, afccli,j are respectively the sum of annualised capital expenditures
(capital financial, capital environmental and social costs) for optional schemes
(OPTSOU) and companies’ proposed optional links (LFT), while sfixi and lfixi,j are
respectively the fixed annual costs (operating, carbon, environmental and social) for
optional nodes and links. vopexsi,t and vopexli,j,t are variable costs (operating, carbon,
environmental and social) incurred at nodes and links respectively. Finally carbsi,t and
carbli,j,t are user-defined annual profiles of capital carbon costs for optional sources and
links respectively, while offi are one-off costs applied to demand management options.
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One-off costs include fixed financial, social, environmental and carbon emission related
costs.
Environmental costs reflect the environmental impact that an option might have,
whereas social costs are measured as a loss of consumer surplus (UKWIR, 2002a,
UKWIR, 2002b). Carbon costs are related to the option emissions of carbon dioxide. To
estimate carbon costs of the options projected emissions, water companies use the latest
government guidance on the cost of carbon (Climate Change Economics and Dpt. of
Energy and Climate Change, 2009). Si,t and Qi,j,t are non-negative decision variables
defining the extent of annual use of supply for sources and links respectively. ASi,t and
ALi,j,t are binary decision variables that activate new supply options i and new links (i, j)
when they change from 0 to 1 during any particular year. FSi,t are binary variables equal
to one at the first year of activation of an optional node (OPTSOU) or optional link
(LFT) respectively and equal to zero otherwise. FSi,t is defined by equations below:
 , , , 1 ,i t i t i tFS AS AS i OPTSOU t T     2.2
In equation 2.2 above T is the set of time periods (years). All decision variables are in
volume/time except for binary variables which represent yes/no activation decisions. In
this Chapter decision variables (binary and continuous) and set declarations are in
upper caseletters; parameters (input data) are in lower case.
Variable costs vopexsi,t and vopexli,j,t are calculated multiplying unit variable costs (svari,t
for sources and lvari,j,t for links) by the continuous usage decision variables Si,t and
Capital costs can be included as a custom time-series of cash outflows or using simple
cash flow methods (see the following section 2.1.3). All costs are in real and not
nominal terms to avoid having toforecast inflation (P. Belli et al., 2002).
The objective function equation is subject to a ‘mass balance’ constraint at all nodes of
the network (Equation 2.3) and to capacity constraints at nodes and links (Equations 2.4
to 2.7):
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 , , , , , , , , , , , ,i j t i j t i j t i j t i j tlmin AL Q lmax AL i j LFT t T       2.6
 , , , , , , , ,i j t i j t i j tlmin Q lmax i j LEX t T     2.7
In the equations above DEM is the set of demand nodes (WRZs), LEX is the set of all
existing links. Σj Qi,j,t is the sum of the flows entering node i during year t, Σj Qi,j,t is
the sum of the flows leaving node i during year t. smini,t, smaxi,t are respectively the
minimum and maximum capacities for schemes (EXDO and OPTSOU), while lmini,j,t and
lmaxi,j,t are respectively the minimum and maximum capacities for links. Binary variables
ASi,t, ALi,j,t are applied only to optional sources and links.
In equation 2.3 sri,t is the outage while dii,t and thri,t are respectively the distribution
input (DI) and target headroom (THR). Terms dii,t and thri,t are applied at WRZ level.
Outage is defined as a temporary short-term loss in deployable output (EA et al., 2012a,
EA et al., 2012b) while the DI is the amount of treated water entering the distribution
system. THR is a margin of spare resource between forecast demand and water available
for use, used to take account of uncertainty around supply and demand estimates
(UKWIR, 2002c). Process losses and reduction in the firm yield might be added in the
equation above to increase the WRZ distribution input when either one are greater than
zero. Process losses are defined as the summation of both raw and treatment work losses
and operational use (EA et al., 2012a, EA et al., 2012b). Reduction of deployable output
may include factors such as sustainability reduction (i.e. reduction in deployable output
required by the EA to meet statutory and/or environmental requirements) and impact of
climate change (EA et al., 2012a). Sustainability reductions can be either a fixed value or
a proportion of annual use.
2.1.3 Calculation of annualised costs
Annualised financial costs (afccsi for nodes i, afccli,j for links i,j) are calculated in the
following way. Financial costs include: capital investments, environmental and social
costs for optional sources (both supply-side and demand management schemes) and new
links. Undiscounted financial costs for optional sources and links (capsi for nodes i,
capli,j for links i,j) are spread over the construction period of the assets (cpsi for
supply-side nodes and demand management measures and cpli,j for links). This provides
annual cash flows whose future value is then evaluated at the end of the construction
period:
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In the equations above ic is the interest rate and tt is an annual time index for the
construction period. Future capital costs are then annualised using:
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where nsi is the asset lifetime of for supply schemes i, while nli,j is the asset life of link
i,j. The equations above imply the model only considers annualised costs during the
planning horizon and does not consider capital costs to be incurred beyond the planning
horizon.
2.1.4 Multiple demand scenario formulation
Supplies must meet demand in relatively infrequent periods of high demand when costs
are typically higher. This implies the above model will over-estimate costs under normal
conditions. To prevent this multiple simultaneous water demand scenarios are introduced
in a single model run. For example four demand scenarios (identified by set SCEN) are
considered in our application: dry year annual average, dry year critical period, minimum
deployable output and normal year annual average. Supplies must meet the most
stringent scenario but variable costs are considered and weighted according to how
frequently each demand scenario is expected. Solving n demand scenarios requires n sets
of continuous decision variables (in place of one set for Si,t and Qi,j,t) to describe how
much each scheme (supply, demand management or transfer) is used annually under
each scenario.
2.1.4.1 Mass balance and capacity constraints under multiple water demand
scenarios
Two sets of mass balance equations are introduced: the first (Equation 2.13) to make
sure that the selected infrastructure is able to meet the most stringent scenario (demand
is equal to DI plus THR), the second (Equation 2.14) to evaluate variable costs based on
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schemes actual utilisation rather than as if peak demands were maintained all year long
(THR is set equal to zero). Each mass balance equation has a different set of annual use
variables (Si,t,scen, Qi,j,t,scen in Equation 2.13 and Suti,t,scen, Quti,j,t,scen in Equation 2.14).
Setting THR to zero means that the required annual use variables (Quti,j,t,scen, Suti,t,scen)
will be lower thus incurring less variable costs. This ensures estimated variable costs
will reflect how much schemes are likely to be used over the 25 year period. This
second set of use variables (Quti,j,t,scen, Suti,t,scen) is the one that appears in the weighted
variable costs terms included in the objective function equation.
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Equations above are applied to each node of the network (supply nodes, junctions,
demand nodes and supply junctions) and also apply to multiple demand scenarios scen
and each year t of the planning horizon. SCEN is the set of all demand scenarios.
Annual use variables for links (Qi,j,t,scen, Quti,j,t,scen) and nodes (Si,t,scen, Suti,t,scen) also
appear in capacity constraints equations 2.4 to 2.7 (in place of variables Qi,j,t and Si,t)
where the minimum and maximum capacities (smini,t,scen, smaxi,t,scen, lmini,j,t,scen,
lmaxi,j,t,scen) are now defined over set SCEN. Terms sri,t,scen, dii,t,scen and thri,t,scen are
respectively the outage allowance, distribution input and the target level of service
during year t, scenario scen and for demand node i.
2.1.4.2 Objective function
The objective function is identical to Equation 2.1 with the difference that now variable
costs are weighted over four scenarios (set SCEN). One set of capital costs and fixed
operating costs and four sets of variable costs are used. Variable costs are evaluated using
Quti,j,t,scen and Suti,t,scen variables. If scen are the elements of set SCEN and tscenscen is the
weight for each demand scenario (e.g. in number of weeks per year), then the weighted
average is expressed by Equation 2.14 (for nodes) and Equation 2.15 (for links):
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where LINKS is the set of existing (LEX) and optional (LFT) transfers, while svari, lvari,j
and vopexsi,t, vopexli,j,t are respectively the variable costs in pence/m3 and the weighted
average variable costs incurred at nodes and links. Scenario durations (tscenscen) are
weights estimated based on expected occurrence with no dimension. Unit variable costs
on existing links (LEX) can be used to encourage the model to use WRZs own existing
deployable output (local sources) before importing from other WRZs.
2.1.5 Additional constraints
Other constraints have been added to describe interdependences between options in the
water supply network representing practical, technological, social and/or
environmental policies and restrictions. These include: ‘mutually exclusive’ constraints
which apply when only one supply or link from a set of alternatives should be
implemented, ‘prerequisite AND’ constraints that assure a link/source form group A is
implemented only if all links/sources from group B have been activated, ‘prerequisite
OR’ constraints that assure a link/source form group A is implemented only if at least
one option (link or source) from a set B of prerequisite schemes has been activated,
‘prerequisite with LAG TIME’ constraints that allow a scheme to be activated only a
certain number of years after the activation of another prerequisite scheme (node or
link), ‘dependency’ constraints that force a node or link to be activated at the same
time as another group of optional schemes are implemented. ‘Capacity connectivity
constraints’ force the total supply (Ml/d) from a group of schemes in set A to be lower
than the total supply from selected schemes in set B, plus an allowance which may
vary depending on the scenario (set SCEN).
‘Ratchet’ constraints can be used to impose a monotonically increasing usage of
schemes to avoid constructing schemes that are used only for few years or regularly
used below their maximum capacity. Ratchet constraints are a good example of a
policy or ‘political’ constraint. ‘Consistent use constraints’ (also referred to as
‘capacity constraints’) are used to discourage the discontinuous use of future supply
sources by forcing the binary variables of optional schemes and links to be one after
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their first year of activation). Finally, start date constraints limit the first use of any link
or supply scheme and represent the time it takes to construct and receive benefits from
the options. The detailed formulation for these constraints is reported below.
2.1.5.1 Ratchet Constraints
Ratchet constraints can be used to impose a monotonically (consistently) increasing usage
oflinks and supply schemes during the planning horizon. They are usually implemented
to discourage the use of an option during only a part of the planning period. This
constraint israrely used except when requested for strategic reasons.
, 1, , , , , 1i t scen i t scenS S scen SCEN i SRC t tmax       2.16
 , , 1, , , , , , , 1i j t scen i j t scenQ Q scen SCEN i j LRC t tmax       2.17
In the equations above SRC and IRC are subsets used to identify those nodes and links
that are subject to ratchet constraints.
2.1.5.2 Start Date Constraints
Some of the optional nodes and links can be available only after a certain year η ∈ T:
, 0 ,i tAS i OPTSOU t     2.18
 , , 0 , ,i j tAL i j LFT t     2.19
2.1.5.3 Continuity Constraints
Continuity or 'irreversibility' constraints maintain the activation of binary variables (ASi,t
ALi,j,t) at a value of one once a scheme is selected as most schemes cannot be `un-built'
lateron to save costs.
 , 1 , , 1i t i tAS AS i OPTSOU t tmax      2.20
   , , 1 , , , , 1i j t i j tAL AL i j LFT t tmax      2.21
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2.1.5.4 Mutually Exclusive Constraints
‘Mutually exclusive’ constraints apply when only one supply node or link can be
implemented from a set of optional nodes z selected from set I and (i,j) links selected
from set CON.
If MUT_SET is as a set composed by the mutually exclusive equations (MUT_SET =
{eq : eq is an equation}), this constraint can be written as:
With z I and (z,eq)M_EXCL, while links (i,j)CON and (i,j,eq)N_EXCL.
M_EXCL is a subset of the Cartesian product between a subset of nodes z
belonging to set I and set MUT_SET, while N_EXCL is a subset of the Cartesian
product between a subset of links (i,j) belonging to set CON and set MUT_SET. i,
j, z are node indices and are used to refer to different nodes that belong to the
same set I.
2.1.5.5 Prerequisite Constraints (AND Condition)
Prerequisite constraints (AND condition) assure that an optional source z*I (or link
(i,j)CON) is allowed to be implemented only if a full set of prerequisite nodes a selected
from set I and links (b,c) selected from set CON has already been activated.
If PRERSET_AND is the set composed by the prerequisite equations
(PRERSET_AND ={eq : eq is an equation}), then this constraints can be written as:
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with a I and (a,eq) P_AND, while (b,c) CON and (b,c,eq) N_AND. P_AND is
a subset of the Cartesian product between a subset of nodes a belonging to set I and set
, , ,
,
1z t i j t
z i j
AS AL   , _t T eq MUT SET   2.22
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PRERSET_AND, while N_AND is a subset of the Cartesian product between a specific subset
of links (i,j) belonging to set CON and set PRERSET_AND. Node z* and link (i,j)* change
with the equation eq. Num_Nrighteq and Num_Lrighteq are the total number of elements
(nodes and links respectively) contained in sets P_AND and N_AND.
2.1.5.6 Prerequisite Constraints (OR Condition)
This constraint is used if the activation of at least one node a selected from set I, or link
(b,c) selected from set CON is sufficient for the activation of node z* in year t (equation
C10) or link (i,j)* in year t (equation 2.26).
If PRERSET_OR is the set composed by the prerequisite (OR condition) equations
(PRERSET_OR = {eq : eq is an equation}), then the constraints can be written as:
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AS AS AL   , _t T eq PRERSET OR   2.25
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with a I and (a,eq) P_OR, while (b,c) CON and (b,c,eq) N_OR. P_OR is a
subset of the Cartesian product between a subset of nodes a belonging to set I and set
PRERSET_OR, while N_OR is a subset of the Cartesian product between a subset of
links (i,j) belonging to set CON and set PRERSET_OR. Node z* and links (i,j)* change
with the equation eq.
To help understand these equations, consider a first constraint (eq1) with node ‘opt1’ that
cannot be activated if one or more among the following options has already been
activated: node ‘opt2’, node ‘opt3’ and link ‘WRZ1.WRZ3’. Equation 2.25 becomes:
' 1', ' 2', ' 3', ' 1',' 3', 1,opt t opt t opt t WRZ WRZ tAS AS AS AL t eq   
With P_OR = {(opt2,eq1), (opt3,eq1)} and N_OR = {(WRZ1,WRZ2,eq1)}.
2.1.5.7 Prerequisite Constraints with LAG TIME
With this constraint a supply scheme z* is allowed to be activated at least δ years after
the activation of another node a* selected from set I. If PRESET_LAG is the set
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composed by the prerequisite with LAG time equations (PRESET_LAG = {eq : eq is an
equation}), then this constraint can be written as:
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where node z* and node a* change with the equation eq.
2.1.5.8 Mutually Dependent Constraints
These constraints force a specific node z* or link (i,j)* to be activated at the same time
as a group of optional nodes a selected from set I and optional links (b,c)
selected from set CON. If DEPENDENT is a set composed of the mutually dependent
equations (DEPENDENT ={eq : eq is an equation}), then the dependency constraint can
be written as:
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If applied to links the mutually dependent constraint becomes:
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with a I and (a,eq) P_DEP while (b,c) CON and (b,c,eq)N DEP. P_DEP is a
subset of the Cartesian product between a subset of nodes a belonging to set I and set
DEPENDENT, while N_DEP is a subset of the Cartesian product between a subset of
links (i,j) belonging to set CON and set DEPENDENT. Node z* and link (i,j)* change
withthe equations equation
2.1.5.9 Capacity Connectivity Constraints
These constraints force supply (in Ml/d) from a set of selected nodes z and links i, j to be
less than total supply provided by other selected nodes a and links (i, j), plus an
allowance (flow_par) which may vary depending on the scenario (set SCEN). If
CAPACITY is a set composed by the capacity connectivity equations, then these constraints
can be written as:
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with z I and (z, eq) M_CAP, (i,j) CON and (i,j,eq) Q_CAP, a I and
(a,eq)P_CAP, while (b,c) CON and (b,c,eq) N_CAP. M_CAP is a subset of the
Cartesian product between a subset of nodes z belonging to set I and set CAPACITY,
Q_CAP is a subset of the Cartesian product between specific links (i,j) belonging to set
CON and set CAPACITY, P_CAP is a subset of the Cartesian productbetween a subset
of nodes a belonging to set I and set CAPACITY, and N_CAP is a subset ofthe Cartesian
product between a specific subset of links (b,c) belonging to set CON and set
CAPACITY.
2.1.6 Demand management option constraints
Demand management options have user-defined annual water saving profiles which
begin from their first year of activation. When the first year of activation is a decision
to be optimised, a new continuous variable (Wt,dm) has to be introduced:
, , , 1 ,i t i t i tW AS AS t T i DM     2.32
, 1 ,t i
t
W t T i DM    2.33
Equation 2.32 ensures variable Wi,t is greater than (or equal to) one in the first year of
activation and greater than (or equal to) zero the years thereafter. Equation 2.33
(together with Equation 2.32) forces Wi,t to be equal to 1 (if the demand management
option is selected) at the first year of activation. If the first year of activation (year t*)
must be fixed, equation 2.32 above can be replaced fixing Wi,t* =1.
If  is a generic set containing as many elements as the number of years included in
the planning horizon, then the capacity constraints are given by equation 2.34.
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Equation 2.34 ensures the annual ‘supply’ is accounted from the first year of activation
of the demand management scheme. Unlike supply schemes that can be used in any
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given year less than maximum capacity (Equations 2.4 to 2.7), from demand
management options scheme contributions are fixed to the scheme’s forecasted ability
to reduce demand (savi,θ,scen, see Equation 2.34). This means that, for selected demand
management options, the extent of annual use variable Si,t,scen has to assume the same
value to the one as variable Suti,t,scen. This is ensured through the following constraint:
, , , , , ,i t scen i t scenS Sut i DM t T scen SCEN     2.35
2.1.7 Dealing with model infeasibilities
Mathematical infeasibilities can arise when the sum of all available supply and demand
management schemes cannot meet the demand of one or more WRZs in one or more
years. Two strategies are available to deal with network infeasibilities: 1) infeasibility
flows, where strongly penalised flows can be injected at WRZ demand nodes during
any year to allow feasibility, and 2) demand reductions, where demands are reduced
just enough to ensure all WRZ supply-demand balances are feasible in each year.
Although method 1 is frequently adopted in network optimisation, defining high unit
(‘penalty’) costs for the infeasibility flows can make the model less sensitive to the real
scheme costs and lead to sub-optimal results. Method 2 was therefore adopted in this
project.
2.1.7.1 Infeasibility flow procedure
If this method is implemented the mass balance constraint previously defined by
Equation 2.12 is modified into Equation 2.36. The same modifications must be applied
to mass balance Equation 2.13.
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In the equation above INFEAS_FLOWi,t,scen is a continuous positive variable representing
flows (fictitious supply in volume per year) that can be injected at the WRZ level (set
DEM) during each year t and scenario scen. These flows have high (`penalty') costs to
ensure they are used only in case the network is infeasible (the existing and proposed
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supply-side and demand-side options are insufficient to meet future demands). The
objective function Equation 2.1 now becomes:
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A limitation of this method is the definition of the unit cost penalty_cost. If this is too
low, infeasible flows may be chosen over available optional schemes (OPTSOU), if it is
too high the objective function value (Equation 2.37) may become so large that the
model becomes less sensitive to the real scheme costs and therefore produces
suboptimal results. This issue led to develop and use the procedure described below.
2.1.7.2 Demand reduction procedure
The demand reduction procedure deals with infeasibilities in the WRSE network
through a 2-step process: 1. reduce demands in WRZs in years with an infeasible
balance just enough to make those balances feasible, 2. run the feasible model with
reduced demands.
Step 1: Solve the following problem:
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Subject to all constraint equations listed in the previous sections with the additional
condition that 0≤αi,t,scen≤1. Mass balance equations 2.12and 2.13 are now written as:
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Step 2: Fix αi,t,scen values obtained from step 1 and solve the model using Equation 2.1
as objective function, equations 2.39 and 2.40for mass balances and all other
constraints described in previous paragraphs. In the equations above, αi,t,scen is a
continuous positive variable defined for all demand scenarios.
2.2 Application: Planning South East England’s Water Supply
2.2.1 Case study water resource system
The proposed capacity expansion optimisation model is applied to a regional system
composed of 34 water resource zones (WRZs), managed by the 6 water companies in
South East England that serve a 17.6 million population (R. Critchley and D.
Marshallsay, 2013). Input data for the model (demands by water resource zone, all
costs, capacities of existing and optional schemes, outage, process losses, sustainability
reductions and climate change allowances) are provided by the water companies for
each water resource zone.
Process losses, reductions of deployable output, target headroom and water demand are
aggregated at a water resource zone level. Four demand scenarios are here included:
dry year annual average (DYAA), normal year annual average (NYAA), dry year
critical period (DYCP) and minimum deployable output (MDO) period (see Chapter 1,
section 1.5.1).
Links between water resource zones are either existing or optional. Optional links
represent new transfers between water resource zones or the prolonging of existing
agreements. When optional transfers start from areas not in the modelled network they
are represented as new supply nodes (TR nodes).
Besides water demand nodes (representing WRZs) and junctions, network nodes are
either existing or optional supply sources. Optional nodes are divided into supply-side
schemes and demand management demand management schemes. These schemes
include water efficiency, leakage and metering.
Supply-side schemes represented as nodes include reservoirs (RES), groundwater
utilisation schemes (GW), surface water abstraction (SW), effluent reuse schemes
(ER), desalination (DESAL), water treatment works (WTW), aquifer storage and
recharge schemes (ASR), and other options (‘other’) such as conjunctive use schemes,
network constraints removal or network improvements.
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Some major supply schemes have several discrete capacities and cost values included
as separate mutually exclusive nodes. For example, reservoir options in the Upper
Thames area are proposed in different sizes which can be built in one phase or in two
separate phases (e.g. 50 Mm3 in phase 1+ 50 Mm3 in phase 2). In some cases the phase
2 option can only be implemented a pre-defined number of years after the phase 1
option is selected (pre-requisite constraint with lag time).
Demand management options have water company defined annual water saving
profiles which start from their first year of activation. Leakage reduction options
include pressure management with new pressure release valves, district metering area
data analysis for targeted repairs or network improvements, and reconfiguration as well
as other strategies such as new detection technologies. Pro-actively fixing leaks before
they are reported is referred to as active leakage control. These options have
diminishing returns as their level of implementation increases. To gauge the extent to
which ALC should be implemented, companies consider ‘tranches’ (bundles) of
implementation. Each tranche is represented in the model with different prerequisite
options (e.g. ‘tranch2’ can only be implemented after ‘tranch1’). Successive tranches
have diminishing returns: water available for use is the same but capital and operating
costs increase.
Metering options include ‘change of occupier’ instalments, metering on left over
domestic or commercial properties (e.g. difficult to fit), targeted compulsory metering,
community integrated metering (new meters and upgrade of existing ones), metering of
all household within stressed areas and programmes to achieve pre-defined level of
meter installations by a specific year. Metering options also include seasonal tariff and
rising block tariff. Tariff is exclusive to ‘change of occupier’ schemes and metering
schemes for household within stressed areas.
Water efficiency measures include a range of different measures: household and
commercial water audit, supply or retrofit of efficient devices (water butts, low flow
taps, low use washing machine), rainwater harvesting and grey water reuse schemes.
The proposed model is applied to two different networks: Case 1 and Case 2. In Case 1
only supply-side options are included whereas Case 2 includes both new supplies and
demand management schemes (water conservation). Both models use the same least
economic cost objective function, demand reduction feasibility assurance scheme (see
paragraph 2.1.7.2), mass balance constraints (equations 2.12 and 2.13) and scheme
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interdependence constraints (see sections 2.1.5.4 to 2.1.5.9). The 272 interdependence
constraints used in the model (in both cases) include mutual exclusivity (103
constraints), pre-requisites (‘and’ 91 of which 1 with ‘lag time’, ‘or’ 4- see Appendix C
for definitions of the constraint subtypes), mutual dependency (68 constraints) and 6
‘capacity connectivity’ constraints.
2.3 Optimisation modelling system
All implementations in this thesis are done within the GAMS modelling system (Brooke
A et al., 2010), using the CPLEX (ILOG, 2007) solver for mixed integer linear
programming (MILP) problems. A modelling system consists of a language compiler
used to encode the model formulation stated by the user (objective function and
constraints) and to transfer it to commercial integrated grade solvers. Solvers are
software that implement optimisation algorithms to solve the user-defined system of
equations. The CPLEX solver uses a ‘branch and bound’ algorithm (B&B) to solve
MILP problems. Below the B&B algorithm is introduced together with the notion of
GAP (stopping criteria for the B&B algorithm), a concept that appears later on in this
Chapter.
To explain how the B&B algorithm works, the example in Table 17 is used (Thomas F.
Edgar et al., 2001). In Table 17, y1, y2 and y3 are binary variables. The first step of the
B&B algorithm (node 1 in Table 17) consists of ‘relaxing’ the binary variables so that
they can assume any fractional value between zero and one. If in the solution y1, y2 and
y3 have integer values, the B&B algorithm has solved the MILP problem, and f in Table
17 is the optimal value of the objective function. If instead one or more variables have
fractional values (see y2 in Table 17), the B&B selects one of the fractional variables
and creates a fork with two new ‘relaxed’ sub-problems (node 2 and 3 in Table 17). The
selected variable is then set equal to zero in one node (in node 2, Table 17) and equal to
one in the other one (node 3, Table 17). The process of creating two relaxed sub-
problems is called ‘branching’. Branching rules has been widely studied (Wolsey L. A.
and Nemhauser G. L., 1988). If the model finds a feasible integer solution in one of the
two nodes, the B&B algorithm does not ‘branch’ further from it and the node is said to
be ‘fathomed’ (see node 2, Table 17). The algorithm stops its search when a ‘measure of
optimality’ is guaranteed. The optimality criterion compares the best integer solution
found during the search (BI, referred to as ‘incumbent’) against the best ‘relaxed’
solution within the B&B search tree not yet fully explored (BF). This difference is
called the GAP. The B&B algorithm terminates its search if the GAP = (BI-BF) is equal
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to or lower than some fraction tol of the incumbent’s objective value. Specifically, when
the following relation holds: GAP/(1-|BF|)≤tol, the BI is considered to be the global
optimum within the desired tolerance. The ratio GAP/(1-|BF|) is referred to in this thesis
as ‘relative GAP’ or RGAP. The factor ‘1’ ensures the ratio GAP/(1-|BF|) makes sense
when BI is equal to zero. A maximum tolerance of 0.1 is usually considered (Yeomans
and Huang, 2003).
In the example of Table 17, integer solutions are only identified in node 2 and node 4.
Since Table 17 refers to a maximisation problem, the ‘incumbent’ solution is the one in
node 2 (the value of the objective function f in node 4 is equal to 44, and is lower than
in node 2). The BF solution is reached in node 1 (f in node is higher than in nodes 3 and
5). The relative gap is therefore equal to [(129-126)/(1+126)]=0.024.
CPLEX uses the branch and bound algorithm and applies ‘cutting planes’, i.e.,
constraints that reduce the feasible region of the linear programming relaxation without
eliminating any feasible solutions for the MILP problem. The combination of B&B and
cutting planes form the ‘branch and cut’ algorithm (Padberg and Rinaldi, 1991).
Combining cutting planes with B&B provides a more efficient approach to solve large-
scale MILP problems (Lieberman, 2004).
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Figure 17: The branch and bound algorithm from (Thomas F. Edgar et al., 2001).
2.4 Model results
The model is solved over a 25 year planning period (2015-2039) with a 4.5 % discount
rate (Ofwat, 2009b) for Case 1 (only supply-side options) and Case 2 (supply and
demand management options) and four demand scenarios (dry year annual average
DYAA, dry year critical period DYCP, minimum deployable output MDO and normal
year annual average NYAA). The mixed integer linear programming model is
implemented in GAMS (Brooke A et al., 2010) and solved using the CPLEX solver.
Table 3 gives model dimensions for Case 1 and Case 2. The models were run using two
computers in a Windows XP environment, i.e. a DELL 2.6 GHz machine with 16 GB
RAM, and a DELL Precision T7500 2.4 GHz with 24 GB RAM.
y2=1
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Model statistics
Case 1 Case 2
Tot number of variables 487,551 623,376
Binary variables 26,366 59,150
Table 3: Model statistics for Case 1 (with no demand management schemes) and Case 2 (with demand
management schemes).
Both models provide in output the year of activation of optional supply-side options,
demand management measures and transfers schemes, together with their optimal
annual use levels under each demand scenario. There are no demand management
schemes in Case 1. Case 1 model converges to a 2.76% relative GAP on a 16 GB RAM
machine, over a thirty hours run (see Figure 20), while Case 2 model reached a 5.94%
relative gap in 46 hours (see Figure 20) on a DELL Precision T7500 machine.
Figure 18 shows the evolution of the upper and lower bound solutions identified by
CPLEX for both Case 1 and Case 2. Total costs (associated to both existing and
optional assets) are equal to £M 1048 for Case1 and £M 980 for Case 2, meaning that
the implementation of the demand management schemes allows a total saving of £M
68.
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Figure 18: Evolution over time of the upper and lower bound solutions for Case 1 and Case 2 runs.
Costs derive from both existing and optional schemes.
Table 4 shows the cost of activated optional schemes grouped by type. Costs are split
into capital expenditure, fixed operating costs, one-off costs for water efficiency
measures, and variable operating costs. Variable operating costs are weighted over the
four demand scenarios. The total capital expenditure on optional assets decreases from
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£M 672 in Case 1 solution to £M 611 in Case 2 (Table 4); fixed operating costs
decrease from £M 65 to £M 53, while variable operating costs from £M 151 to £M 98.
Costs [£M]
Case 1 Case 2
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
One-
off
Capital
costs
Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
One-
off
Supply
options
562 36 139 / 363 20 94 /
MET - - - / 19 3 -5 /
LEAK - - - / 141 10 -1 /
WEFF - - - / 0 0 -1 83
LFT 165 42 4 / 87 20 12 /
Total 672 65 151 / 611 53 98 83
Table 4: Total discounted costs over 25-year time horizon for Case 1 and Case 2 for transfers, supply-des
options and demand management measures.
Effluent reuse schemes provide the 34% and the 27% of total capital expenditure in
Case 1 and Case 2, respectively. These schemes also generate the 69% and 74% of
weighted variable costs in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively (Table 5).
Effluent re-use schemes consist of using treated wastewater as a source of potable
water. There are two types of effluent reuse schemes: direct and indirect. The first one
consists of using recycled and treated wastewater and is only adopted in the UK for
non-potable applications (industry and irrigation (EA, 2011). The second one consists
of discharging treated water in a watercourse or reservoir. The discharged water is then
abstracted and treated again to reach potable standards. This allows for increased
dilution, higher residence time and for the settlement of potential contaminants (EA,
2011). Effluent reuse schemes can be implemented to reduce the need for further
resource development; however, there may be issues related to their implementation,
such as the environmental impact of wastewater discharge and public health perception
(recycled water is perceived to be less clean than water from other sources). Carbon
and greenhouse gas emission are also relatively higher than those related to other
supply-side schemes (EA, 2011); this is due to the reverse osmosis process, an energy
intensive process often used to treat wastewater for re-use.
Company proposed transfers (set LFT) provide the 16% and 14% of total capital costs
under Case 1 and Case 2 respectively (Table 4). In Case 1, the activation of a reservoir
scheme generates £M 48 discounted capital costs. This is equivalent to the 72% of total
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capital costs on reservoir options (see Table 5). This scheme is no longer activated in
Case 2 leading to a significant cost reduction (from £M 68 to £M 11, Table 5).
Costs [£M]
Case 1 Case 2
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating +
One-off
Weighted
variable
operating
ASR 27 4 5 7 1 1
DESAL 7 0.4 0.1 8 1 0
ER 227 12 103 167 8 73
GW 135 11 13 94 7 8
Other 2 0.5 0.4 2 0.5 0.4
RES 68 -3 3 11 -1 1
SW 9 -4 2 13 -7 1
WTW 50 3 8 47 3 7
MET / / / 19 3 -5
LEAK / / / 142 10 -1
WEFF / / / - 82 -1
TR 39 12 4 15 8 2
LFT 109 29 13 87 20 12
TOTAL 672 65 151 611 136 98
Table 5: Discounted costs for activated links demand management measures and supply-side options
aggregated by option type for both Case 1 and Case 2 networks. Columns may not add up due to
rounding.
The Case 2 solution is dominated by smaller options including demand management
measures, such as leakage control, metering schemes and water efficiency measures.
Amongst all of the demand management schemes, leakage reduction schemes have the
highest extent of use (see Table 6). These schemes contribute to the 23% of total
capital expenditure on optional schemes (see Table 5).
The activation of demand management schemes in Case 2, reduces costs on
groundwater and effluent reuse options; specifically the capital expenditure on effluent
reuse schemes is £M 227 in Case 1 and £M 167 in Case 2, while the one related to
groundwater schemes is £M 135 in Case 1 and £M 94 in Case 2. Weighted variable
costs decrease by 35% (i.e. from £M 151 in Case1 to £M98 in Case 2, Table 5). This is
mainly due to the lower use/activation of effluent reuse schemes (variable operating
costs on effluent reuse schemes decrease from £M 103 in Case 1 to £M 73, Table 5)
and to the negative carbon costs associated to the demand management options.
Negative carbon costs represent savings in greenhouse gas emissions due to the
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capability of demand management options to reduce water demands and the subsequent
need for additional supply-side schemes.
Table 6 gives a summary of the total optimal capacity provided by selected schemes
for Case 1 and 2. Leakage reduction and supply-side options contribute most
significantly to the supply-demand balance. Specifically, leakage reduction schemes
provide 2346 Ml/d under all demand scenarios. This corresponds to the 19% of total
supply from optional schemes for the dry year critical period scenario, and the 34% for
the normal year annual average scenario. Amongst all supply schemes, effluent reuse
schemes provide the highest volume of supply; and specifically, a maximum of 39%
of total supply in Case 1 and 60% in Case 2 (see the year annual average scenario in
Table 6).
Optimal extent of use [Ml/d]
Case 1 Case 2
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
MET / / / / 190 190 190 190
LEAK / / / / 2346 2346 2346 2346
WEFF / / / / 204 204 204 204
Total demand
management / / / / 2758 2758 2758 2758
ASR 210 691 150 147 49 273 44 42
DESAL 20 108 38 / 24 118 63 7
ER 4657 4787 4721 4365 3465 3689 3576 3156
GW 1412 2264 1401 1006 1067 1681 1028 663
Other 192 217 196 184 194 218 190 180
RES 383 522 396 207 253 316 272 69
SW 1114 1466 1110 65 1110 1604 1109 54
WTW 1586 1907 1594 747 1555 1935 1518 594
TR 1207 1426 1244 531 1008 1202 1016 528
Total supply-
side schemes
10782 13388 10851 7252 8724 11035 8816 5294
Supply-side+
demand
management
10782 13388 10851 7252 11483 13794 11575 8052
EXDO 128409 146900 122721 124284 127759 146603 122006 123484
Total
optional+
existing
schemes
139191 160288 133572 131536 139241 160397 133580 131536
Table 6: Total least-cost quantity in Ml/d for activated supply-side schemes and demand management
measures for Case 1 and Case 2.
The total level of supply provided by both existing and optional schemes is higher under
Case 2 than Case 1 (see last row in Table 6). This is because deficits in Case 2 are
lower than in Case 1 (see Table 7); Case 1 network has fewer options to meet projected
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demands and available schemes are often limited by ‘starting date’ constraints. Table 7
shows the magnitude (in Ml/d) of deficits in water resource zones where they occur for
Case 1 and Case 2 and under the four demand scenarios. There are no deficits under the
normal year annual average scenario where demand levels are lower.
Deficit [Ml/d]
Case 1 Case 2
DYAA DYCP MDO DYAA DYCP MDO
WRZ17 - - 0.9 - - 0.2
WRZ13 4.5 3 58 2.5 1.3 52.4
WRZ02 - 2.4 - - 1.3 -
WRZ01C 10.3 27.4 - 5.2 23 -
WRZ34 - 5 - / / /
WRZ22 43 97.5 - / / /
WRZ18 - - 0.8 / / /
WRZ03 - - 1 / / /
TOTAL 58 135 61 7 26 52
Table 7: Supply-demand deficits [Ml/d] where they appear for some of the water resource zones in the
network. Deficits under the normal year annual average scenario are zero.
Table 8 and Table 9 show, respectively, costs and optimal capacities for selected
effluent reuse schemes. The 64% of supply (Table 9) and the 65% of capital
expenditure (Table 8) on effluent reuse schemes is generated by option ‘ER_1080’.
This is activated in the London water resource zone (‘WRZ22’), the one with the
highest deficit in the whole network. ‘ER_1080’ is an indirect potable reuse scheme
with a maximum annual capacity of 150 Ml/d. It consists of a new wastewater reuse
plant that uses a reverse osmosis membrane treatment, and of a twenty-three kilometre
long pipeline to discharge treated water into a river for subsequent re-abstraction. The
implementation of this option may create issues concerning its environmental impact.
For example, the pipeline route may affect cultural heritage resources. Significant issues
in relation to gas emissions and air quality may also incur. Options ER _1074’, ‘ER
_1068’, ‘ER _1070’ and ‘ER_786’ are also indirect effluent-reuse schemes.
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Costs [£M]
Case 1 Case 2
Option
Name
WRZ
name
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
ER _786 WRZ06 15 1.2 1 20 1.6 1.6
ER _1080 WRZ22 147 4.3 74 127 4 63
ER _1074 WRZ22 11 1.8 5 1.3 0.2 0.6
ER _1068 WRZ22 36 3.7 15 19 2 8
ER _1070 WRZ22 18 1.2 8 / / /
TOTAL 227 12 103 167 8 73
Table 8: Discounted costs of selected effluent reuse schemes under ‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ and ‘Case
2_maxEXDO’ runs. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Capacity [Ml/d]
Case 1 Case 2
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
ER_786 292 422 356 / 310 534 423 1.2
ER_1080 3000 3000 3000 3000 2700 2700 2698 2700
ER_1074 245 245 245 245 35 35 35 35
ER_1068 400 400 400 400 420 420 420 420
ER_1070 720 720 720 720 / / / /
TOTAL 4657 4787 4721 4365 3465 3689 3576 3156
Table 9: Total extent of use of effluent reuse schemes selected in Case 1 and Case 2 runs. Numbers may
not add up due to rounding.
54 water company proposed links (LFT) are activated in Case 1 and 62 in Case 2, out of
215 available ones. Table 10 shows the total supply that circulates through the selected
links for each demand scenario.
LFT optimal extent of use [Ml/d]
Case 1 Case 2
DYAA 3762 3154
DYCP 5168 4363
MDO 4148 3437
NYAA 2893 2726
Table 10: Total optimal extent of use of LFT schemes over the four demand scenarios and for Case 1 and Case
2 runs.
Figure 19 shows the activated optional links for both Case 1 (top panel ‘a’) and Case 2
(bottom panel ‘b’).
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Figure 19: Links activated in Case 1 and Case 2. Numbers in red indicate the number of selected links
in a specific direction. When numbers are omitted, only one link is selected.
2.4.1 Sensitivity runs on effluent reuse schemes
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine how the model solution would change if
some of most cost-expensive effluent reuse schemes in the network (see Table 11) were
disabled for both Case 1 (‘Case1_noER’ model) and Case 2 (‘Case2_noER’ model).
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Costs
Max annual
capacity
[Ml/d]
Option
name
Capital
[£M]
Fixed
operating
[£M/year]
Weighted
variable
operating
[£M/m3]
ER_1077 123 0.4 0.03 150
ER_851 117 0.7 0.02 150
ER_1080 116 0.3 0.01 150
ER_1071 115 0.8 0.02 150
ER_1077 123 0.4 0.03 150
ER_1076 87 0.3 0.03 100
ER_849 83 0.5 0.02 100
ER_1079 81 0.3 0.01 100
ER_1070 81 0.8 0.02 100
ER_848 79 0.8 0.01 60
ER_1068 75 0.2 0.09 60
ER_1900 71 0.6 0.01 50
ER_1078 71 0.1 0.08 50
ER_1075 68 0.2 0.02 50
ER_1069 69 0.2 0.01 50
Table 11: Undiscounted costs and capacity of available effluent reuse schemes in the London water
resource zone ‘WRZ22’.
Figure 20 shows the evolution, over time, of the upper and lower bound solutions for
both ‘Case 1_noER’ and ‘Case 2_noER’. By excluding the effluent reuse options in
Table 11, the cost of the solution increases by £M 389 for ‘Case 1_noER’ (from £M
1048 in Case 1 to £M 1437) and by £M 82 for ‘Case 2_noER’ (from £M 980 in Case 2
to £M 1062). ‘Case2_noER’ model reaches a 4.4% relative gap in less than 20 hours,
‘Case1_noER’ reaches a 2.9% relative gap in about 16 hours.
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Figure 20: Evolution over time of the upper and lower bound solutions for Case 1_noER and Case
2_noER runs. Costs derives from both existing and optional schemes.
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Costs of activated schemes (grouped by type) are shown in Table 12 for model
‘Case1_noER’ and ‘Case2_noER’.
Costs [£M]
‘Case 1_noER’ ‘Case 2_noER’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
Capital Fixed
Operating+
One-off
Weighted
variable
ASR 46 5 10 39 3 9
DESAL 376 19 26 13 1 1
ER 22 2 3 15 1 1
GW 134 11 15 94 6 10
Other 2 0 0 2 0 0
RES 71 -4 4 32 -1 2
SW 61 26 13 62 21 16
WTW 47 3 8 47 3 7
TR 90 14 8 55 13 4
Total
Supply-side
schemes
849 76 87 359 47 50
MET / / / / / /
LEAK / / / 200 9 -1
WEFF / / / - 78 -0.5
Total
demand
management / / / 200 87 -1.5
LFT 118 28 12 85 23 11
TOTAL 967 105 99 643 157 60
Table 12: Costs of activated schemes grouped by type, for both ‘Case 1_noER’ and ‘Case2_noER’ runs
The capital expenditure increases from £M 611 in Case 2 (Table 5) to £M 643 in ‘Case
2_noER’ (Table 12). Fixed operating costs also increase from £M 136 in Case 2 to £M
157 in ‘Case 2_noER’.
Under the dry year annual average scenario, supply from effluent reuse schemes
decreases by 4216 Ml/d in ‘Case 1_noER’, and 3284 Ml/d in ‘Case 2_noER’ (Table 6
and Table 13). Contrarily, supply increases by 324 Ml/d for aquifer storage and
recharge schemes, 212 Ml/d for reservoirs, 1570 Ml/d for surface water options and 483
Ml/d for imports from external areas (compare Table 6 with Table 13).
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Capacity [Ml/d]
‘Case 1_noER’ ‘Case 2_noER’
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
MET / / / / / / / /
LEAK / / / / 2894 2894 2894 2894
WEFF / / / / 167 167 167 167
Total demand
management
/ / / /
3061 3061 3061 3061
ASR 421 850 379 357 356 597 355 353
DESAL 1939 2028 1797 694 69 140 104 14
ER 387 571 468 22 269 405 345 /
GW 1443 2252 1450 1121 1170 1647 1163 743
Other 201 226 193 186 194 218 190 178
RES 364 447 386 287 445 528 463 180
SW 2124 3108 1615 70 2146 3174 1549 33
WTW 1569 1900 1565 715 1528 1948 1491 681
TR 1553 1635 1527 72 1428 1685 1476 502
Total supply-side
schemes
10001 13016 9379 4174 7606 10342 7135 2685
Supply-side +
demand
management
10001 13016 9379 4174 10667 13403 10196 5871
EXDO 129190 147271 124193 127362 128575 146993 123385 125665
Total optional+
Existing schemes 139191 160288 133572 131536 139241 160397 133580 131536
Table 13: Total capacity provided by the activated schemes and grouped by type, for both ‘Case 1_noER’
and ‘Case2_noER’ runs. Existing nodes are referred to as EXDO.
Total supply from optional schemes decreases compared to the Case 1 and Case 2,
while the one from the existing nodes increases by the same amount (compare Table 6
and Table 13). Existing schemes provide over of the 90% of the total supply (Table 6
and Table 13). These are aggregated into one node per water resource zone and have
unit variable costs associated (the optimal level of variable costs on existing schemes is
equal to £M 217 in ‘Case 1_noER’ and £M 285 in ‘Case 2_noER’).
2.4.2 Removing the variable costs for the existing nodes
In order to understand how costs on the existing schemes influence their optimal extent
and the activation of the optional schemes, two further runs were executed. Specifically,
unit variable costs on the existing schemes were set equal to zero for both Case 1
(model ‘Case1_maxEXDO’) and Case 2 (‘Case2_maxEXDO’).
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Costs [£M]
‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ ‘Case 2_maxEXDO’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
Capital Fixed
operating+
One-off
Weighted
variable
operating
ASR 31 4 2 16 2.2 0.4
DESAL 7 0 1 6 0.3 0.3
ER 219 12 27 153 5.5 15
GW 137 11 6 95 6.5 3.9
Other 2 0.5 0.2 2 0.4 0.3
RES 69 -2 3 13 -0.1 1.3
SW 11 -5 2 33 7.8 4.9
WTW 49 3 2 50 3.4 2.4
TR 42 14 3 14 8.5 1.3
Total
optional supply-
side schemes 568 38 44 383 34 30
MET / / / 16 3 -4.3
LEAK / / / 87 11 -1.5
WEFF / / / 81.2 -1.0
Total demand
management / / / 103 96 -7
LFT 98 27 16 87 22 17
TOTAL 666 65 60 573 152 39
Table 14: Discounted costs of activated schemes grouped by type, for both ‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ and
‘Case2_maxEXDO’ runs.
Results show that the level supply from the existing nodes increases compared to Case
1 and Case 2 respectively (compare Table 6 and Table 15). For example, under the dry
year critical period scenario, this increases by 659 Ml/d in ‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ and by
737 Ml/d for ‘Case 2_maxEXDO’.
This reduces the extent of use of optional schemes and, consequently, the weighted
variable operating costs (compare Table 5 with Table 14). Variable costs mainly
decrease for the effluent reuse schemes, i.e. by £M 76 when no demand management
schemes are considered (‘Case 1_maxEXDO’) and by £M 71 otherwise (‘Case
2_maxEXDO’).
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Capacity [Ml/d]
‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ ‘Case 2_maxEXDO’
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
MET / / / / 162 162 162 162
LEAK / / / / 1796 1796 1796 1796
WEFF / / / / 190 190 190 190
Total
demand
management
/ / / / 2148 2148 2148 2148
ASR 212 852 49 27 76 513 44 6
DESAL 28 104 47 7 22 83 43 3
ER 3917 4107 3228 1039 2580 2823 2092 544
GW 1048 2179 988 402 773 1735 753 271
Other 72 134 42 52 72 136 38 32
RES 413 552 442 200 303 372 320 93
SW 1110 1505 1110 69 1502 2184 1269 41
WTW 1401 1861 1466 140 1326 1991 1395 131
TR 1036 1436 1103 251 825 1073 783 162
Total supply-
side schemes 9236 12729 8475 2188 7479 10910 6736 1283
Supply-side+
demand
management 9236 12729 8475 2188 9626 13057 8883 3430
EXDO 129955 147559 125097 129348 129615 147340 124697 128106
Total
optional+
existing
schemes
139191 160288 133572 131536 139241 160397 133580 131536
Table 15: Total capacity provided by activated schemes grouped by type, for both ‘Case 1_maxEXDO’
and ‘Case2_maxEXDO’ runs. Existing nodes are referred to as EXDO.
Even if the supply from effluent reuse schemes decreases, these schemes still provide
the highest volume of supply amongst all optional supply-side schemes (see Table 15).
Supply mostly decreases under the normal year annual average scenario (i.e. by 2217
Ml/d in ‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ and by 2612 Ml/d in ‘Case 2_maxEXDO’), compared to
the other demand scenarios (see table below). This is because the level of demand under
the normal year annual scenario is lower compared to other scenarios. Therefore, if the
supply from the existing nodes increases, the deficit and the consequent extent of use of
the optional schemes decreases by a higher extent in the normal year annual average
scenario than in other scenarios (see Table 16).
98
‘Case1_maxEXDO’ ‘Case2_maxEXDO’
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
ER reduction 740 680 1493 3326 740 680 1493 3326
% reduction 16% 14% 32% 76% 26% 23% 41% 83%
Table 16: Difference in the extent of use of effluent reuse schemes between Case 1 and ‘Case
1_maxEDO’, Case 2 and ‘Case 2_maxEDO’. The vales are obtained by comparing data in Table 6 and
Table 15.
Under the normal year annual average scenario, the supply from scheme ‘ER_1080’
decreases from 3000 Ml/d in Case 1 to 999 Ml/d in ‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ and from 2700
Ml/d in Case 2 to 542 Ml/d in ‘Case 2_maxEXDO’ (Table 9 and Table 17).
Costs [£M]
‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ ‘Case 2_maxEXDO’
Option
Name
WRZ
name
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
ER_786 WRZ06 15 1 1.5 15 1.2 1.3
ER_1080 WRZ22 147 4 22.6 137 4 13
ER_1074 WRZ22 11 2 0.4 / / /
ER_1068 WRZ22 36 4 1.8 / / /
ER_1069 WRZ22 6 0.5 0.1 / / /
ER_857 WRZ22 4 0.4 0.1 / / /
ER_1067 WRZ22 / / / 1 0.2 0.04
TOTAL 219 12 27 153 5 15
Table 17: Discounted costs of selected effluent reuse schemes under ‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ and ‘Case
2_maxEXDO’ runs.
Capacity [Ml/d]
‘Case 1_maxEXDO’ ‘Case 2_maxEXDO’
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
ER_786 285 434 348 6 270 417 350 1
ER_1080 2610 2641 2294 999 2285 2383 1718 542
ER_1074 242 235 76 / / / / /
ER_1068 663 683 446 34 / / / /
ER_1069 74 69 50 / / / / /
ER_857 45 45 15 / 25 24 25 -
TOTAL 3917 4107 3228 1039 2580 2823 2092 544
Table 18: Total extent of use of selected effluent reuse schemes under the four demand scenarios.
2.4.3 Sensitivity runs on LFT links
Case 1 and Case 2 models were run without including water company proposed
optional transfers (models ‘Case1_noLFT’ and ‘Case2_noLFT’). Figure 23 shows the
evolution over time of the upper and lower bound solutions. The upper bound solution
improves rapidly from a 77% relative gap (point A in Figure 23) to a 1.93% one in only
15 minutes. A total running time of 3.3 hours was required, lower than the 45 hours
required to run Case 2 with 5.94% relative gap.
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Figure 21: Evolution over time of the upper and lower bound solutions for Case 2_noLFT run. Costs
derives from both existing and optional schemes.
Costs [£M]
‘Case 2_noLFT’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted variable
operating
ASR 2 0.2 0.2
DESAL 46 6 1
ER 291 9 80
GW 112 8 8.8
Other 44 3 1.9
RES 168 4 3.7
SW 46 10 3.0
WTW 49 3 3.8
TR 34 12 1.4
Total supply-
side schemes 793 55 104
MET 28 5 -8
LEAK 217 17 -2
WEFF 83 -1
Total demand
management 245 105 -11
LFT / / /
TOTAL 1038 160 93
Table 19: Costs of activated schemes grouped by type, for both ‘Case 1_noER’ and ‘Case2_noER’ runs.
Total costs increase from £M 981 in Case 2 (see Figure 20) to £M 1445. This
corresponds to a difference of £M 464. Specifically, capital costs increase by £M 427,
fixed operating costs by £M 59, and weighted variable costs by £M 4 (Table 5 and
Table 19). The increase in capital costs is mostly related to the activation of additional
reservoir schemes and to the higher extent of use of effluent reuse schemes.
1.93% RGAP
lower bound= 1417 £M
Point A
RGAP=77%
(upper bound= £M 6236, lower bound= £M 1417)
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The volume of supply provided by both demand management and supply-side schemes
increases by the 8% in average over the four demand scenarios (compare Table 6 with
Table 20).
‘Case 2_noLFT’
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
MET 280 280 280 280
LEAK 2906 2906 2906 2906
WEFF 191 191 190 190
Total demand management 3376 3376 3376 3376
ASR 16 91 19 16
DESAL 55 149 165 5
ER 3468 3800 3639 3227
GW 1047 1980 998 650
Other 271 162 219 138
RES 444 720 412 345
SW 1278 1485 1249 110
WTW 1573 1620 1514 321
TR 653 1505 1387 509
Total supply-side schemes 8806 11510 9602 5322
Supply-side + demand management 12182 14886 12977 8697
EXDO 127054 145504 120563 122839
Total optional+
existing schemes 139236 160390 133540 131536
Table 20: Costs of activated schemes grouped by type, for both ‘Case 1_noER’ and ‘Case2_noER’ runs.
The level of network infeasibility also increases compared to Case 2 (Table 7 and
Table 21). This shows that some water resource zones cannot meet their deficits
without importing water from other water resource zones.
Deficits [Ml/d] - Case 2_noLFT
DYAA DYCP MDO NYAA
WRZ18 / / 2.7 /
WRZ17 / 2 0.5 /
WRZ13 8 1.3 90 /
WRZ01C / / / /
WRZ15 / 4.8 / /
WRZ02 / 1.7 / /
WRZ01C 5.2 3.4 / /
TOTAL 13 33 93 -
Table 21: deficits in Ml/d under the four demand scenarios and for each water resource zone.
2.4.4 Using starting solutions
Starting solutions can be used to help CPLEX improving convergence. An initial
solution might come from a different problem that has been previously solved and that
is a feasible solution of the model. A starting solution may include both continuous and
discrete variables (such as binary variables or variables appearing in special ordered
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sets). Assigning an initial solution means specifying the value for any combination of
these variables.
Starting solutions were identified from solving sub-problems for both Case 1 and Case 2
models (Figure 22). For example, ‘Case1_noER’ is a sub-problem for Case 1 where
some of the effluent reuse schemes are excluded. ‘Case2_noER’ and ‘Case2_noLFT’
are sub-problems of both Case 2 and Case 1 as well.
Case 1 Case 2
Case 1_noER Case 2_noER
Case2_noLFT
su
b-
pr
ob
le
m
s
Case2_maxEXDO
Figure 22: Improving the relative GAP for Case 1 and Case 2 solutions through starting solutions.
Model runs showed that none of the starting solutions improved the evolution of the
lower and upper bound solutions.
2.5 Discussion of model results
Including demand management options (Case 2) reduces total net present value costs
by the 6% compared to Case 1, which is equivalent to £M 68 (Figure 18). The level of
infeasibility also reduces by a maximum of 81% under the dry year critical period
scenario (see Table 7). The application of the proposed capacity expansion model to
South East England argues in favour of joint supply-side and demand management
efforts in order to meet future water demands.
Both Case 1 and 2 models are solved with the CPLEX solver, which uses the branch a
bound algorithm introduced in section 2.3. Case 1 model was stopped after about 30
hours with a relative GAP of 2.76%, while Case 2 after 45 hours at a 5.9% relative gap.
The inclusion of 511 demand management options in Case 2 corresponds to adding
12,775 additional binary variables (i.e. 511 multiplied by the 25 years of the planning
horizon). This increases the model computational burden.
In both Case 1 and Case 2, effluent reuse schemes generate the highest volume of
supply (Table 6), as well as the highest capital and weighted variable costs amongst
selected schemes (Table 5). Sensitivity analysis was conducted to analyse how the
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model solution would change under different assumptions on costs and availability of
schemes. First, some of the most expensive effluent reuse schemes were deactivated by
setting their binary variables equal to zero in Case 1 and Case 2. This increased costs
by £M 389 for Case 1 and £M 82 for Case 2 (Table 6 and Table 13) due to an increased
level of supply from other scheme types. Specifically, supply increases by 1570 for
surface water schemes, 548 Ml/d for leakage reduction measures, and 483 Ml/d
imports from external areas. This confirms that surface water schemes, leakage
reduction, and import schemes also represent important solutions for the supply-
demand balance problem.
A further run was then executed where no costs were associated to the existing
schemes. Existing schemes have variable operating costs associated with them, which
prevents the model from activating these schemes at the maximum capacity. Results
show that the total supply from all optional schemes decreases by 16% on average
under the four demand scenarios (see Table 6 and Table 15), while supply from the
existing nodes increases. Effluent reuse schemes still provide the highest level of
supply amongst all optional supply-side schemes, showing that their implementation is
a cost-effective decision.
Finally, all optional transfers were deactivated in Case 2. Results showed that water
company proposed regional transfers help reducing the cost on new schemes by 67%
(i.e. from £M 1445 to £M 981 in Case 2). If al transfers are deactivated, capital costs
increase mostly due to the activation of additional effluent reuse schemes (this
increases capital costs by £M 124) and reservoir options (this increases capital costs by
£M 157).
2.6 Conclusions
A deterministic capacity expansion model was formulated in this Chapter that finds the
least-cost schedule of new supply-side schemes, demand management measures and
transfers over a 25 year-long time horizon. The model includes constraints designed to
represent the predicted effect of conservation measures on the supply-demand balance.
Complex interdependencies between proposed options, which frequently manifest in
real systems, are also represented. The model is conservative and assumes planners aim
to satisfy peak demands with a prescribed reliability. Multiple simultaneous demand
scenarios are considered in order to meet peak demands and accurately estimate
variable costs. An infeasibility management procedure is used which reduces demand
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just enough to allow model feasibility (and warns the analyst), so that the model can
still run if certain water supply zones are not able to satisfy intended reliability
requirements.
The model is applied to a regional system (South East England) composed of six water
utilities serving 17.6 million people. Initially, only new transfers and supply-side
schemes were considered (Case 1). Demand management options were added in Case 2.
The availability of water conservation schemes in the planning problem reduced the
total discounted economic costs by 6% over the 25-year planning horizon. This is due to
the implementation of 248 demand management options in place of some of the most
capital cost-intensive schemes, such as reservoirs.
Both Case 1 and Case 2 suggest the implementation of effluent reuse schemes with a
higher extent than other scheme types. Specifically, effluent reuse schemes provide the
36% and 27% of total supply from optional schemes in Case 1 and Case 2 respectively,
under the worst-case scenario (i.e. the dry year annual average scenario). If some of the
major effluent reuse schemes are excluded from the analysed network, total costs
increase by 27% and 8% in Case 1 and 2 respectively. Furthermore under different
assumptions on costs (i.e. by setting costs on the existing schemes equal to zero) and
availability of schemes (i.e. company proposed transfers were deactivated) the model
recommendation persists, i.e. the optimal extent of use of effluent reuse schemes is
higher than other scheme types.
In both Case 1 and Case 2, a first integer solution is found after about three hours. Then,
the upper bound solution immediately decreases by about 5% and, after more than 11
hours, by 2-3%. The model convergence does not show any significant improvement
afterwards (i.e. the upper bound solution remains constant while the lower bound
solution slowly increases by less than 1%). Case 1 model was stopped after 30 hours
with a 2.8% ‘gap’ while Case 2 was stopped after 45 hours with a 6% relative ‘gap’.
The model’s computational burden decreases when no optional transfer is included in
the analysed network (a 1.93% relative gap solution in reached in less than 3.5 hours).
The model convergence did not improve by manually setting an initial solution. This
implies that setting the initial solution to aid convergence may not be appropriate for
EBSD models.
The proposed model is effective at suggesting economically efficient capacity
expansion schedules for a large system with 272 interdependency conditions, some
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quite complex stringing together several proposed schemes. This is demonstrated by
the fact that the model selects a restricted subset of schemes out of 827 water company
proposed options. Specifically, 97 and 78 supply-side options are selected in Case 1
and Case 2, respectively, out of 316 available supply-side schemes. Furthermore, 248
demand management schemes are implemented in Case 2 out of the 511 available
ones. Selected demand management schemes include: 142 water efficiency measures
(out of 230), 2 metering options (out of 108) and 104 leakage reduction schemes (out
of 173). Finally, 54 and 62 optional transfers are activated in Case 1 and Case 2,
respectively, out of 215 available ones.
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Chapter 3
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL WATER
TRANSFERS AND UTILITY INTERCONNECTIVITY
3 Introduction
The model introduced in Chapter 2 allows identifying the least-cost schedule of water
company proposed schemes (transfers, supply-side and demand management options)
for regional water supply-demand networks. The model’s ability to identify new inter-
company transfers is however limited to only considering those proposed by water
companies. This may overlook transfers schemes that could contribute to a lower cost
solution. In this Chapter, the model formulation in Chapter 2 is therefore extended to
incorporate a generic capital cost estimate for new inter-company transfers not yet
proposed in water company plans.
The Chapter is structured as follows: section 3.1 introduces a review of previous
studies conducted on the benefits of water transfers; section 3.2 presents the trading
water context in England; sections 3.3 and 3.4 introduce the mathematical formulation
and its application to the network respectively. Results are described in section 3.5;
discussion of results and model limitations are introduced in sections 3.6 and 3.7
respectively, while conclusions are presented in section 3.8.
3.1 Review of previous studies on water transfers
The uneven distribution of water resources, excessive exploitation of some water
supplies and increased water demand have often triggered the need to adopt water
transfers as an alternative resource under water scarcity (Young, 1986, Trelease, 1965).
Transfers help reduce the cost of future capacity expansion by decreasing the need for
capital cost-intensive supply-side schemes or costly demand management measures.
Transfers can also help reduce abstraction in locations where taking more water out of
the environment could damage the wildlife and other habitats (Lund and Israel, 1995).
The literature discussing the advantages of water transfers is vast (Vaux and Howitt,
1984, Wang, 2012, Hadjigeorgalis, 2008) and many studies have been conducted that
estimate the benefits of water trading allocations. Vaux and Howitt (1984) considered a
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regional system of five demands and eight supply regions in California for a three year
planning period. The study results highlighted that less than 123 million cubic meters of
new supplies would be required in the area if an increased level of sharing of water
resources was allowed through additional transfers. Zarghami and Akbariyeh (2012)
estimated benefits from additional trading for a city in Iran and showed that both
transfers and demand management measures could reduce water shortages in their case-
study by up to 45%. Chang et al. (2011) showed that using transfers in conjunction with
local water resources for a region in China consistently increases the level of supply
reliability. Characklis et al. (2006) used simulation and optimisation modelling to find
the least-cost portfolio of transfer options in conjunction with supply-side schemes for
urban water planning development. Zaman et al. (2009) incorporated an economic
trading model with a hydrologic water allocation model to estimate impacts and
potential bottlenecks of temporal water trading and physical water transfers in Australia.
Karamouz et al. (2010) used simulation and optimisation modelling techniques to
analyse the feasibility of two potential inter-basin transfer projects in Iran. George et al
(2011) used an integrated hydro-economic model to evaluate water allocation strategies
for river basins or sub-basins.
Unlike most studies that consider the economic returns from water transfers in a market
context, this Chapter is centred on trading between large regional utilities. Currently, the
regulatory system in England is not designed to incentivise water companies to trade
between each other, and so the companies do not typically seek such arrangements.
Changing incentives can be costly and entails some level of risk as the English water
supply sector is funded through private investors.
3.2 Water trading in the South East of England
The water industry in England faces possible shortages in the South East region, the
driest part of the UK (EA, 2005b). Since the early 1990s, water transfers (pipelines and
natural river channels) have been suggested to solve supply-demand deficits instead of
the traditional supply-fix strategy (Swinnerton and Sherriff, 1993, Cryer, 1995).
However historically water companies in England have faced disincentives from
developing trades across their borders (Ofwat, 2010d).
Reasons behind low company trading include: A. under the current 2010-2014 price-cap
regulation if water companies develop their own water resources, they can earn a return
on the associated capital expenditure, whilst importing water from a neighbouring area
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is classified as an operating cost and no return can be earned on it; B. the presence of
regulatory penalties for not meeting expected supply obligations (Water Act 1989) may
encourage water companies to count on their own resources rather than on imports from
other companies (Ofwat, 2010d); C. trading is not a familiar solution in the South East.
A lack of information on supply-costs and future demand levels has often made it
difficult to identify new cross-border trades (Severn Trent Water, 2010, Ofwat, 2010d).
Both the Environment Agency and Ofwat are aware of these disincentives (Ofwat,
2010d) and have taken measures to promote an increased level of interconnections in
the South East of England. Ofwat (2010c) carried out a study to estimate savings from
additional inter-company transfers in England and Wales. Results identified benefits of
about £M 1000 compared to the water company resources management plans. The
water resources of the South East (WRSE) group, a consortium led by the Environment
Agency and composed of Ofwat, Defra and the water companies in the area, carries out
EBSD least-cost optimisation modelling to identify new sharing opportunities (bulk
supply agreements) in the area. The WRSE model treats the whole network as if it were
under the jurisdiction of one water company (regional modelling) and identifies a
solution (schedule of new schemes) that is least-cost for the whole region, rather than
for the individual companies in the area. Regional modelling carried out in 1990 led to
the implementation of four new transfers in the South East region (EA, 2010b). In 2010
the WRSE group identified potential savings of £M 501 by 2035 as a result of more
sharing in the area (EA, 2010b).
Both the 2010 Ofwat study (2010c) and the WRSE model have limitations. The Ofwat
study (2010c) is based on substantial simplifications: A. it does not support capacity
expansion planning, therefore it cannot claim that the identified interconnections are
cost-effective; B. benefits from a new interconnection between two water resource
zones (WRZs) are roughly estimated as the difference between the highest average
incremental social cost (see section 1.5.3) of company proposed supply-side schemes in
the two WRZs, minus the cost of the transfer; C. the study only considers pairs of
transfers between neighbouring demand zones: greater benefits may be gained if water
is allowed to move through ‘chains’ of interconnections passing through intermediate
demand zones.
The WRSE model overcomes all the above limitations but its capability of identifying
new transfers in the South East area is limited because it only considers the
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interconnections proposed by water companies. Currently the WRSE network is not
fully interconnected. Water resource zones are either only connected to a few of their
neighbouring zones (as proposed in water company plans) or not inter-connected at all.
This prevents potential transfers from being considered that could contribute to a lower
cost solution. The work carried out in this Chapter is supposed to overcome this
limitation. In addition to including the water transfers proposed in the water company
resource management plans, the WRSE model used in this study was expanded to
consider interconnections (referred to collectively by set INT) between all neighbouring
demand zones. A new model formulation is introduced that allows optimising the INT
transfers that do not have pre-defined costs. A concave cost curve is used that reflects
the economies of scale of building large infrastructures. The curve is approximated by a
piece-wise linear function.
Capital costs for INT transfers are defined using a non-convex cost curve provided by
Ofwat, the economic regulator of water companies in England and Wales. In order to
keep the model as a mixed integer linear programming formulation, the cost curve is
approximated by a sequence of adjacent linear segments. Fixed operating costs for the
INT transfers are estimated as a percentage m of the capital expenditure, while unit
variable costs are known and given as input into the model. The percentage m and the
unit variable costs were provided by Ofwat.
Compared to the model formulation in Chapter 2, all schemes are now identified
through their interconnection i,j. Therefore, in place of considering two ‘extent of use’
variables (Si,t,scen for nodes and Qi,j,t,scen for links), only one set of variables (Qi,j,t,scen for
nodes and links) is used. The same is done for the binary variables that determine the
activation of schemes (ALi,j,t refers to both nodes and links). The formulation in Chapter
4 and 5 follows this rule as well. This allows reducing the number of decision variables
and model constraints and improves the model’s computational efficiency. The model
formulation is described below. As in Chapter 2, all terms in capital letters represent
decision variables or set definitions while those in lower case are the model input data.
3.3 Model formulation
3.3.1 Nomenclature
In addition to the list in Chapter 2 (section 2.1.1), the following terms are introduced:
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Indices of Sets
k breakpoints of the piecewise linear function
Sets
INT possible inter-company transfers i,j not proposed by water companies
K set of breakpoints of the piecewise linear function
Parameters
γk expansion size at point k of each INT transfer
δk undiscounted capital cost at point k of each INT transfer
disi,j length in kilometres of INT transfers
crf capital recovery factor
Variables
UNCi,j undiscounted capital cost of INT transfer i,j
Zi,j maximum extent of use of INT transfer i,j
CALi,j,t undiscounted annual capital cash outflow per kilometre length of INT transfer
i,j
CALNi,j,t positive variable equal to CALi,j,t if the INT transfer i,j is selected, otherwise
zero
Li,j,k SOS2 variable. It can be greater than zero only for adjacent values of k, i.e.
(k1,k2), (k2,k3), etc.
3.3.2 The objective function
The objective function equation 2.1 in Chapter 2 (referred to as f’) is updated to include
costs for the INT transfers:
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3.1
where vari,j is the unit variable costs, Qi,j,t,scen [Ml/d] is the extent of annual use variable,
disi,j is the length of transfer i,j of set INT. The variable costs are weighted over the
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demand scenarios with tscenscen being each scenario’s time horizon in number of weeks
(see equation 2.15). Capital costs are included as annual time-series of constant cash
outflows. CALi,j,t [k£/km] is a positively defined decision variable representing the
annual undiscounted capital cost per kilometre (see the compound interest formula for
equal payment series in paragraph 1.3). CALi,j,t is determined based on transfer i,j’s
maximum level of utilisation which is optimised by the model. CALi,j,t is equal to zero
until when the transfer is activated at year t*, and equal to a constant value from year t*
till year T, where T is the final year of the planning horizon.
3.3.3 Piece-wise linear formulation
The non-convex cost function is approximated by a sequence of k segments (piecewise
linear function). The slope of each segment decreases at ‘breakpoints’ (γk, ∂k) where γk
and ∂k are the transfer’s expansion size and undiscounted capital costs respectively. The
piece-wise linear function is expressed by the following set of constraints:
 , , , , ,i j k i j k
k
UNC L i j INT k K    3.2
 , , , , ,i j k i j k
k
Z L i j INT k K    3.3
 , , 1 , ,i j k
k
L i j INT k K    3.4
where UNCi,j and Zi,j are positive decision variables and represent the undiscounted
capital costs and the maximum extent of use respectively. UNCi,j and Zi,j are expressed
as a linear combination of ∂k and γk (see equations above).
In order to determine the correct value for variable UNCi,j, a set of variables Li,j,k has to
be used that satisfies the following condition. For each INT link at most two variables in
the set {Li,j,1,…., Li,j,k} can assume positive values, and if there are two positive variables
in the set, they must be adjacent (Keha et al., 2006). For example, if the piece-wise
linear function is composed of three adjacent segments, then there are four breakpoints:
(γ1, ∂1), (γ2, ∂2), (γ3, ∂3), (γ4, ∂4). To satisfy the condition stated above, Li,j,k can only
assume non-zero values for two consecutive elements of set K, i.e., (Li,j,1, Li,j,2) or (Li,j,2,
Li,j,3) or (Li,j,3, Li,j,4).
There are two ways to satisfy this condition. The first one is to introduce a new set of
binary variables and constraints (Keha et al., 2004). The second method consists of
using a branching technique that adopts a set of variables called ‘special order sets of
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type 2’ or SOS2. MILP models that use SOS2 variables have long been used (Beale and
Forrest, 1976) and many studies have been conducted that replace binary variables with
special ordered set variables (de Farias et al., 2001, de Farias Jr et al., 2008, Martin et
al., 2006, Keha et al., 2004, Keha et al., 2006, Verleye and Aghezzaf, 2013). SOS2
variables allow reducing the number of binary variables, and this helps improve the
computational efficiency of the branch and bound algorithm (Keha et al., 2006). The
GAMS modelling system embeds a special feature that allows the use of SOS2
variables. In this study, variables Li,j,k are SOS2 variables:
 , , 2 , ,i j kL SOS i j INT k K   3.5
Equation 3.6 defines Zi,j as each transfer’s maximum level of utilisation over the
planning horizon and demand scenarios (set SCEN).
 , , , , , , ,i j i j t scenZ Q i j INT t T scen SCEN     3.6
Equations 3.3 and 3.6 can be combined into equation 3.7 below:
 , , , , , , , ,k i j k i j t scen
k
L Q i j INT t T scen SCEN      3.7
The annual capital cost CALi,j,t [k£/year] is obtained by multiplying the undiscounted
capital cost UNCi,j [k£] by the capital recovery factor crf=[ic(i+ic)ul/(i+ic)ul-1], where ic
is the interest rate (see section 1.3). This multiplication returns the value of a series of
end-of-year payments of a constant amount, for a number of periods equal to the
transfers’ lifetime ul (see paragraph 1.3). Variable CALi,j,t is accounted for starting from
the transfers’ first year of activation. Binary variables ALi,j,t change from zero to one
when any optional asset i,j is selected. The annual capital costs (UNCi,j crf) are
multiplied by variable ALi,j,t (see equation3.8) to force capital costs to be accounted for
only if the transfer i,j is selected:
 , , , , , , ,i j t i j i j tCAL UNC crf AL i j INT t T      3.8
The multiplication of UNCi,j by ALi,j,t in equation 3.8 introduces nonlinearities in the
model formulation. In order to keep the model linear, a new positive variable is
introduced CALNi,j,t which appears in the objective function equation 3.1, and is
constrained by equation 3.9.
   , , , , ,(1 ) , ,i j i j t i j tUNC crf g AL CALN i j INT t T       3.9
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The meaning of equation 3.9 can be explained as follows. If a transfer i,j of set INT is
not selected (ALi,j,t=0), equation 3.9 becomes: CALNi,j,t(UNCi,j crf-g), with CALNi,j,t
being the transfer’s annual capital cost. Term g is a scalar. This is greater than the
maximum value for UNCi,j crf (g can be estimated from the cost curve). The
difference (UNCi,j crf-g) is therefore negative. Since costs are minimised (see the
objective function equation 3.1) and given that CALNi,j,t is a positive variable, then the
model will fix CALNi,j,t=0. This means that, if the transfer is not selected (ALi,j,t=0), its
capital cost is 0 (CALNi,j,t=0) in the objective function equation 3.1. If ALi,j,t=1 (INT
link selected), equation 3.9 becomes: CALNi,j,tUNCi,j crf where UNCi,j is defined by
equation 3.2 based on the transfers’ maximum extent of use (see equations 3.2 and 3.7).
Equations 3.2 and 3.9 can be merged into the equation below:
 , , , , , ,(1 ) , , ,k i j k i j t i j t
k
L crf g AL CAL i j INT k K t T         
 

3.10
3.3.4 Other model constraints
The objective function equation 3.1 is subject to all constraint equations defined in
Chapter 2 plus equations 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, and equation 3.10 for the INT transfers. The
infeasibility approach in Chapter 2 is also adopted here (see section 2.1.7.2).
3.4 Application: South East of England water supply
This model is applied to the WRSE network. In contrast to Chapter 2, where the water
companies’ private data are used, a new version of the WRSE network was built for this
study (Figure 23) using the water resources management plans (WRMPs) that
companies submitted for the 2010-14 periodic review period (Thames Water, 2010,
Veolia Water Central Limited, 2010, Veolia Water South East, 2009, Sutton&East
Surrey, 2010, Southern Water, 2009, di Pierro et al., 2009, Portsmouth Water Ltd, 2009,
Southeast Water, 2009). Data on the ‘private’ WRSE network are confidential and could
not be used for this study.
The main difficulty of using public data is that the costs for schemes proposed by water
companies are aggregated into their net present values. Since the model uses
undiscounted costs, these were estimated based on reported net present value costs by
assuming a planning horizon of 60 years (UKWIR, 2002b), a 4.5% discount rate and a
4-year construction period. Furthermore, since in the company water resources
management plans the reported net present value operating expenditure includes both
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variable and fixed operating costs, the variable costs were estimated as a percentage of
fixed costs based on previous data received from the Environment Agency. Social and
environmental economic costs of schemes (Eftec, 2012, EA, 2003) were also estimated
from the net present values. The approximated capital and operating cost estimates per
scheme are why this study’s results should not be used to evaluate specific
infrastructure investments. No costs are associated to the existing schemes, since this
information was not available from water company management plans. This means that,
compared to Chapter 2, for any given water resource zone, the model maximises the
extent of use of the existing schemes before activating new options. However, if there
are optional schemes with no variable costs that need to be activated to meet the
forecast demand, then the model is indifferent between reducing supply from the
existing nodes or increasing accordingly the one from the variable cost-free schemes.
This is because both strategies result in the same final cost.
The company water resources management plans contained supply and demand data for
three demand scenarios: dry year annual average (DYAA), dry year critical period
(DYCP) and normal year annual average (NYAA). The NYAA scenario was assumed
to occur with an average frequency of 8 out of 9 years while a total occurrence of 1 out
of 9 years was considered for the dry year scenarios (DYAA, DYCP) based on average
information collected from the WRSE group for work in Chapter 2.
Figure 23: Water supply and demand network of South East England showing 2009 supply and demand
management options, as per the water company 2009 water resources management plans.
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The capital cost curve for the INT links was provided by Ofwat. The curve is an
upgraded version of the one published in a previous report (Ofwat, 2010c). The curve
gives the total undiscounted capital cost per unit length of transfer as a function of the
transfer’s expansion size. Its shape is concave reflecting the economies of scale of
building large infrastructure. The curve was approximated by a piecewise linear
function. The quality of the piecewise linear approximation depends on the number of
linear segments. However, increasing the number of segments also increases the number
of variables and model constraints. Furthermore, as the cost curve is an approximation
in the first place, a precise piecewise linear function may not be necessary. The concave
curve used for this application is an approximation because it is based on assumptions
on ‘fixed costs’ (set up costs required to initiate the transfer), rate of cost increase per
transfer diameter, and velocity of flow inside the transfer. The cost curve was
approximated by three linear segments (see
Figure 28). The segments were selected in order to better approximate the concave cost
curve for lower capacities, based on an initial analysis of deficits at the WRZs (deficits
were calculated comparing demand with the available supply from the existing nodes).
The curve (or its piece-wise linear approximation) returns capital costs per unit length.
The length of the INT links was assumed to be the distance between the centres (‘centre
to centre’ distance) of neighbouring water resource zones (WRZ) measured using GIS
tools as shown in Figure 24.
Figure 24: Estimation of the centre-to-centre distance between contiguous water resource zones, in
Quantum-GIS.
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Since a WRZ is defined as an area where water resources can be shared, ‘there is
already some capability of moving water’ within each WRZ (Ofwat, 2010c) and only
half of the ‘centre to centre’ distance was considered.
The operating costs in the model were calculated based on information received from
Ofwat: fixed operating costs are a fixed percentage of the transfers’ capital expenditure,
while unit variable operating costs (due to pumping) are equal to 0.102 p/m3/km and
assume an electrical consumption of 0.0102 kWh/m3/km and a conservative electricity
price of 10 p/kWh.
Nineteen inter-company transfers (set INT) were identified which connect WRZs in
surplus to neighbouring WRZs in deficit. Surpluses and deficits were calculated by
subtracting the WRZs existing supply (nodes EXDO) from the WRZs forecast demands.
In addition to the INT transfers, the network also includes: existing transfers (LEX),
existing nodes (EXDO) and schemes proposed in water company resource management
plans. Such schemes include: 242 supply-side options, 48 metering schemes, 258
leakage reduction strategies, 186 efficiency measures and 41 company proposed
transfers (referred to collectively as LFT). As in Chapter 2, demand management
schemes have user-defined annual water saving profiles which start from their first year
of activation. Some major supply schemes have several discrete capacities and cost
values, which are included as separate mutually exclusive nodes. This is the case for
Abingdon reservoir, also known as the ‘Upper Thames reservoir’ (UTR). The UTR is
proposed in two different possible sizes (75 Mm3 or 150 Mm3). The UTR at 150 Mm3
can be implemented in one or multiple phases.
The proposed model is applied to two different networks which are named: ‘partial-
LFT’ and ‘full-INT’. The ‘partial-LFT’ network only includes the companies’ proposed
schemes (LFT transfers, supply-side options and demand management measures)
whereas the ‘full-INT’ network considers the extra INT interconnections. Both models
use the same demand reduction feasibility assurance scheme (see section 2.1.7.2), mass
balance constraints, continuity equation and scheme interdependence constraints. The
266 interdependence constraints include mutual exclusivity (55 constraints), pre-
requisites (‘and’ 186, ‘or’ 6, ‘with lag time’ 1), mutual dependency (17). A 25 year
planning horizon (2010-2034) is considered for both the ‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’
network.
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3.5 Results
The problem is stated as a mixed integer linear programming formulation and is solved
in GAMS using the CPLEX (ILOG, 2007) solver. Table 22 gives the model dimensions
for both model runs. A DELL Precision 7500 machine with 24 GB RAM was used for
the model runs.
Model statistics
‘partial-LFT’ ‘full-INT’
Tot number of variables 114,099 114,669
Binary variables 31,373 31,867
SOS2 variables / 76
Table 22: Model statistics for ‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’ runs.
Figure 25 shows the evolution of the upper and lower bound solutions in ‘partial-LFT’
(blue line) and ‘full-INT’ (red line). Including the 19 additional links (set INT) increases
the model computational burden, i.e. in ‘full-INT’ a 5% relative ‘gap’ is reached in 12
hours, while in ‘partial-LFT’ a 3.3% relative ‘gap’ is reached in the first 30 minutes and
a 0.31% relative ‘gap’ in less than four hours.
Figure 25: Evolution of the upper and lower bound solutions for the ‘partial_LFT’ (see upper blue lines)
and ‘full_INT’ model.
Total discounted costs decrease from £M 2231 in ‘partial-LFT’, to £M 1178 in ‘full-
INT’. Table 23 shows the capital expenditure, the fixed and variable operating costs for
both model runs. Variable costs are weighted over the three demand scenarios (dry
critical period DYCP, dry year annual average DYAA and normal year annual average
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NYAA). Supply-side schemes in Table 23 are aggregated by type and include: aquifer
storage and recharge (ASR); desalination plants (DESAL); effluent reuse (ER);
groundwater utilisation (GW); network improvement (NI); reservoirs (RES); surface
water (SW); water treatment works (WTW), and imports from areas external to the
network (TR). Demand management options consist of leakage reduction strategies
(LEAK), water efficiency measures (WEFF) and metering schemes (MET).
In ‘full-INT’, capital costs reduce by 32% (from £M 1279 in ‘partial-LFT’ to £M 865),
fixed operating costs by 75% (from £M 832 in ‘partial-LFT’ to £M 212), while
weighted variable costs increase by 14% (from £M 117 in ‘partial-LFT’ to £M 101).
Costs [£M]
‘partial-LFT’ ‘full-INT’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
NI 34 5 0.04 5 2 0.03
RES 138 2 0.3 187 1 0.5
TR 347 428 91 331 66 93
WTW 7 2 0.0 10 2 0.1
ASR 133 21 15 / / /
ER 40 7 1 14 6 0.1
GW 87 18 0.6 65 19 0.5
DESAL 97 48 8 54 38 6.4
MET 278 14 / 16 -1
SW 51 3 0.6 50 4 0.1
LEAK 18 288 / 12 73 /
WEFF 49 -3 / 11 -0.5 /
Supply options 1279 834 117 753 210 101
LFT 0.2 2 0.02 1 2 0.04
INT / / / 111 0.28 0.34
INT + LFT 0.2 2 0.02 111 3 0.34
TOTAL 1280 835 117 865 212 101
Table 23: Discounted costs for supply-side options and demand management measures aggregated by
option type for ‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’ runs. Columns may not add up due to rounding.
Solving the ‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’ models also returns the extent of annual use of
existing and selected optional schemes (see Table 24). When 19 additional transfers are
included (‘full-INT’), the extra-supply from water resource zones in surplus, or where
the costs for new resource development are lower, reduces the need for additional
infrastructure or high-cost demand management schemes in the network. For example,
the extent of use of ‘network improvement’ schemes (set NI) drops from 368 Ml/d in
the ‘partial-LFT’ to 49 Ml/d in ‘full-INT’ under the dry year critical period scenario
(Table 24). Demand management schemes are also used to a lesser extent in the ‘full-
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INT’ than in ‘partial-LFT’. Alternatively, the extent of use of imports (set TR, these are
operating expenditure based assets) is higher in ‘full-INT’ (under the dry year demand
scenarios) than in ‘partial-LFT’ (Table 24). Aquifer storage and recharge schemes are
not selected in ‘full-INT’. In contrast, in ‘partial-LFT’, under the dry year scenarios,
these schemes release 666 Ml/d and include: five options in the London water resource
zone (see Table 25) and one option in the SWOX zone (Thames Water). The 63% of
supply from aquifer storage and recharge schemes (i.e. 418 Ml/d) is due to the
activation of a scheme in the London area. This scheme (option ‘AS_SLA’, see Table
25) generates a total discounted cost of £M 96 (see Table 25), which corresponds to the
64% of total discounted costs for aquifer storage and recharge schemes (Table 23).
‘partial-LFT’ ‘full-INT’
DYAA DYCP NYAA DYAA DYCP NYAA
NI 148 368 124 20 49 3
RES 17 390 / 26 445 2
TR 2894 2939 213 3545 3601 72
WTW 16 60 3 31 53 13
ASR 666 666 433 / / /
ER 113 204 113 5 118 5
GW 422 835 31 494 729 62
DESAL 1005 1090 / 872 918 /
MET 1913 1913 1913 681 681 681
SW 141 240 76 100 198 3
LEAK 1657 1657 1657 1219 1219 1219
WEFF 218 218 218 129 129 129
TOTAL 9210 10579 4781 7122 8140 2188
Table 24: Least-cost quantity in Ml/d of activated supply-side and demand management schemes for the
‘partial-LFT’ run and the ‘full-INT’ run. Costs are discounted to year 2010. Columns may not add up due
to rounding.
Supply from optional nodes decreases in ‘full-INT’ compared to ‘partial-INT’ (see
Table 24). This is because the INT links allow water to be exported from zones in
surplus or where the cost for new infrastructure development is lower.
Figure 26 shows the existing (LEX) and optional (LFT) transfers selected under both the
‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’ model runs. Numbers in Figure 26 correspond to the INT
transfers’ maximum annual level of utilisation [Ml/d]. Transfers proposed by companies
(LFT) are in red, while the INT links are in magenta. Supply and demand management
schemes are also activated in both runs but these are not shown to avoid Figure 26 from
becoming too cluttered. The top panel of Figure 26 refers to ‘partial-LFT’, while the
bottom panel shows results from ‘full-INT’. By comparing the two plots in Figure 26,
the following differences can be noticed.
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In the SWOX water resource zone, an INT transfer is activated (panel ‘b’ of Figure 26)
that provides a maximum annual capacity of 58 Ml/d. On the contrary, in ‘partial-LFT’
an LFT link is selected with a lower maximum annual capacity of 3.3 Ml/d. This means
that some of the supply schemes activated in ‘partial-LFT’ are no longer selected, but
rather replaced by the 34 Ml/d INT import. Similarly, surpluses from the HKI and HSO
water resource zones (panel ‘b’, of Figure 26) are exported to zone RZ4 in place of
higher cost supply and demand management schemes selected in ‘partial-LFT’.
The INT imports with the largest extent of use are located in the London zone (LDN in
Figure 26), the area with the largest deficit in the region. Total costs in the London zone
reduce by 65% (from £M 1606 in the ‘partial-LFT’ run to £M 564 in the ‘full-INT’ run)
due to two INT imports from Veolia Water Central. Specifically one INT link is
activated from the NORTH zone with a maximum capacity of 118 Ml/d and the other
from the SOUTH zone with a maximum capacity of 54 Ml/d (see Figure 26, bottom
panel). These two INT imports replace supply schemes selected in ‘partial-LFT’. Such
as: aquifer storage and recharge, targeted compulsory metering, imports and
groundwater schemes (see Table 25). Specifically there are two options that contribute
the most to total costs in ‘partial-LFT’. These include import option TR_BTN and a
targeted compulsory metering scheme (option M_TCM). These schemes provide,
respectively, the 35% (2186 Ml/d) and 25% (1596 Ml/d) of total supply in the London
area. Such schemes are no longer selected in ‘full-INT’.
Table 25 shows the capital and operating costs of schemes selected in ‘partial_LFT’ and
‘fully_INT’, for the London water resource zone. The 73% (£M 1622 in ‘Partial_LFT’)
and 43% (£M 506 in ‘full_INT’) of total costs (compare Table 25 with Table 23) are due
to the activation of supply-side and demand management schemes in the London area.
A significant amount of capital costs in the London area is due to the activation of the
import scheme TR_BT and the metering scheme M_TCM.
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Costs [£M]
London ‘LDN’
‘Partial_LFT’ ‘full_INT’
Option
name Type
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
TR_ST TR 30 2 1 30.9 3.4 1.9
TR_BTN TR 244 42 75 244 42 90
TR_BSS TR 24 181 8 / / /
TR_BSN TR 18 178 5 / / /
AS_ARK ASR 12 5 3 / / /
AS_SLA ASR 77 7 12 / / /
AS_ASR ASR 8 3 0.1 / / /
AS_DV2 ASR 10 1 0.01 / / /
AS_DV1 ASR 18 4 0.1 / / /
ER_HB ER 29 2 1.3 / / /
GW_ELR GW 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.1 0.3 0.01
GW_NNR GW 0.9 0.8 0.01 0.8 0.6 0.02
GW_ECR GW 1.0 2.5 0.1 0.8 1.6 0.04
GW_SW GW 3.9 0.8 0.1 3.1 0.6 0.1
DE_ESD DESAL 14 30 8 13.0 25.6 6.3
M_TCM MET 246 13 / / / /
AL1 LEAK 1.1 19 / 1.0 15 /
AL2 LEAK 1.1 26 / 0.6 7 /
AL3 LEAK 1.1 38 / 0.5 9 /
AL4 LEAK 1.1 61 / 0.5 7 /
AL5 LEAK 1.1 61 / / / /
EWE_L WEFF 40 -2 / / / /
TOTAL 779 40 -2 295 112 99
Table 25: discounted costs of schemes selected in ‘partial_LFT’ and ‘fully_INT’ for the London water
resource zone.
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Figure 26: Existing (blue) transfers and selected companies’ proposed LFT (in red) and INT transfers (in
magenta) under the ‘partial-LFT’ (top panel) and ‘full-INT’ (bottom panel) runs. Numbers state the
transfers’ maximum annual extent of use in Ml/d.
(a) ‘Partial-LFT’
(b) ‘Full-INT’
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The activation of INT imports to the London zone increases costs for the NORTH and
SOUTH water resource zones (Veolia Water Central). This is because the surplus of
water exported to the London zone is generated in the NORTH and SOUTH water
resource zones through a greater activation or extent of use of optional supply schemes
and demand management options (Table 26).
NORTH WRZ SOUTH WRZ
‘partial-LFT’ ‘full-INT’ ‘partially-
LFT’
‘full-INT’
£M Number £M Number £M Number £M Number
TR / / / / / / 20 2
WTW / / 0.05 / / / 0.1 1
ER 0.02 1 0.02 1 0.03 1 0.04 1
GW / / / / 1.2 5 13 11
LEAK 0.5 18 3 21 1.2 20 8.4 23
WEFF 0.26 2 0.4 6 0.1 1 2 7
Total 0.8 21 4 28 2.5 27 44 45
Table 26: Discounted costs and number of options selected in the SOUTH and NORTH water resource
zone for both the ‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’ model runs. Options are aggregated by type.
3.5.1 Analysis of ‘partial-LFT’ model
Both ‘Partial-LFT’ and Case 2 (Chapter 2) models are applied to study investment
decisions in the South East of England. However, the two models use different input
data; the ‘Partial-LFT’ network was built based on water company resources
management plans published online in 2009, while the one in Case 2 uses water
company private data from the 2013 resources management plans. Furthermore, the
‘Partial-LFT’ input data is approximated since it is extrapolated from net present value
costs information that is available online (see section 3.4). The aforementioned reasons
explain why ‘Partial-LFT’ and Case 2 networks differ in both their topology and input
data, even if both of them refer to the South East of England.
Section 3.5.1.1 provides a more detailed analysis of ‘Partial-LFT’ model results and
justifies the differences between ‘Partial-LFT’ and Case 2 model. Sensitivity analysis is
then applied in section 3.5.1.2 to validate the ‘Partial-LFT’ model solution.
3.5.1.1 Analysis of the main differences between Case 2 and ‘partial_LFT’
This section analyses the main differences between ‘Partial-LFT’ and Case 2 model
solutions. By comparing Table 5 (Chapter 2) with Table 23 in section 3.5, the following
major differences are observed. The capital expenditure on reservoir schemes increases
from £M 11 in Case 2 to £M 138 in ‘partial_LFT’ and the one on imports TR increases
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from £M 15 in Case 2 to £M 347 in ‘partial_LFT’. Capital costs for metering schemes
increase by £M 188. On the contrary, the capital expenditure on leakage and effluent
reuse schemes decreases by £M124 and £M 127 respectively, compared to
‘partial_LFT’. Sensitivity analysis also is carried out in section 3.5.1.2 to provide
further insights.
The 82% of capital costs in ‘partial_LFT’ is due to the activation of a reservoir scheme
(option ‘RES_064’) in water resource zone RZ2. This scheme provides a total
maximum capacity of 295 Ml/d over the dry year critical period scenario. Case 2
network has four reservoir options available in the equivalent zone ‘WRZ13’, however
none of these is selected. In contract, smaller options are implemented which include:
seventeen water efficiency schemes, 6 leakage reduction measures, 3 groundwater
options and 1 water treatment works scheme (Table 27). Deficits in water resource zone
RZ2 are lower than in ‘WRZ13’, which explains why the total level of supply (Table
27) is higher in ‘partial_LFT’ than Case 2. Table 27 below shows costs (£M) and
capacities (Ml/d) of activated scheme types in ‘WRZ13’ (Case 2) and ‘RZ2’
(‘partial_LFT’).
Case 2 ‘Partial_LFT’
WRZ13 RZ2
Capital
[£M]
Fixed +
Weighted
variable
operating
[£M]
Capacity
[Ml/d]
Capital
[£M]
Fixed +
Weighted
variable
operating
[£M]
Capacity
[Ml/d]
NI / / / 2 0.4 7
RES / / / 114 -2.2 304
TR / / / 40 24 110
WTW 28 3 50 5 1.5 34
ER / / / 36 0.7 2
GW 167 11 141 3 0.8 36
LEAK 5 0.4 10 3 2 21
WEFF / 158 13 2 / 3
TOTAL 200 171 214 205 27 518
Table 27: Comparison of schemes selected under Case 2 and ’partial_LFT’ model.
The total capital expenditure on company proposed links (LFT) decreases from £M 87
in Case 2, to £M 0.2 in ‘partial_LFT’. Case 2 includes 215 company proposed transfers,
while ‘partial_LFT’ only includes 41. Out of the 41 links, only 21 interconnect water
resource zones and represent company bulk transfer agreements, while the remaining 20
links join shared supply-side schemes with multiple water resource zones. In
‘partial_LFT’, only five transfers are selected (in magenta in Figure 26), four of which
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represent extensions in time of already existing bulk-supply agreements. Such links
have therefore no capital expenditure but only fixed and variable operating costs. Only
one link (from the SUT to the KMD zone, Figure 26) has a capital cost (£M 0.204),
since it represents a ‘newly activated’ link, and not an extension of an existing one.
The capital expenditure on imports TR from external areas increases from £M 15 in
Case 2 to £M 347 in ‘partial_LFT’, while capital costs on effluent reuse schemes
decrease from £M 305 in Case 2 to £M 40 in ‘partial_LFT’. The 76% of the capital
expenditure on effluent reuse schemes in Case 2 is due to the activation of option
‘ER_1080’ in the London water resource zone (zone ‘WRZ22’, see section 2.4). Such
scheme has a maximum annual capacity of 150 Ml/d. The equivalent water resource
zone in ‘partial_LFT’ is referred to as ‘LDN’. No effluent reuse scheme is selected in
the London area in ‘partial_LFT’ out of two mutually exclusive available schemes
(‘ER_100’ and ‘ER_25’, Table 28). In contrast, two imports (‘TR_BTS’ and
‘TR_BTN’) are selected. These have a maximum annual capacity of 220 Ml/d. Option
‘TR_ST’ (Table 28) is the ‘Columbus’ transfer (import from third party resources west
of the Severn estuary), while ‘TR_BTN’ and ‘TR _BTS’ are respectively bulk sea
imports by tankers from Norway and Scotland. Finally, in Table 28 , ‘TR_BSS’ and
Table 28: Undiscounted costs [£M] and maximum annual capacity [Ml/d] of available imports TR and effluent
reuse schemes (ER) for the London water resource zone LDN and model ‘partial_LFT’.
‘partial_LFT’ Case 2
Option
name
Capital
[£M]
Fixed
operating
[£M]
Weighted
variable
operating
[£M/m3]
Cap.
[Ml/d]
Option
name
Capital
[£M]
Fixed
operating
[£M]
Weighted
variable
operating
[£M/m3]
Cap.
[Ml/
d]
ER_100 436 3.8 0.06 100 ER_1077 123 0.43 0.03 150
ER_25 60 2.0 0.01 25 ER_851 117 0.69 0.02 150
ER_HB 31 0.2 0.005 4.9 ER_1080 116 0.33 0.01 150
TR_ST 81 3.2 0.1 39 ER_1071 115 0.82 0.02 150
TR_BTS 332 0.6 4.8 220 ER_1076 87 0.34 0.03 100
TR_BTN 362 5.4 0.2 220 ER_849 83 0.51 0.02 100
TR_BSS 27 14.3 0.1 16 ER_1079 81 0.27 0.01 100
TR_BSN 20 14.1 0.1 11 ER_1070 81 0.77 0.02 100
/ / / / / TR_1108 138 0.65 0.03 98
/ / / / / TR_1107 107 1.09 0.03 98
/ / / / / TR_865 46 1.4 0.03 71
TOTAL 1349 44 5.4 636 TOTAL 1094 7.3 0.25 1267
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‘TR_BSN’ are respectively, bulk sea import via bags from Norway and Scotland.
Import ‘TR_BTN’, selected in ‘Partial_LFT’, is used with a maximum annual capacity
of 214 Ml/d. No other scheme can provide this level of supply alone. For example, if the
100 Ml/d effluent reuse scheme (‘ER_100’) was selected, the undiscounted capital cost
would have been higher (£M 436 for ‘ER_100’ and £M 362 for ‘TR_BTN’) and the
activation of another scheme would have been needed to reach a total supply of 214
Ml/d. This is the reason why imports schemes are preferred to effluent reuse schemes in
‘partial_LFT’. In Case 2, effluent reuse scheme ‘ER_1080’ is activated in year 2022
with a capacity of 150 Ml/d over the planning period. Available imports TR cannot
provide the same level of supply (Table 28).
Another major difference between Case 2 and ‘partial_LFT’ is represented by selected
metering and leakage reduction schemes. Capital costs on metering schemes increase
from £M 19 in Case 2 to £M 278 in ‘partial_LFT’, while those on leakage reduction
schemes decrease from £M 142 Case 2 to £M 18. Table 29 shows the cost and optimal
capacity of selected metering schemes in Case 2 and ‘partial_LFT’. In Table 29,
‘VWSE’ stands from Veolia Water South East, ‘THM’ for Thames Water, SWS for
Sothern Water and ‘VWC’ for Veolia Water central. Furthermore, SMART is a smart
metering scheme (water meters connected to a wireless network), while ‘TCM’ and
‘COM’ stand for ‘targeted compulsory metering’ and ‘change of occupancy metering’.
‘MET1223’ and ‘MET1212’ are also ‘change of occupancy metering’ schemes.
Water
company
Cost [£M]
Capacity
[Ml/d]
Option
name
Water
resource
zone
Model Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
variable
operating
SMART DG ‘partial_LFT’ VWSE 0.1 0.1 / 0.5
M_TCM LDN ‘partial_LFT’ THM 246 13 / 1596
S_TCM SWOX ‘partial_LFT’ THM 18 1.5 / 40
COM_H HAN ‘partial_LFT’ SWS 0.9 0.0 / 18
COM_K KMD ‘partial_LFT’ SWS 12 -1.3 / 371
COM_S SBR ‘partial_LFT’ SWS 13 -0.9 / 274
Total Metering - ‘partial_LFT’ 290 12.4 / 2299
MET1223 WRZ32 Case 2 VWC 7 1.3 -1.9 72
MET1212 WRZ35 Case 2 VWC 12 2.1 -3.2 118
Total Metering - Case 2 19 3.4 -5 190
Table 29: Optimal costs and capacity of selected metering schemes in Case 2 and ‘partial_LFT’.
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The 85% of capital costs on metering schemes in ‘partial_LFT’ is due to the activation
of option ‘M_TCM’ in the London area (Table 29). The total optimal supply from this
scheme is equal to 1596 Ml/d (annual capacity of 88 Ml/d). Only two other schemes in
the London area can provide an annual capacity of 88 Ml/d: effluent reuse option
‘ER_100’ (maximum capacity of 100 Ml/d), and reservoir scheme ‘RES_RM’
(maximum capacity of 190 Ml/d). These schemes, however, have higher capital and
operating costs than ‘M_TCM’, and therefore are not selected in ‘partial_LFT’.
No metering scheme is selected in Case 2 within the London zone. This is because
metering schemes have higher fixed operating costs per unit capacity compared to other
scheme types (see Table 30). Furthermore, metering schemes (maximum annual
capacity of 56 Ml/d) are mutually exclusive to leakage options, which have lower
capital and operating costs (see Table 30) a total higher maximum capacity of 277 Ml/d.
For this reason, leakage schemes are preferred to metering options. The 91% of
discounted capital costs on leakage schemes (see Table 5) is due to the activation of one
option in the London area (maximum annual capacity of 72 Ml/d, £M 129 capital costs
and £M 6 savings).
Case 2
London water resource zone ‘WRZ22’
Option
name
Average capital
cost/capacity
[£M/(Ml/d)]
Average fixed
operating
cost/capacity
[£M/(Ml/d)]
Unit variable
operating cost
[pence/m3]
ASR 501 17 34
DESAL 1362 11 25
ER 836 12 21
GW 197 11 18
LEAK 151 -7 /
MET 301 31 /
RES 880 -11 5
SW 694 14 80
Table 30: Average costs per capacity for available optional scheme types available in Case 2.
3.5.1.2 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is conducted to analyse how the ‘partial_LFT’ model solution
would change based on different assumptions on availability of schemes. First, reservoir
option ‘RES_064’ in water resource zone RZ2 is deactivated (this generates 82% of
total capital costs in ‘partial_LFT’). This model run is referred to as
‘partial_noRES_064’.
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Costs [£M]
‘partial_noRES_064’ ‘partial_noLFT’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
NI 36.6 33 5 33 5 0.04
RES 146 136 0.33 136 0.33 0.28
TR 355.0 348 432 348 432 91
WTW 9.4 7 2 7 2 0.02
ASR 134.6 138 21 138 21 15
ER 123.0 45 10 45 10 1.50
GW 106.9 76 16 76 16 0.52
DESAL 54.7 98 48 98 48 8
MET 260.1 302 14 302 14 -
SW 50.8 49 3 49 3 0.62
LEAK 18.0 21 289 21 289 -
WEFF 55.3 51 -3 51 -3 -
LFT 0.2 33 5 / / /
TOTAL 1350 1305 837 1305 837 117
Table 31: List of all optional schemes when reservoir scheme ‘RES_094’ is not selected. Numbers may
not add up due to rounding.
Total costs increase by £M 142 compared to ‘partial_LFT’, capital costs by £M 8 (from
£M 138 ‘partial_LFT’ to £M 146). This is because another reservoir scheme
(‘RES_079’) is activated in zone RZ3 (discounted capital cost of £M 115). Supply from
‘RES_079’ is exported to zone RZ2 through an existing link.
Optional links LFT are then excluded from selection (model ‘partial_noLFT’, see Table
31). This improves the model convergence, i.e. a 1.5% GAP solution if found in less
than 20 minutes with a total cost of £M 2259. Capital costs increase by £M 26
compared to ‘partial_LFT’ (Table 23 and Table 31), while total operating costs increase
by £M 3. The increase in capital expenditure is due to the activation of an additional
metering scheme in the ‘KMD’ water resource zone (this increases discounted capital
costs by £M 15), and to the earlier activation a metering scheme in the SWOX area (this
increases discounted capital costs by £M 8).
Finally, two further runs were then executed where imports ‘TR_BTS’ and ‘TR_BTN’,
(model ‘partial_noTR_LDN’) and metering schemes ‘TCM_L’ and ‘COM_L’ (model
‘partial_noMET’) were deactivated. Results are shown in Table 32. Total costs in
‘partial_noTR_LDN’ increase by £M 300, compared to ‘partial_LFT’. This is due to the
activation of an additional reservoir scheme in the London zone (£M 729 discounted
capital costs, maximum capacity of 2391 Ml/d).
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Costs [£M]
‘partial_noTR’ ‘partial_noMET’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
NI 32 4 0.04 34 5 0.049
RES 914 -10 0.5 187 0.3 0.435
TR 140 232 11 536 452 147
WTW 7 2 0 7 2 0.05
ASR 136 22 15 132 21 16
ER 85 26 14 81 23 12
GW 84 18 1 107 18 1.3
DESAL 55 43 6 73 51 12
MET 277 19 / 28 -3 /
SW 51 3 1 53 3 0.6
LEAK 16 281 / 16 283 /
WEFF 48 -3 / 47 -3 /
LFT 0.2 2 0.02 0.2 2 0.025
TOTAL 1846 639 47 1300 855 189
Table 32: Discounted costs for schemes selected in ‘partial_noTR_LDN’ and ‘partial_noMET_LDN’.
Schemes are grouped by type. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Costs in ‘partial_noMET’ increase from £M 2231 in ‘partial_LFT’ to £M 2344.
Specifically, capital costs in the London area decrease by £M 9, while fixed and
weighted variable operating costs increase by £M 44 and £M 71, respectively. The
increase in the operating costs is due to the activation of an additional import scheme
(option ‘TR_BTS’) and to the earlier activation of import options. Table 33 shows the
capital and operating costs of imports selected in ‘partial_LFT’ and ‘partial_noMET’.
Costs [£M]
‘partial_LFT’ ‘partial_noMET_LDN’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
TR_ST / / / 62 32 18
TR_BTS / / / 121 0.45 22
TR_BTN 244 42 76 255 46 91
TR_BSS 23 181 8 23 181 9
TR_BSN 18 177 / 17 17 6
TOTAL 285 400 88 478 276 146
Table 33: Costs for activated imports TR in model ‘partial_LFT’ and ‘partial_noMET’ in the London
area. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
3.6 Discussion of results
This Chapter presents an expanded version of the model formulation introduced in
Chapter 2. The model (referred to as ‘full-INT’) can be used as a tool to identify new
economic water supply interconnections which have not yet been proposed by water
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companies in their water resources management plans. The model results were
compared to those obtained by only considering companies’ proposed transfers
(‘partial-LFT’). Both models use approximate cost estimates extrapolated from
aggregated net present value figures in the company water resources management plans.
Costs for the additional interconnections are defined through a concave cost function
approximated by a piecewise linear function.
Results show that by only interconnecting water resource zones in surplus with those in
deficit (additional 19 links), total discounted costs are reduced by 47%. The selected
additional transfers reduce costs by £M 1053 (from £M 2231 in the ‘partial-LFT’ run
to £M 1178 in the ‘full-INT’ run) by drastically reducing the need for additional capital
cost intensive supply-side schemes and high cost demand management options in areas
in deficit. Specifically, the capital expenditure decreases by 32%, while the fixed and
weighted variable operating costs decrease by 75% and 14% respectively.
In the London water resource zone, two INT imports reduce the net present value costs
by 68% (from £M 1606 in the ‘partial-LFT’ run to £M 506 in the ‘full-INT’ run) due to
the decreased extent of used of ‘aquifer storage and recharge’ schemes and due to a
compulsory metering scheme that is no longer activated. The 73% and 43% of total
costs in ‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’ respectively, derive from the activation of schemes
in the London zone, the one with the highest deficit in the whole network. Specifically,
import (option TR_BTN) and compulsory metering (option M_TCM) schemes,
generate together the 62% of total discounted capital costs in ‘partial-LFT’. Scheme
M_TCM is no longer selected in ‘full-INT’ (imports from neighbouring zones are
selected in place of M_TCM).
In ‘partial-LFT’, the 83% of discounted capital costs on reservoir schemes is due to the
activation of a reservoir in zone RZ2. If this scheme is deactivated, the model selects
another reservoir scheme in the adjacent zone RZ3 (the supply from this scheme is then
exported to zone RZ2, through an existing link). If selected import and metering
schemes in the London area are in turn deactivated, total costs increase by £M 300 and
£M 113 respectively (due to the selection of additional reservoir and import schemes in
the London zone). This demonstrated that imports and metering options represent
important solutions doe the analysed supply demand balance problem.
Finally, if the company proposed links are excluded, discounted costs increase by £M
26 due to the activation of additional metering schemes. The LFT links only generates
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£M 2.2 in ‘partial-LFT’ and ‘full-INT’. This is because, out of the five selected
transfers, four of them represents extension in times of already existing bulk transfer
agreements, and therefore have no capital costs associated.
3.7 Discussion of model limitations
Limitations of the ‘full-INT’ model are listed below:
1. ‘Full-INT’ is a regional model. This means that it finds a solution to the supply-
demand balance problem that is a least-cost solution for the whole region rather than for
the individual water companies in the area. A regional least-cost solution may not
necessarily be the least cost solution for each individual company for two main reasons:
a. suppose that the regional model recommends a transfer from company ‘A’, which is
in surplus, to another company ‘B’ in deficit. Company ‘B’ may not accept this
solution if it is more expensive than its own solution which does not involve
transfers.
b. suppose the regional model activates a number of options in company ‘A’ to fix a
deficit in company ‘B’. Company ‘A’ may not accept this solution if it generates
costs greater than those needed to solve its own deficit. In situations like this,
company ‘A’ may expect appropriate cost sharing or bulk supply incomes from
company ‘B’. This is the case of the London water resource zone (Thames Water),
which imports surplus water from two neighbouring zones (NORTH and SOUTH)
belonging to company Veolia Water Central. The surplus water is generated by
activating additional supply-side schemes in Veolia Water Central. This increases
costs from £M 0.8 to £M 4 in the SOUTH zone and from £M 2.4 to £M 44 in the
NORTH zone, while costs in the London area reduce by £M 311 (metering schemes
previously selected for £M 246 are no longer activated).
2. One of the major difficulties of the ‘Full-INT’ model is its computational burden. If
water companies’ proposed links only are considered, the model converges to a 0.3%
relative ‘gap’ in less than three hours. When 19 additional transfers are added (to
interconnect water resource zones in surplus with neighbouring zones in deficit), the
model reaches a 5% relative ‘gap’ in twelve hours. Finally, when the number of links is
increased to 92 (all neighbouring water resource zones belonging to different water
companies are interconnected) the model converges to a 28% relative ‘gap’ in 14 days
(see Figure 27). Having a relative ‘gap’ greater than zero means that the difference
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between the best ‘relaxed’ and the best integer (BI) solution identified by the model is
greater than a fraction of the incumbent objective’s value BI. If the branch and bound
search tree was fully explored, a smaller best integer solution could have been identified
from: a. the improvement in the ‘relaxed’ solution at subsequent nodes of the branch
and bound tree; b. the improvement of the ‘best integer’ solution (identification of new
incumbents).
Figure 27: Evolution of the upper and lower bound solution when the number of additional links is
increased from 19 in ‘full_INT’ to 92.
The model convergence did not improve by manually setting an initial solution.
Specifically starting solutions were obtained from running g: a. ‘partial_LFT’; b.
‘full_INT ’with 19 links; c. full_INT’ with 92 links where the piecewise linear cost
function was replaced by a line that joins its extreme breakpoints (see problem P1 in
Figure 28).
3.7.1 Deriving sub-optimal results
This section provides a summary of the work conducted to derive a sub-optimal solution
for an expanded version of the network shown in Figure 23. This network has 137 INT
transfers that connect all neighbouring water resource zones, even where these
interconnections are already proposed in company resources management plans (in this
case, the INT links represents an expansion of the proposed transfers). A fully
interconnected network allows the optimisation model to select among a greater amount
of chains of interconnections passing through intermediate water resource zones. The
expanded network also has different input data where scheme costs (extrapolated from
the net present value figures in water company resources management plans) were later
improved returning the network in Figure 23.
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For this network, the branch and bound algorithm failed to identify an integer solution.
Therefore, the following strategy was adopted to obtain a sub-optimal solution. The
problem (referred to as PP) was decomposed into sub-problems that contain the feasible
solution of the original problem (see Figure 28). These sub-problems, referred to as P3,
P2, and P1, simplify the model formulation with the degree of simplification increasing
from P1 to P3. The simplification allows the reduction in the number of binary variables
and model constraints and therefore the model’s computational burden.
In sub-problem P3 the cost function is a represented by a line passing from the origin of
the axis, as in Figure 28. In sub-problems P1 and P2 the piecewise linear function is
replaced by one unique line passing through its extreme points. For sub-problem P1
costs were estimated based on the INT transfers’ annual maximum level of use, while in
P2 costs were calculated based on the transfers’ maximum extent of use over the whole
planning horizon.
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Figure 28: Definition of the sub-problems to solve problem PP.
The solution obtained for sub-problem P3 was then used as the starting solution for sub-
problem P2. This was done in order to aid the CPLEX solver in finding an initial
solution to the problem (ILOG, 2007). The solution from sub-problem P2 was given as
input into P1 as shown in Figure 28. For these runs, the CPLEX platform was used (not
within GAMS). Within CPLEX, a predefined feature can be used that allows genetic
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algorithms (GA) to be called at each node of the branch and bound algorithm as a
solution-improvement method. Based on the results presented in (Armbruster et al.,
2006), using a GA together with the branch and bound algorithm can improve the
computational efficiency of the model.
Each sub-problem was ran until the branch and bound algorithm was not able to
improve its convergence to a lower GAP (see Figure 29). At this point the model was
stopped and the solution obtained was taken as the best possible integer solution for the
analysed sub-problem. Since sub-problems P1 and P2 could not be solved to global
optimality, the GA was called within the branch and bound algorithm to reduce run
times. A total time of about four days was required to solve sub-problems P3, P2, P1.
Seventeen hours were required to find the integer solution for the original problem PP.
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Figure 29: Improvement over time of the integer solution identified by the branch and bound algorithm,
for sub-problems P3, P2, P1 and the original problem PP.
The solution obtained from problem PP was considered to be the best possible integer
solution with a total discounted cost of £M 272.6 (see Figure 29). To ascertain the
quality of this solution, another sub-problem was solved, P2’. In P2’ the cost function is
represented by the piece-wise linear function in Figure 28, however costs for the INT
transfers change annually based on the transfers’ annual extent of use. Solution from
sub-problem P2’ (total cost of £M 253.4) results in a lower bound for problem PP. This
means that costs for problem PP can decrease up until they are equal to the costs for
sub-problem P2’, i.e., by 7% (£M 272.6 minus £M 253.4 divided by one hundred). A
7% range of error was considered acceptable for the reasons explained in section 3.5.
‘P3’ ‘P2’ ‘P1’ ‘PP’
BI
BF
Time [s]
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3.8 Conclusion
This Chapter presents an extension to the mixed integer model formulation introduced
in Chapter 2. This extension allows the incorporation of a generic capital cost estimate
for new inter-company transfers not yet proposed in water company plans. Costs for
these transfers are defined by a concave cost curve to represent the economies of scale
of building large infrastructure. The non-convex cost curve was approximated by a
piecewise linear function. The piecewise linear approximation was implemented by
using a branching technique that works on sets of variables known as ‘special ordered
sets of type two’ (or SOS2). In a SOS2 set only two adjacent variables can assume non-
zero values. This is done to avoid the introduction of additional binary variables and
constraints that could decrease the computational efficiency of the branch and bound
algorithm.
The network was first expanded with 19 additional transfers to interconnect
neighbouring water resource zones in surplus with neighbouring zones in deficit. Model
results show that a total discounted savings of about £1 billion can be achieved when
more transfers are allowed in South East England. This is because the inter-company
transfers allow re-allocating the surplus water generated by the existing schemes to
zones in deficit. Surplus water is also generated by activating schemes in zones where
the cost of developing new infrastructure or demand management measures is lower
than in those that would incur a deficit. The model is then expanded to include 92 links
to interconnect all neighbouring water resource zones belonging to different water
companies. This increased the computational burden, i.e. a 28% relative gap was
reached over 14 days meaning that the identified model solution can deviate up to 28%
in cost from the least-cost plan. If the number of links is increased to 137 (fully
interconnected network) the model cannot even identify an integer solution. In order to
identify a sub-optimal solution, the problem was split into sub-problems (containing the
feasible solution of the original problem). Genetic algorithms were integrated within the
branch and cut algorithm to improve the algorithm’s computational efficiency. This
experiment demonstrates that mathematical programming may not be suitable for large-
scale networks. This raises the question of whether other modelling techniques should
be investigated.
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Chapter 4
IMPROVING THE STOCHASTIC USE OF EBSD
MODELS
4 Introduction
The reliability of the supply-demand schedules provided in the output by EBSD models
can be affected by the random variation of input data due to the natural spatial or
temporal variability of both supply and demand. In order to test the reliability of the
EBSD model solution, the water industry proposed the ‘intermediate framework’
(UKWIR, 2002b, UKWIR, 2002a). This framework uses Monte Carlo simulation to
determine whether the solution provided by the EBSD models remains valid under
uncertainty on supply and demand data. Monte Carlo simulation also provides a
measure of the levels of service that the options in the solution should provide. If this is
lower than companies’ target level of service, then target headroom is increased and the
EBSD model is run again to return a new combination of options. Water companies face
confusion about how much the headroom values should be increased and this can
discourage the application of the framework (see paragraph 1.6.2.4 in the Chapter 1).
To overcome this issue, two possible extensions of the ‘intermediate framework’ are
proposed to extend the model presented in Chapter 2: the ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT-
strategy’. In the ‘THR-strategy’ the headroom values are increased by the worst, or
close to worst, deficits recorded under the Monte Carlo simulation. Under the ‘CUT-
strategy’ companies’ headroom values remain unvaried and instead, at each run of the
EBSD model, new constraint equations are introduced that exclude unreliable grouping
of schemes identified during previous runs. The results from both methods are analysed
and compared and their respective benefits and limitations are discussed.
The Chapter is structured as follows: section 4.1 presents a summary of the model
structure; section 4.2 presents the mathematical formulation used to implement Monte
Carlo simulation together with the ‘THR-strategy’ and ‘CUT-strategy’. Section 4.3
shows the case study and is followed by results in section 4.4. Discussion of results and
conclusions are presented in sections 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.
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4.1 Summary of model formulation
Graphical representations of the ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT- strategy’ are shown in
Figure 30. Under both the ‘THR-strategy’ and ‘CUT- strategy’, the water companies’
target level of service (TLS) is first defined. TLS values are agreed between companies
and their customers and set an upper limit to the frequency by which companies
anticipate to impose restrictions on supplying water, i.e. no more than 1/N years (see
section 1.5.1). This approximates to an annual probability of less than 1/N that supply-
demand failures will occur. Then, the EBSD model is run in a two step-process:
demands are reduced as little as possible to remove infeasibilities at water resource
zones (see section 2.1.7.2, in Chapter 2), then the EBSD model presented in Chapter 2
is run. The EBSD model returns the schedule and optimal extent of use (least-cost
quantity) of supply, demand management and transfer schemes that meet the forecast
demands at minimum costs.
The reliability (probability of failure) of the EBSD model solution is then tested using
Monte Carlo simulation for the dry year critical period scenario (the worst case scenario
with higher demands). Probability distribution functions of uncertainty on supply and
demand input data are then considered. A number ‘m’ of possible deviations from the
supply and demand input data (uncertainty) are sampled from the probability
distribution functions (see Figure 31). The supply-demand balance at each demand node
is then tested by adding the uncertain term to the supply and demand estimates (target
headroom values are set equal to zero). The probability of supply-demand deficits
(PSFi,t) is then calculated for each water resource zone i and year t. This is equal to the
ratio between the total number of deficits recorded over the ‘m’ simulations and total
number of simulations mmax. If PSFi,t is greater than the company’s allowed maximum
probability of failure TLSi,t, then the EBSD model is run again and the ‘THR-strategy’
or the ‘CUT-strategy’ is applied, to identify, a different schedule of options. This
procedure is repeated ‘n’ times until a solution is found for which PSFi,t is lower than
TLSi,t. Under the ‘THR-strategy’ target headroom values are increased by the worst, or
close to worse, deficit recorded over the Monte Carlo simulation (see section 1.4.5.1).
Under the ‘CUT-strategy’ target headroom values are not varied but new equations are
included in the EBSD model to exclude solutions (supply-demand schedules) selected at
previous iterations.
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Figure 30: The ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT- strategy’.
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Figure 31: Monte Carlo simulation applied to the solution of the EBSD model.
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The model formulation is presented in the following sections. The nomenclature is first
introduced in section 4.2.1. Section 4.2.2 describes the formulation adopted to
implement the Monte Carlo simulation. The ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT-strategy’ are
then introduced in sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2 respectively.
4.2 Model formulation
4.2.1 Nomenclature
Indices of Sets
m Monte Carlo iterations
n EBSD model runs
eq elements of set EQ indicating the number of times the EBSD model is run
Sets
M set of Monte Carlo iterations
N set of the EBSD model runs
SEL subsets of the Cartesian product between schemes i,j belonging to the
connectivity matrix CON and set EQ
DEM subset of demand nodes i in deficit under the Monte Carlo simulation
EQ set composed by as many elements eq as the number of times the EBSD
model is run EQ={eq1…eqn}.
Parameters
mmax maximum number of Monte Carlo iterations
Ui,j,t,m uncertainty value at option (i,j) and Monte Carlo iteration m
Xi,t supply-demand balance at demand node i and time t
counti,j,t,m counter for the number of times a supply-demand deficit is recorded (Xi,t<0)
over the m Monte Carlo iterations
cpdii,j,t distribution input at demand node i, time t under the DYCP scenario
cpsri,j,t outage allowance at demand node i, time t under the DYCP scenario
Xranki,t,m deficits at demand node i, time t and Monte Carlo iteration m ranked from
the highest to the lowest value
mfi,t maximum number of allowed failures (deficits) at demand node i, time t
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TLSi,t target level of service for water resource zone i at year t
APi,t level of service for the solution set provided by the EBSD model at water
resource zone i at year t
αfixi,t maximum level of demand satisfaction at demand nodes i and year t under
the dry year critical period scenario
4.2.2 Monte Carlo simulation
4.2.2.1 Uncertainty and correlation
When sampling from probability distribution functions (see Figure 31) it is important to
consider possible correlations among the input data values (see also section 1.5.2). This
is done through the following steps. A vector of random uncorrelated data X is first
generated. A correlation matrix C is then defined that specifies the magnitude of the
correlation coefficients. C is a positive definite and symmetric matrix and can be
decomposed into a lower triangular matrix R and its transposition R’. The
decomposition C=RR’ is called Cholesky factorisation. Given X and R, the vector of
correlated numbers D can be calculated as D=XR’ (Iman and Conover, 1982, Lurie and
Goldberg, 1998). Probability distribution functions of uncertainty on supply and
demand data are then defined. The uncertainty values are then estimated from the
inverse cumulative distribution functions alongside the random correlated numbers D
(see also illustration in Figure 31).
4.2.2.2 The supply-demand balance under the Monte Carlo simulation
The uncertainty values Ui,j,t,m identified over a number m of random samples are added
to the supply and demand input data of the EBSD model. This analysis is done for the
worst-case scenario (the dry year critical period or DYCP). The supply-demand balance
is then evaluated at each demand node by only considering the set of schemes i,j (set
SEL) selected by the EBSD model.
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4.1
In the equation above Xi,t,m is the water surplus (if positive) or deficit (if negative)
recorded at year t (set T), demand node i (set DEM) and simulation m (set M). Σj qj,i,t is
the sum of flows entering demand node i at year t, while Σj qi,j,t is the sum of flows
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leaving demand node i at year t. qi,j,t is output by the EBSD model. Terms cpdii,t and
cpsri,t are the water demand (distribution input) and ‘outage allowance’ respectively
(see section 1.5.1), while αfixi,t is the maximum level of demand satisfaction at demand
node i and year t. Equation 4.1 is applied to the dry year critical period scenario. If
during any of the ‘m’ simulations, a deficit occurs (Xi,t,m<0), a counter counti,t,m is
increased by one unit:
, , , , , ,1 0 , ,i t m i t m i t mcount count if X i DEM t T m M       4.2
For each year t and demand node i, the ratio between the total number of failures and
the total number of simulations is then calculated. If this is greater than the company’s
accepted maximum probability of failure, the EBSD model is run again, and the ‘THR-
strategy’ or the ‘CUT-strategy’ is applied to identify a new supply-demand schedule.
4.2.3 Generating different solutions
4.2.3.1 The ‘THR- strategy’
Under the ‘THR-strategy’ the companies’ target headroom values are increased
according to the following procedure. First, deficits (Xi,t,m<0) are ranked from the
highest to the lowest obtaining the ranked matrix Xranki,t,m. The maximum number of
allowed failures (mfi,t) is then determined for each demand node i and time step t by
multiplying the nbmax by the maximum probability of failure TLSi,t. The first mfi,t
largest deficits are then removed from matrix Xranki,t,m (e.g. if nbmax=100 and
TLSi,t=5%, then the first 5 largest deficits are removed). Finally the deficit at position
mfi,t+1 is used to increase the company’s target headroom values.
4.2.3.2 The ‘CUT- strategy’
Under the proposed ‘CUT-strategy’, every time the EBSD model is run, a new set of
equations are included in the EBSD model formulation to exclude solutions identified at
previous runs:
 , , , , 1 1 ,j i t j i t eq
t j SEL
AL AL par eq EQ i DEF

 
      
  
 
4.3
In the equations above EQ is a set composed by as many elements eq as the number of
times the EBSD model is run, DEF is the set of demand nodes i in deficit (Xi,t,m<0)
under the ‘m’ simulations, while SEL is a set containing the list of schemes i,j activated
each time the EBSD model is run, i.e., (j,i,eq)SEL.
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Equation 4.3 works in the following way: every time the EBSD model is run a new
combination of schemes ‘A’ is found. Then, if ‘A’ fails under the Monte Carlo analysis,
the EBSD model is run again and equation 4.3 is used to exclude solution ‘A’ from the
next model solution ‘B’. If ‘B’ is unsuccessful under the Monte Carlo simulation (i.e. its
level of service is lower than the target), this solution is saved in set SEL together with
solution ‘A’, i.e., SEL= {‘B’.eq2, ‘A’.eq1}. This procedure is repeated until a
combination of schemes is found that is successful under the Monte Carlo simulation.
Parameter pareq is the number of schemes (selected nodes and links in set SEL)
activated at each iteration. The difference (pareq-1) implies that every time the EBSD
model is run, a new solution (grouping of options) has to be found that differs from all
previous solutions (e.g. ‘A’ and ‘B’) by at least one option.
Figure 31 below provides a detailed flow chart of the ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT-
strategy’.
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are not independent
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Figure 32: Schematic chart flow of the ‘THR-strategy’ and ‘CUT-strategy’.
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4.3 Case Study
The ‘THR-strategy’ method was developed for the WRSE group. The work was
intended to be applied to the whole WRSE area (34 water resource zones, see Chapter
2) starting from a sub-set of the WRSE network composed of only three water resource
zones. This pilot network is shown in Figure 33. Each water resource zone of network
in Figure 33 belongs to a different water company.
WRZ7
WRZ8
WRZ17
Resb
Resa
Weff18
Weff28
Weff38
Lea18
Lea28
Supply-side option
Demand management option
Existing supply
Optional transfer
Supply junction
Existing transfer
Demand node
Figure 33: Network topology.
The ‘CUT-strategy’ was also applied to network in Figure 33. A 26 year planning
horizon was considered. The input data (supply and demand estimates, headroom
values, target level of service, costs, probability distribution functions etc.) are
confidential and were randomly varied between +10% and -10%. Four demand
scenarios (DYAA, DYCP, NYAA and MDO) were considered as in Chapter 2. One
thousands Monte Carlo simulations were applied.
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The probability distribution functions in this case study are triangular, uniform and
normal (first column of Table 34) and are extrapolated from company water resources
management plans. Column ‘HU’ of Table 34 provides the list of the uncertainty types
(see headroom components in section 1.5.2) applied to the existing nodes (suffix
‘EXDO’). All remaining columns in Table 34 (‘lower limit’, ‘mode’, ‘upper limit’,
‘mean’, ‘standard deviation’) provide the statistics for each probability distribution
function.
Distribution HC Node Lower
limit
Mode Upper
limit
Mean Standard
deviation
Triangular S6 ExDO7 -3 2 4 / /
Normal D1 WRZ07 / / / 0 0.73
Triangular D2 WRZ07 -6 0 6 / /
Triangular D3 WRZ07 -2 0 3 / /
Triangular D8 WRZ07 -8 0 7 / /
Uniform S5 ExDO8 1.68 0 9.58 / /
Triangular S6 ExDO8 -1.3 1 1.3 / /
Triangular S8 ExDO8 -1.5 3 8 / /
Triangular D1 WRZ8 -0.74 -0.74 0 / /
Triangular D2 WRZ8 -4 0 8 / /
Triangular D3 WRZ8 0.9 1.4 1.9 / /
Uniform S8 ExDO5 4 0 5 / /
Triangular D1 WRZ17 -8 0 9 / /
Triangular D2 WRZ17 -4 0 8 / /
Triangular D3 WRZ17 -1.2 0 1.2 / /
Table 34: Probability distribution functions assigned to different uncertainty components (S5, S6, S8 for
the existing supply nodes, D1, D2 and D3 for the demand nodes).
For the optional schemes, a normal probability distribution function of uncertainty was
applied with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 0.02 based on (EA, 2010a). The
correlation coefficients (Table 35) were assumed by following the UKWIR guidelines
(UKWIR, 2002c).
Correlation
coefficient
S8 -‘EXDO17’ D3 - ‘WRZ07’ 0.75
S8 - ‘EXDO38’ D3 - ‘WRZ8’ 0.75
S8 - ‘EXDO35’ D3 - ‘WRZ17’ 0.8
S9 - ‘sop068’ S9 - sop120’ 0.6
S9 - ‘sop079’ S9 - ‘sop197’ 0.6
Table 35: Correlation coefficients.
Uncertainty types S8 and D3 are positively correlated (UKWIR, 2002c). This is because
if climate change (uncertainty type S8) has an impact on yields, then it will also likely
impact the level of water demand (uncertainty type D3). Annual water demand is
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generally driven by summer consumption while supply mostly depends on rainfall.
Instead of considering a correlation coefficient equal to one between the two (suitable
for directly correlated uncertainties), a lower value of 0.75 was adopted following
(South East Water, 2014). The optional groundwater sources (‘sop068’, ‘sop120’ in
WRZ17 and ‘sop079’, ‘sop197’ in WRZ8) are subject to uncertainty type S9 and are
positively correlated by a factor of 0.6 (UKWIR, 2002c). Groundwater schemes in the
same water resource zone are assumed to be affected by the same sustainability
reductions (e.g. licence reductions).
4.4 Results
Both methods (‘THR-strategy’ and ‘CUT-strategy’) are implemented in GAMS and
solved with CPLEX on a DELL Precision 7500 machine with 24 GB RAM. Table 36
shows the model statistics for both runs.
Model statistics
‘THR-strategy’ ‘CUT-strategy’
Run time 34 seconds 1 minute
Relative gap reached under
all iterations
0% 0%
Total number of variables 16,387 16,309
Binary variables 1,298 1,281
Table 36: Models statistics for the ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT-strategy’.
Two iterations were required under the ‘THR-strategy’, three under the ‘CUT-strategy’.
Of the three water resource zones (‘WRZ7’, ‘WRZ8’ and ‘WRZ17’, see Figure 31), only
‘WRZ7’ has deficits over the Monte Carlo simulations. The remaining tables and figures
only refer to water resource zone ‘WRZ7’.
The ‘CUT-strategy’ and the ‘THR-strategy’ identify the same schedule of schemes for
zone ‘WRZ7’: reservoirs ‘Res_b’ and ‘Res255’ and a water efficiency option ‘Weff28’
for the water resource zone. Table 37 shows the total discounted cost of the solutions
obtained under the ‘CUT-strategy’ and the ‘THR-strategy’, for each iteration. Total
costs include: capital expenditure, and fixed and variable operating costs. The latter are
weighted over the four demand scenarios (dry year annual average DYAA, dry year
critical period DYCP, minimum deployable output MDO, and normal year annual
average NYAA).
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Total cost [£M]
Solution Set ‘THR-strategy’ ‘CUT-strategy’
Initial Solution - Iteration 1 81.1 81.1
Iteration 2 86.2 81.3
Iteration 3 / 82.1
Iteration 4 / 82.3
Iteration 5 / 82.7
Iteration 6 / 83.1
Table 37: Total discounted costs in £M (capital expenditure plus fixed and variable operating costs) for
solutions obtained at each run of the EBSD model, under both the ‘CUT-strategy’ and ‘THR-strategy’, for
water resource zone ‘WRZ7’.
Total costs under the ‘THR-strategy’ (see the last iteration number 2) are higher than
those under the ‘CUT-strategy’ (Table 37). This is because, with the ‘THR-strategy’,
target headroom values are increased by deficits generated in the Monte Carlo
simulation (Figure 34). This increases the extent of use of the selected schemes, and
consequently the variable cost element.
Figure 34 shows the target headroom profile for water resource zone ‘WRZ7’ under the
‘THR-strategy’ (the headroom values remain unchanged under the ‘CUT-strategy’).
Target headroom values increase in the second iteration, towards the end of the planning
period, starting from year 2027, corresponding with a demand increase of 26 Ml/d. i.e.
from 50 Ml/d, in the previous year, to 76 Ml/d.
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Figure 34: Target headroom values at each run of the EBSD model, under the ‘THR-strategy’.
Figure 36 shows, for the ‘THR-strategy’ (Panel ‘a’) and the ‘CUT-strategy’ (Panel ‘b’),
the annual probability of failure at each iteration for water resource zone ‘WRZ7’. A
maximum allowed probability of system failure of 0.1 (see purple line in Figure 36) was
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considered. The system probability of failure (identified with the Monte Carlo
simulation) exceeds the 0.1 threshold (under both the ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT-
strategy’) after year 2026 due to the increased level of demand.
The probability of failure simulated over the last iteration (iteration 2 for the ‘THR-
strategy’ and iteration 6 for the ‘CUT-strategy’) is higher for years 2023 to 2026
(Figure 35 and Figure 36) compared to previous iterations. This is because, most of the
demand management options selected in previous iterations (two in year 2023 and two
in year 2024) are replaced by demand management scheme ‘Weff38’ in year 2025. The
extent of use of the existing node is also increased over years 2023 to 2026 (by a
maximum of 0.29 Ml/d). Reservoir ‘Res_b’ is only activated in year 2027. Since the
level of failure is calculated based on the schemes’ maximum capacity (demand
management options savings are accounted from their first year of activation), the level
of surplus in years 2023 to 2026 is lower than in previous iterations.
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Figure 35: Supply-demand resources system probability of failure (blue and orange lines) and maximum
probability of failure (horizontal red line) for water resource zone ‘WRZ7’ under the ‘THR-strategy’.
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Figure 36: Supply-demand resources system probability of failure (blue and orange lines) and maximum
probability of failure (horizontal red line) for water resource zone ‘WRZ7’ under the ‘CUT-strategy’
(panel ‘b’).
Figure 37 shows, for the ‘THR-strategy’ and ‘CUT-strategy’, the extent of use of
schemes selected at each iteration under the dry year critical period scenario. Under the
‘CUT-strategy’ the model consistently selects, over the first five iterations, reservoirs
‘Res255’ and ‘Res256’ while varying the combination of selected demand management
options. At the final iteration, reservoir option ‘Res_b’ is implemented. This scheme
provides a maximum capacity of 21 Ml/d, much higher than the maximum saving (0.32
Ml/d) with available demand management schemes. This increases the level of surplus
in the network and consequently reduces the frequency of supply-demand deficits
generated under the Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically the probability of failure
decreases from 0.08 in year 2026 to 0.014 in the following year (see Figure 36). After
year 2027, the probability of failure increases (up to a maximum of 0.04 in year 2034),
due to an increased level of demand.
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Figure 37: Least cost quantity of selected schemes under the ‘THR-strategy’ (top panel ‘a’) and ‘CUT-
strategy’ (bottom panel ‘b’), for the DYCP scenario and ‘WRZ7’ only.
4.4.1 Sensitivity analysis- adding another node to the analysed network
Reservoir ‘Res_b’ reduces the system probability of failure below the company target
level (see Figure 36). If, however, its implementation raises environmental or political
issues, the water company may decide to abandon the scheme. By increasing the
company’s target headroom values, the ‘THR-strategy’ may overlook solutions that are
lower cost, still reliable, and preferred by planners for reasons that cannot be fully
(a)- ‘THR-strategy’
(b)- ‘CUT-strategy’
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represented in the model (see also Appendix II). On the contrary, the ‘CUT-strategy’
does not overlook any portfolio.
This is demonstrated by adding in the analysed network (Figure 33) and additional node
(‘Res_c’) for water resource zone ‘WRZ7’. This node has lower capital and operating
costs than ‘Res_b’, and a maximum capacity of 17 Ml/d (see Table 38).
Capital
expenditure
[£M]
Fixed
operating
cost [k£]
Variable
operating
cost
[pence/m3]
Maximum
capacity
[Ml/d]
‘Res_b’ 525 344 30 17
Res_c’ 425 244 19 21
Table 38: Comparison of undiscounted costs and maximum capacity of schemes ‘Res_b’ and ‘Res_c’.
The ‘THR-strategy’ returns the same solution as in Figure 37, with selected options
reservoirs ‘Res_b’, ‘Res255’ and the water efficiency measure ‘Weff28’. Under the
‘CUT-strategy’, the model selects (at the last iteration number 6) reservoir ‘Res_c’,
‘Res255’ and the water efficiency option ‘Weff28’ (the first five iterations identify the
same schedule of schemes as in Figure 37). The system probability of failure (Figure
38) is higher than with selection of option ‘Res_b’ (Figure 36) but still below the
maximum probability of failure (0.1, see red line in Figure 38). This is due to the lower
maximum capacity of ‘Res_c’ compared to ‘Res_b’.
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Figure 38: Probability of failure under the ‘CUT-strategy’ when scheme ‘Res_c’ is added to the modelled
network, for water resource zone ‘WRZ7’.
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4.4.2 Testing reliability over a diverse set of near-optimal solutions with the
‘CUT-strategy’
The ‘CUT-strategy’ can also be used to return a diverse set of schemes (portfolios) and
their associated level of service. As specified in Appendix II, given uncertainty around
projected scheme capital and operating costs and the inability of EBSD models to
embed non-monetary metrics of system performance (see also section 1.6.2.7), the least-
cost solution may not represent, necessarily, the ‘best’ solution to the problem. For
these reasons, regulators and water company decision makers may prefer diverse plans
that are sufficiently ‘close’ the least-cost plan. The ‘CUT-strategy’ allows the
identification of these plans and their associated reliability. This is shown in Figure 39
below, where the ‘CUT-strategy’ has been used to obtain 15 alternative solutions
(schedule of schemes). The red line with red dots corresponds to the solution identified
by the ‘THR-strategy’ (see iteration 8 in Figure 37), while the green line with green dots
is the first reliable lower cost solution identified by the ‘CUT-strategy’ (see iteration 2
in Figure 37 and iteration 6 in Figure 38). In iteration 14 and 15, the activation in year
2027 of a reservoir ‘Res_a’ (maximum capacity of 10 Ml/d) and its conjunctive use
with reservoir ‘sop256’ (maximum capacity of 22 Ml/d) reduces the probability of
failure to 0.001 from 2027 to 2033, and 0.002 in 2034.
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Figure 39: Probability of failure over a range of near-optimal solutions
Figure 40 shows the minimum (light orange dots), maximum (dark orange) and average
(red dots) probability of failure recorded over the planning horizon, for the 15 portfolios
identified under the ‘CUT-strategy’. Each of the 15 dots (see numbers next to the red
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dots) represent a unique portfolio of schemes. The company decision makers may opt to
adopt higher-cost solutions (i.e. those in iterations 7, 9 or 10) than the lower-cost
solution identified with the ‘CUT-strategy’ (see iteration 6 in Figure 40) or the ‘THR-
strategy’ (see iteration 8). This could happen, if solutions 7, 9 or 10 present other
benefits (non-monetary metrics) not represented in the model, which are important to
the decision maker.
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Figure 40: Minimum (light orange dots), maximum (dark orange) and average (red dots) probability of
failure over the near-optimal solutions identified with the ‘CUT-strategy’.
Figure 43 shows the extent of use of schemes selected over the 15 near-optimal
solutions identified with the ‘CUT-strategy’.
Lower-cost solution under the ‘CUT-strategy’
‘THR-strategy’ solution
(Obtained without increasing the target headroom)
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4.5 Discussion
This Chapter proposes two extensions to the EBSD ‘intermediate framework’: the
‘THR-strategy’ based on current guidelines (UKWIR, 2002c) and the ‘CUT-strategy’
developed in this thesis. Both strategies consist of an iterative approach where the
EBSD model is run and the reliability (probability of failure) of the model solution
(supply-demand schedules) is tested using Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo
simulation consists of sampling ‘m’ random values of uncertainty from the estimated
probability distribution functions and applying these values to the supply and demand
data. The supply-demand balance is evaluated over the ‘m’ simulations at a water
resource zone level. If a level of service is found which is lower than the target one,
then the EBSD model is run again to return an alternative combination of schemes.
Under the ‘THR-strategy’ target headroom values are increased by the worst deficits
recorded over the Monte Carlo simulation. If the increased target headroom values
generate infeasibilities in the modelled network, then the target headroom values are
reduced just enough to remove the network infeasibilities. Under the ‘CUT-strategy’
target headroom values remain unchanged and new constraints are added to exclude
unreliable solutions selected at previous iterations. Limitations of the two methods are
listed below.
The ‘THR-strategy’ may generate network infeasibilities if demand becomes higher
than the available supply from existing and optional schemes (due to the increased level
of target headroom). Furthermore, increasing the headroom values may trigger the
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model to activate unnecessary infrastructure. It is possible that under a slightly lower
deficit, the model would return a lower-cost, but still reliable solution. This is
demonstrated by adding a new node to the modelled network that has lower costs than
the one selected under ‘THR-strategy’ as well as a lower maximum capacity (by
4 Ml/d). The selection of this node, can still bring the network level of failure below the
allowed level of failure. However, with the ‘THR-strategy’ this scheme cannot be
selected since its maximum supply (in conjunction with supply from other selected
schemes) is not sufficient and cannot meet the increased level of demand (due to the
augmented values for the target headroom).
The ‘THR-strategy’ presented in this Chapter was developed for the WRSE group. A
lesson was learned, in that re-evaluating headroom values discourages the application of
the ‘intermediate framework’. Results from the ‘THR-strategy’ stopped at a specific
level of target headroom and both companies and regulators struggled to see how the
new headroom values would have fitted within the regulatory framework since the
target headroom estimates follow established regulatory guidelines (UKWIR, 2002d).
The WRSE group did not accept the new headroom values and only considered the fully
deterministic version of the EBSD framework referred to as ‘current framework’ (see
model in Chapter 2).
To overcome the limitations above a new iterative procedure (the ‘CUT-strategy’) was
formulated, as described in this Chapter. The ‘CUT-strategy’ allows identifying a
reliable set of schemes without having to modify the company’s headroom values at
each iteration. This is done by adding new constraints to the model formulation, in order
to exclude unreliable solutions identified at previous iterations. The resultant solution
differs from those produced at previous iterations by at least one activated option. The
‘CUT-strategy’ guarantees the identification of all possible reliable portfolios of
schemes contrary to the ‘THR-strategy’. An extension of the ‘CUT-strategy’ is also
presented: a set of diverse near optimal solutions is generated whose level of reliability
is higher than the company’s target level. Given uncertainty on projected scheme costs
and the inability of the EBSD models to embed non-monetary metrics of the system
performance, that can be important to decision makers, it becomes important to be able
identify a set of near-optimal reliable solutions (in addition to the lower-cost solution).
The ‘CUT-strategy’ is similar to, but not identical to another optimisation technique
known as ‘modelling for generating alternatives’ (see the literature review in Appendix
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II). This optimisation technique (Brill et al., 1990) identifies alternative solutions that
are maximally different (see Section II.2). This means that at each iteration, the solution
is as different as possible from the one at all previous iterations, given minimum targets
on the value of the objective function. In the extreme case, the ‘modelling for generating
alternatives’ method may return a plan that is completely different (in terms of selection
of schemes) than previous solutions. The ‘CUT-strategy’, in contrast, identifies at each
iteration, the next ‘best’ (in terms of cost) least-cost solution. That is, it finds solutions
(portfolios of schemes) whose cost increases progressively. The ‘CUT-strategy’ stops
when a solution is found with a level of service lower than the target one. This is
implemented because water companies in England must show to regulators that their
plans are least-cost and it is therefore important to be able to identify solutions that are
reliable but also sufficiently ‘close’ (in terms of costs) to the least-cost plan.
A drawback of the ‘CUT-strategy’ method is that it may require more iterations than the
‘THR-strategy’. The number of iterations may increase if the network expands and this
may increase the total run time. To reduce the number of iterations, a minimum level of
diversity of two or more schemes could be imposed. However, this may prevent the
model from finding possible lower cost solutions or may create infeasibilities in cases
where there are too few available options to guarantee an appropriate level of diversity.
4.6 Conclusion
The work presented in this Chapter is an extension of the EBSD ‘intermediate
framework’ and the techniques here presented are intended to overcome difficulties that
have discouraged its application in real-word planning studies (see also section 1.6.2.4).
Two possible extensions of the ‘intermediate framework’ are proposed and compared:
the ‘THR-strategy’ that follows current regulatory guidelines (UKWIR, 2002c) and the
‘CUT-strategy’ proposed in this thesis.
The ‘intermediate framework’, by re-evaluating companies’ headroom values, has led to
some confusion, which has generally discouraged its application. This is because
headroom estimates follow well established regulatory guidelines (UKWIR, 2002a,
UKWIR, 2002b). Increasing target headroom can also generate model infeasibilities, if
the level of demand (the distribution input plus the new headroom values) is higher than
the available supply from both the existing and the optional schemes. Furthermore,
since the new headroom values induce the model to activate new schemes, the model
may overlook lower cost solutions that are still reliable.
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The ‘CUT-strategy’ allows, instead, the identification of reliable set of schemes
(portfolios) without having to modify water company target headroom values. It
consists of an iterative procedure where, at each iteration, a set of equations is added to
exclude non-reliable sets of schemes identified at previous iterations. The ‘CUT-
strategy’ can be used to return not only the lower-cost reliable portfolio of schemes but
also a diverse set of reliable plans. This is implemented to provide water company
decision makers with a wider range of options (in addition to the lower-cost one) so a
reliable plan can be chosen from among the options whilst considering non-monetary
metrics that cannot be represented in the model (see also Appendix II).
In this Chapter, both the ‘THR-strategy’ and the ‘CUT-strategy’ are applied to the same
pilot network and return the same schedule of schemes. When the network is expanded
with an additional node, the ‘CUT-strategy’ is able to return a reliable lower cost
solution than the one identified under the ‘THR-strategy’. This is because under the
‘THR-strategy’ the activation of schemes is triggered by increased levels of target
headroom values, contrarily to the ‘CUT-strategy’.
The ‘CUT-strategy’, because of its ability to overcome the limitations of the
‘intermediate framework’, could be used by the water industry in place of or in
conjunction with the ‘intermediate framework’.
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Chapter 5
MODELLING REGULATED WATER UTILITY
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
5 Introduction
This Chapter models the infrastructure investment choices of privatised water utilities
subject to the rate of return and price cap regulation. The goal is to help understand how
regulations may influence water company investment decisions such as their desire to
construct transfers with neighbouring companies. Under the 2010-14 regulatory process,
water companies in England can make a profit by reducing their operating costs below
the regulatory assumptions, or if the allowed rate of return is greater than the market
cost of capital. If companies invest in capital cost intensive schemes the associated
expenditure is added to their regulatory capital value (total value of assets at
privatisation and subsequent investments in new and replacement assets), on which they
can earn a return. No such return is earned on the operating expenditure. The regulator
also uses incentive schemes to reward (or penalise) companies for overspending (or
spending less) on the capital and operating expenditures.
This Chapter is organised as follows. Before proceeding with the literature review and
presenting the detailed model formulation, section 5.1 explains the model formulation
and how the ‘capital bias’ is revealed. Section 5.2 presents the literature review, while
section 5.3 describes the regulated English water supply sector. The model formulation
is presented in section 5.4 and 5.5, and its application is explained in 5.6. Discussion on
the model input data is presented in section 5.7 while results are shown in section 5.8.
Finally, the model benefits and limitations are presented in section 5.9, followed by
conclusions in section 5.10.
5.1 Summary of the model formulation and how it can reveal a
‘capital bias’
In this Chapter a new model formulation is introduced to represent how, under the
2010-14 regulatory constraints, water companies in England are allowed to make profit
based on the investments they make. Water companies in England are natural
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monopolies and as such they tend to overprice and under-produce in order to maximise
their profit (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). In order to refrain their monopoly market
power, the regulator caps the maximum price that companies can charge to customers
and on the allowed rate of return for future capital cost expenditures.
From the prospective of the regulator, the best case scenario is one in which cost
efficiency is achieved under the regulatory regime. This would mean that company
investment decisions are least-cost and this is reflected in lower customer bills. This
‘best case’ scenario is identified in this Chapter by running the EBSD model introduced
in Chapter 2 referred to here as the ‘Min Cost’ model run. Given a list of possible future
capacity expansions (new supply-side schemes, demand management measures and
transfers), the ‘Min Cost’ model identifies the least-cost schedule of schemes that needs
to be implemented to meet forecasted future demands under practical, political and
environmental restrictions (see the model constraints in Chapter 2). The ‘Min Cost’
model is applied to a water company in the South East of England, a subset of the
WRSE network presented in Chapter 3.
The success in delivering the ‘best case’ efficiencies and social benefits (represented
with the ‘Min Cost’ model) however depends on the incentives that the regulator uses to
ensure cost cutting and quality enhancement. If the regulatory incentives are not well
designed companies will not be incentivised to minimise costs and instead over-invest
in new infrastructure in order to increase profits. A ‘capital bias’ has been observed in
the English privatised water system (Ofwat, 2011, Severn Trent Water, 2010). Such a
bias occurs when capital cost-based schemes are chosen inappropriately by water
companies, in lieu of more cost-effective solutions that require higher operating costs
but lower totals costs (capital and operating costs). The 2010-14 regulatory framework
could create a new or contribute to an existing ‘capital bias’ if under the system of
incentives water companies profit more by increasing capital expenditure rather than by
operating expenditures. The aim of the work presented in this Chapter is therefore to
understand if the 2010-14 regulatory mechanisms could possibly drive companies
towards inefficient behaviours and generate a ‘capital bias’.
A new model formulation was developed and referred to here as ‘Max Profit’. The
‘Max Profit’ model is applied to the same network used to run the ‘Min Cost’ model.
Both models suggest what schemes must be activated (amongst those proposed by the
companies) and during which year in the planning horizon, such that the total supply
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provided by these schemes (together with the existing one) is equal to the company’s
forecasted annual demand. In ‘Max Profit’ the schemes are selected in order to
maximise the company’s profit under the 2010-14 regulatory incentives, while in ‘Min
Cost’, schemes are selected so that the total cost of future capacity expansions is
minimised. The incentive schemes that regulators use to induce companies to reduce
their capital and operating expenditures below the regulatory assumptions (out
performance) are also represented in the ‘Max Profit’ model formulation. These
incentives are included in the company’ profit equation and through additional model
constraints. The profit equation represents mathematically how companies can make
profit under the 2010-14 regulatory system through the investments they make by out-
performing the regulatory assumptions on the cost of capital (allowed rate of return) and
on the operating expenditure. Companies also receive financial penalties/rewards for
under- or out-performing the regulatory allowances on the two costs types. These
incentives increase (in case of out-performances) or decrease (for under-performances)
company profit and are optimised in the model by introducing new decision variables
and model constraints. These incentives include the Capital Incentive Scheme (CIS)
scheme and the rolling incentive allowances for the operating costs (here referred to as
IAJ). Under the CIS scheme, the regulator makes assumptions about the water
companies’ future capital expenditures needed to deliver the required level of service at
each periodic review period. If water companies spend more than what was assumed
(under-performance), the additional capital expenditure is added to their regulatory
capital value at the next periodic review period and a financial CIS penalty is subtracted
from the revenue allowance. On the contrary, if water companies out-perform the
regulatory assumption on the capital costs, then a CIS reward is applied. Under the IAJ
scheme, companies receive a reward for lowering the operating costs below the
regulatory allowance. Such rewards can be kept for six years before being transferred to
customers through lower bills (and consequently lower profits).
The solution of the ‘Max Profit’ model (schedule of scheme activation over a 26 year
planning horizon) is then compared to the one previously obtained by running the ‘Min
Cost’ model. By comparing the schemes selected by the ‘Max Profit’ and ‘Min Cost’
models, a ‘capital bias’ in the regulatory system can be revealed. For example, if under
the ‘Max Profit’ model, capital cost intensive reservoir schemes or desalination plants
are selected in place of more operating cost intensive but overall more cost-effective
options (as revealed by the ‘Min Cost’ model) such as imports or demand management
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measures, water companies can increase their profits by increasing their capital
expenditure. This would show that the 2010-14 regulations promote a ‘capital bias’.
Sensitivity analysis is then applied to show how the ‘Max Profit’ model works. By
activating and deactivating the incentives placed on the capital expenditure and on the
operating costs, changes in the results are highlighted. This allows gaining more insight
about how each individual incentive scheme impacts on the model solution. In the
following section a summarised description of the mathematical model formulation is
first introduced followed by a detailed description of how the profit equation has been
obtained and by the detailed list of all model constraints. The nomenclature is also
presented to help the reader become familiar with the new terms introduced in the
model formulation.
5.2 Regulating private water utilities
Regulation is necessary for privatised natural monopoly firms (Budds and McGranahan,
2003). Natural monopolies occur when a single firm can produce the market quantity at
lower production costs than two or more firms (Dennis W. Carlton, 2005). A common
explanation for this is the increasing returns to scale, that is, the larger the producer, the
lower its average costs. In such a market, competition among several firms is short-lived
(firms reduce to one because of mergers or failures) or inefficient: if multiple firms
exist, production employs more resources than necessary (Posner, 1969).
In comparison with firms operating in a competitive market, monopolists tend to
overprice and under produce, and therefore realise ‘excess’ profits (Budds and
McGranahan, 2003). Concern over the pricing of natural monopolies is the reason for
regulating private utilities such as telephone services, natural gas, electricity and water.
There are several approaches for regulating such monopolies and these typically involve
a price cap (Armstrong et al., 1994, Braeutigam, 1989, Isaac, 1991, Beesley and
Littlechild, 1989) and/or rate of return (Baumol and Klevorick, 1970) regulation. Under
price cap regulation, the regulator sets an initial cap on the price companies can charge
customers or on the allowed weighted average price for the firm’s multiple products.
The price is then adjusted every year by the Retail Price Index to consider inflation and
by a target productivity factor X (Bernstein and Sappington, 2000, Bernstein and
Sappington, 1999).
When determining prices regulators usually employ a ‘fair rate of return’ criterion: the
difference between the expected revenue and operating expenditure must be sufficient
161
enough to allow the firm to finance its investment plan by earning a ‘fair’ return on it
(Averch and Leland, 1962, Leland, 1974). Regulated firms typically have more
information than regulators about future demands and the potential for less costly future
provision (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). Under this information asymmetry, the
regulator might not be able to perfectly control the activities of the monopoly producer
as well as understand when the firm does not operate at minimum cost, with the
consequence of higher prices for customers. To lower this distortion incentives
regulation can be used to compare company performance. Financial penalties can then
be applied for poor performance whilst good performance is rewarded.
Several authors have attempted to study how price cap regulation impact the
investments utilities make (Evans and Guthrie, 2012, Teisberg, 1994, Broer and Zwart,
2013, Guthrie, 2006, Nagel and Rammerstorfer, 2009), with some studies applied to
sectors such as transport (Yang and Zhang, 2012, Starkie, 2004) and the
telecommunication industry (Kridel et al., 1996, Greenstein et al., 1995). However little
literature is available on modelling investment behaviours under the price-cap
regulation in the privatised water market.
5.3 Water supply planning in England and Wales
In 1989 the water and sewerage sector in England and Wales was privatised. Since then
water companies have been private natural monopolies and are regulated to incentivise
cost cutting, sustainable development and quality improvements. To limit the
companies’ monopoly market power Ofwat, the Water Services Regulation Authority,
uses price cap regulation to control prices and rate of return regulation to set ‘fair’
returns on capital (Armstrong et al., 1994, Matthew Bishop et al., 1994, Byatt, 2013,
Saal and Parker, 2001).
Price limits are determined every five years in a periodic review process (PR) which
considers costs incurred during the 5-year period (Helm and Rajah, 1994). When setting
price limits Ofwat allows companies to recover capital and operating costs that they are
expected to incur for the next periodic review period given assumptions on future
capital expenditure and operating efficiency (Allan, 2006, NERA, 2002). Incentives for
costs savings are also implemented to reward (or penalise) companies that out-perform
(or under-perform) the estimates assumed by Ofwat on future capital and operating
costs (Summerton, 1998, Ofwat, 2010a).
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Every five years companies must submit and publish Water resources Management
Plans (WRMPs) and Business Plans. WRMPs set out companies’ estimates for future
supply and demand and their least cost investment plan for the future. In the water
resources business plans, the companies publish future expenditure needs, financing
requirements and the implications for their average bills. Until 2011 companies have
also submitted annual ‘June Returns’ reports with detailed performance information
(e.g. expenditure comparison by purpose, financial and not-financial measures, key
outputs, etc.).
5.3.1 The building block approach
Ofwat uses a ‘building blocks’ approach to determine price limits. An illustration of this
approach is set out in Figure 42. Operating costs are recovered from customers through
the bills they pay in the year in which they are incurred (opex building block, see Figure
42) while capital expenditures are recovered over the assets’ useful life (between 20 to
100 years for civil infrastructure). For this reason, in place of one building block for the
capital expenditure, Ofwat considers two capex building blocks: one for depreciation on
the asset base and one for the return on the Regulatory Capital Value (RCV). The RCV
is the total value of the companies’ assets invested in the regulated regime (Ofwat,
2013d).
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Figure 42: The building block approach, adapted from (Severn Trent Water, 2010).
The maximum price companies can charge customers is calculated as the ratio between
the companies’ expected revenue requirement and the expected demand. The revenue
requirement is the sum of depreciation (DEP), return on the asset base, and operating
expenditure. Companies also need to pay corporation tax on their profits.
Once the maximum price is determined, the year to year change in the price limit is
fixed (reflecting the assumed level of capital expenditure) for each of the five years until
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the next periodic review is carried out. The price limit is also adjusted for inflation
(through the retail price index, RPI) as it becomes known. Under some circumstances a
company can apply for an interim adjustment; this allows price limits to be adjusted
between periodic reviews for items whose value exceeds 10% of a company’s turnover
(Ofwat, 2009b).
Depreciation DEP is composed of two terms: ‘infrastructure renewals charge’ (IRC) and
‘current cost depreciation’ (CCD). IRC is the annualised cost of maintaining the system
at its current level of operation (Ofwat, 2009b) and is calculated for infrastructure
(INFR) assets only. CCD is evaluated for non-infrastructure (N-INFR) assets and is
based on the assets’ ‘Modern Equivalent Asset’ value which is the cost to replace an old
asset with a new one with the same service capability (Ofwat, 2007). CCD is calculated
by dividing the capital expenditure across the N-INFR assets lives (Ofwat, 2002).
Classification of INFR and N-INFR assets is reported in (Ofwat, 2013c).
The return on the asset base is obtained by multiplying the Ofwat estimate for the cost
of capital, by the company’s regulatory capital value. The cost of capital is the rate of
return that could be earned elsewhere on assets of equivalent risk (Armstrong et al.,
1994) and can be estimated through the Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Dividend
Growth Model
At each periodic review, the regulatory capital value of the previous year from the last
review is adjusted to consider the movement in Retail Price Index (RPI). Then for each
of the 5 years of the periodic review, the expected capital expenditure to enhance and
maintain the network is added to the company’s regulatory capital value and any
expected grant and contribution (G&C) towards the costs on new assets is subtracted
along with the depreciation (CCD). Expenditure to maintain and replace infrastructure
assets (‘IRE’ or ‘infrastructure renewal expenditure’) is not directly accounted for in the
RCV, but instead subtracted from the infrastructure renewal charge (IRC). This
difference gives an idea of how much more (or less) money has been spent in
maintaining the infrastructure asset base than assumed in price limits.
5.3.1.1 Incentives for cost efficiency
Ofwat uses the capital incentive scheme (CIS) to challenge companies to reduce their
capital expenditures below the regulatory allowance. Under CIS at the beginning of
each periodic review, the company’s regulatory capital value RCV is adjusted to include
the company’s actual capital expenditure of the previous 5 years period and hence a
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regulatory return is earned on it. Then, if in the previous periodic review, companies
out-performed (or under-performed) the Ofwat allowance on the capital expenditure, a
reward (or penalty) is added to their revenue requirement for the current review period.
Rewards/penalties are calculated as follows. For each company, Ofwat sets a ‘baseline’
level for the capital expenditure. The baseline is compared with the company’s forecast
capital expenditure (as declared in the water resource business plan, WRBP) and is used
to calculate the company’s expenditure allowance included in price limits. An additional
incentive (efficiency incentive) is allowed for further out-performance which declines as
the ratio between the ‘water resources business plans’ forecast and the baseline (referred
to as CIS ratio) increases. At each periodic review, CIS rewards/penalties are the
difference between the expenditure allowance and the water resources business plans
forecast cost at the previous PR, multiplied by the efficiency incentive plus an
additional incentive that declines as the CIS ratio increases (OFWAT, 2010b).
Incentives for savings on the operating costs include the operating expenditure incentive
allowance. According to these incentive schemes, companies get one hundred percent of
any outperformance or underperformance on the operating costs, and can retain the
benefits of spending less operating costs than allowed by the regulator, for a total of six
years, irrespective of the timing of that spending. At each periodic review, the benefits
kept for more than six years are offset against the calculation of the incentive allowance.
The incentive allowance benefit is augmented by 50% for the most efficient companies
(referred to as frontier company) and by 25% for companies within the 5% of the
frontier.
5.3.2 The ‘capital bias’ issue
When deciding whether to use capital-intensive or opex-intensive solutions, a major
factor is whether a company thinks it is more likely to be able to outperform the
operating or the capital expenditure (rate of return) assumptions. Over the past years a
preference towards expenditure on capital assets over day-to-day operational
expenditure (capital bias) has been recorded (Ofwat, 2011, Severn Trent Water,
2010).Causes for ‘capital bias’ are analysed in detail in (Ofwat, 2011) and mainly
include the following: 1. companies earn a rate of return on the capital expenditure,
remunerated through the regulatory capital value, while operating costs are recovered
from customers in the year it is incurred and earns no such return; 2. to be certain they
can meet their security of supply obligations (Water Act, 1989), companies prefer
relying on infrastructure they own and control rather than on operating cost-intensive
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solutions such as imports from neighbouring companies or efficiency programmes
whose success depends upon customer’s habits and reactions. Since companies are
subject to enforcement actions for compliance failures, they may choose capex-based
solutions if they think these can guarantee a greater certainty of delivery 3. Companies
always retain more information about their businesses than regulators do and might
introduce in their water resource business plans unjustified capital expenditures that
Ofwat cannot challenge.
5.4 Basic model formulation
5.4.1 Nomenclature
Abbreviations used in the text
PR periodic review period (this is composed by 5 years)
RCV company’s regulatory capital value: value of the company’s assets invested
in the regulatory regime
INFR infrastructure assets: ‘underground systems of mains and sewers,
impounding and pumped raw, water storage reservoirs, dams, sludge
pipelines, sea outfalls, information about infrastructure assets such as zonal
investigation records’ (Ofwat, 2013c).
N-INFR Non infrastructure assets: all other assets, typically above ground (Ofwat,
2013c).
DEP depreciation on the company’s asset base. This is the sum of IRC and CCD
IRC infrastructure renewal charge: annual cost of maintaining the infrastructure
system at its current level of operation
CCD current cost depreciation: non-infrastructure capital expenditure divided by
the assets lives
RPI Retail price index
C&G company’s grant and contributions towards the costs on new assets
IRE infrastructure renewal expenditure: expenditure to maintain or replace the
infrastructure assets
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Indices
wc water company
tt different years that belong to the same set t
pr periodic review period
Set
WC set of water companies WC={wc: wc WC }
T set of time periods. T={t: t is an year and 1 ≤ t ≤  tmax=26}
PR set of periodic review periods. PR={pr: pr is a periodic review period and
pr1 ≤ pr ≤prmax}. PR={pr1, pr2, pr3, pr4, pr5, pr6=prmax}
Tfpr first year of each pr. Tfpr ={t: t is an year and t = [1,6,11,16,21,]}
Tlpr final years of each pr. Tlpr ={t: t is an year and t = [5,10,15,20,25]}
L set of existing and optional transfers and supply options {i, j}
Lopt set of optional transfers and supply options {i, j}
Ln-infr set of infrastructure assets
TPR subset of the Cartesian product between T and PR. It defines a mapping
between year t of set T and the correspondent periodic review period pr which
year t belongs to. TPR= {(t,pr): t T and pr PR }, that is:
TPR= {(t1,pr1),…,(t5,pr1),(t6,pr2) ,…, (t10,pr2), (t11,pr3),…, (t25,pr5)}
Parameters
iot regulatory allowance on companies’ cost of capital during year t
it companies’ actual cost of capital during year t
demandwc,t demand for company wc during year t
demandowc,t regulatory estimate of demand for company wc during year t
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ccdowc,t regulatory estimate of current cost depreciation for company wc during
year t
ircowc,t regulatory estimate of infrastructure renewal charge of company wc
during year t
opexowc,t regulatory estimate of the company’s wc operating costs during year t
hwc,t ratio between demandwc,t and demandcwc,t
fixwc,i,j fixed operating costs for Lopt assets of company wc
varwc,i,j unit variable costs (p/m3) for of Lopt assets of company wc
rpit retail price index during year t
gcwc,t grants and contribution during year t for company wc
swwc,t capital expenditure in the sewage and water sector (e.g. quality
enhancement, enhances level service, new outputs/obligations). This
does not include costs for maintaining/enhancing the supply-demand
balance which are instead optimised by the model
capwc,i,j capital expenditure of asset i ,j
cwwc,t,pr capital expenditure for the water sector (e.g. quality enhancement,
enhances level service, new outputs/obligations). This does not include
costs for maintaining/enhancing the supply-demand balance
depwc current cost depreciation CCD of company wc for year 2009
baswc,t,pr baseline expenditure for company wc during year t
pmaxwc,t maximum price per company wc during year t
allowedwc,t,pr allowance on capital expenditure for company wc, during year t and
review pr
effwc,t,pr efficiency incentive for company wc, during year t and review pr
addwc,t,pr additional incentive for company wc, during year t and review pr
gcwc,t grants and contributions for company wc during year t
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uli,j useful life of optional schemes i,j
fwc,t,pr CIS ratio for company wc during year t and review pr
Variables
Qwc,i,j,t,scen extent of use of options i,j for company wc, year t and scenario scen
Pwc,t actual price per company wc during year t
NPVπwc,t net present value profit for company wc during year t
OPEXwc,i,j,t weighted operating (fixed plus variable) costs for asset i, j of company
wc during year t
RCVwc,t regulatory capital value for company wc during year t
CCDwc,t current cost depreciation for company wc during year t
IRCwc,t infrastructure renewal charge for company wc during year t
INDwc,t Indexation (term used to upgrade the RCV values by inflation)
CISwc,t,pr rewards/penalties for capex out/under-performances for company wc,
during year t and periodic review pr
IAwc,t,pr incentive allowance during year t of periodic review pr, and company
wc for out-performances on the operating expenditure
IAJwc,t,pr equal to IAwc,t,pr when this is positive, and equal to zero otherwise.
OUTwc,t out-performance on operating expenditure during year t and for
company wc
OUTZZwc,t equal to OUTwc,t if this is positive, and zero otherwise (only defined at
the final year of each pr).
MAXwc,t max level of opex out-performance for any year prior than t
ROUTwc,t relative out-performance (OUTwc,t - MAXwc,t) for company wc, during
year t
ROUTNZwc,t equal to ROUTwc,t if positive, and zero otherwise
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IANEGwc,t equal to IAwc,t-1,pr at previous year (t-1) if IAwc,t-1,pr is negative, and equal
to zero otherwise
Binary Variables
ALi,j,t 1 if option i, j is activated during year t, 0 otherwise
BSwc,i,j 1 if option i, j is used during any year t and demand scenario scen, 0 otherwise
ZZwc,t 1 if OUTwc,t is positive during year t, 0 otherwise
Xwc,t 1 if MAXwc,t-1  OUTwc,t-1 during the previous year t-1, 0 otherwise
Ywc,t 1 if ROUTwc,t is positive during year t, 0 otherwise
Zwc,t 1 if variable IAwc,t,pr is negative during year t, 0 otherwise
5.4.2 The objective function equation
For each company wc (set WC) the net present value profit (NPVπwc) is given by the
sum of three terms: 1. the difference between the Ofwat estimated cost of capital (iot)
and the companies’ actual (it) cost of capital multiplied by RCV; 2. the Ofwat allowance
on the operating expenditure (input data, opexowc,t) minus the companies’ actual
operating costs on selected assets i, j (variable OPEXwc,i,j,t); 3. Penalties (or rewards) for
under-performing (or outperforming) the regulatory assumptions on the capital
expenditure (CIS scheme, variable CISwc,t,pr) and on the operating costs (opex incentive
allowance at year t and company wc, variable IAJwc,t,pr). OPEXwc,i,j,t contains both fixed
and variable operating expenditure. The variable operating expenditure is weighted over
multiple demand scenarios (see section 2.1.4 in Chapter 2). CIS rewards/or penalties
(variable CISwc,t,pr) are accounted for at the first year t of each review pr (set Tfpr) and
multiplied by the baseline expenditure baswc,t,pr (see CIS scheme).
The profit equation 5.1 also takes into account the revenue correction mechanism, a
‘legacy tool’ used to deal with differences between the company’s actual revenue and
the regulatory assumption (see section 5.5.1). Companies’ regulatory capital value
(RCV) is calculated through an additional constraint: at each year t, RCV is equal to the
one at the previous year (t-1), plus the investments on capital expenditure at year t,
minus grants and contributions (G&C) and the total depreciation (DEP) during year t.
170
 
 
1
1
, , , , ,
,
, , , , 1 , ,1 1
( , ) ( , 1) ( , )
1
1
fpr
tmax
wc t
t
t t wc t wc t wc i j t
i j
wc t pr wc tt pr wc t prpr pr
t pr TPR tt pr TPR t pr TPR
t T
maximize NPV
dr
io i RCV opexo OPEX
CIS bas IAJ
wc WC



 
   

 

  
      
   


   


 


  
5.1
Profit equation 5.1 shows that under the current regulatory process Ofwat fixes
companies’ maximum prices such that, for given assumptions about the operating
expenditure (opexowc,t), depreciation and cost of capital (ic), the total profit should be
zero. A company can therefore achieve a positive profit only if it achieves costs
(operating expenditure, depreciation and cost of capital) which are lower than those
assumed by the regulator at each price review. A company cannot effectively influence
its depreciation which leaves opex and the cost of capital as the only factors a water
company can impact. If Ofwat sets a rate of return which is above the actual cost of
capital that investors require, then a company can make profit by making capital
investments. However if Ofwat sets the rate below the actual cost of capital, then a
company will not make profits by investing and hence does not have any incentive to
make capital investments. Companies can also make profit by outperforming on the
regulatory assumptions on the operating expenditure.
5.4.3 The CIS incentive scheme for capital expenditure
The capital cost incentive scheme’s rewards/penalties CISwc,t,pr are calculated at the first
year of each periodic review period (set Tfpr) as the difference between the Ofwat
allowance on the capital expenditure and companies’ actual capital expenditure
(optimised by the model) recorded over the five years of the previous periodic review
period. Variable CISwc,t,pr is then multiplied by an efficiency allowance (see section
5.5.3) plus an additional income (see section 5.5.3) determined from companies’ CIS
ratios. CIS ratio values are obtained from (Ofwat, 2009b). The Variable CISwc,t,pr is a
percentage of the Ofwat established baseline (baswc,t,pr). CISwc,t,pr is therefore multiplied
by baswc,t,pr related to the previous periodic review period. All costs in this Chapter
(including the CIS rewards/penalties) are expressed in M£.
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5.4.4 Operating expenditure allowances
The operating cost incentive allowance allows companies to retain one hundred percent
of any annual outperformance of under-performance on the operating expenditure
(Ofwat, 2010a). This is represented in the objective function equation 5.1 by the
difference between the regulatory assumption on opex opexowc,t and the sum of the
operating expenditure OPEXwc,t optimised by the model.
5.4.5 The rolling incentive allowance for operating expenditures
The allowance on operating expenditure is calculated using variable IAJwc,t,pr which is
also included in the objective function equation 5.1. Variable IAJwc,t,pr is calculated as
shown in Figure 43. First the company’s outperformance on operating expenditure
(OUTwc,t) is calculated for every year t of the planning horizon as the difference between
the regulatory assumption on the operating costs (opexowc,t) and the company’s actual
operating expenditure OPEXwc,i,j,t . OPEXwc,i,j,t is a continuous positively defined
decision variable, defined for selected assets i,j and is estimated considering the most
probable scenario (normal year annual average, NYAA) to ensure that variable
operating costs (included in the OPEXwc,i,j,t figure) reflect how much schemes are likely
to be used over the planning horizon (rather than peak demands maintained all year
long). In line with the Ofwat regulatory requirements (Ofwat, 2009b), variable OUTwc,t
during the first four years of each periodic review period is forced to be lower than the
one at the last (fifth) year of the periodic review.
Once OUTwc,t is known, the relative outperformance (ROUTwc,t) at year t is calculated as
difference between OUTwc,t and the maximum level of outperformance (MAXwc,t) any
year before than t. ROUTwc,t is set equal to zero when negative, and this is done by
introducing variable ROUTNZwc,t. The Incentive allowance IAwc,t,pr at year t is then
calculated as the sum of all relative outperformances ROUTNZwc,t recorded no more
than six years prior to year t. After six years, the relative outperformances are subtracted
from the incentive allowance IAwc,t,pr at the first year of each periodic review (see
Figure 43).
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Figure 43: explanatory example on how the rolling incentive allowance for opex out-performances is
accounted in between periodic reviews. Numbers in the individual boxes represent the annual relative
outperformance (ROUTNZ) on the operating costs for each specific periodic review period. Arrows show
subtraction of the relative outperformance values in the boxes after six years have passed from their initial
occurrence.
This difference, if negative, is offset against the remaining four years of the periodic
review period using variable IANEGwc,t, but is not carried forward between
reviews.Finally IAwc,t,pr is set to zero, when negative, obtaining variable IAJwc,t,pr which
appear in the objective function equation 5.1 (see also Figure 43). A detailed description
of the model formulation is provided below.
5.5 Detailed model formulation
In this section the detailed model formulation is presented. At first, the calculations
conducted to obtain the objective function equation 5.1 are shown in section 5.5.1. The
regulatory capital value (decision variable RCVwc,t) equation is detailed in section 5.5.2,
the equation defining CIS rewards/penalties (decision variable CISwc,t,pr) is presented in
section 5.5.3, while the rolling incentive allowance equation (decision variable IAJwc,t,pr)
is shown in section 5.5.4. Again, in the formulation, variables and set definitions are
capital letters and input data are lower case.
5.5.1 The Objective function calculation
Companies’ net present value profit is first calculated as in equation 5.2. A loop is also
introduced in the model formulation to run the model multiple times, each time for a
different water company wc.
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5.2
In equation 5.2, WC is the set of all companies wc , tmax the last year of the planning
period, Pwc,t the price that companies charge to customers during year t, demandwc,t is
the company’s estimated level of future demand while OPEXwc,i,j,t is the sum of fixed
and variable operating costs for selected assets i, j of company wc and at year t. Finally
CCDwc,t and IRCwc,t are respectively the current cost depreciation and the infrastructure
renewal charge for company wc at time t. Terms it and RCVwc,t are respectively the
company’s actual cost of capital and regulatory capital value. The multiplication
itRCVwc,t is the company’s return of the cost of capital.
As explained in section 5.3.1 the regulator calculates the maximum consumer water
price in year t (pmaxwc,t) as the ratio between the revenue requirement and the regulator
estimate of the company’s expected demand (demandowc,t). The revenue requirement is
the sum of the expected return on capital, plus the regulator assumed operating
expenditure (opexowc,t) and depreciation (sum of current cost depreciation ccdowc,t and
infrastructure renewal charge ircowc,t). The return on the cost of capital is obtained by
multiplying the regulatory assumption of the company’s RCV value (RCVowc,t) by the
regulatory assumption iot on the cost of capital (allowed rate of return). The regulatory
allowed maximum price is given by equation 5.3.
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5.3
If companies push prices to the regulatory allowed maximum value pmaxwc,t, then
variable Pwc,t in equation 5.2 can be replaced by the maximum price allowed by the
regulator in equation 5.3. At each periodic review, under the CIS scheme, companies’
actual capex is included in their regulatory capital value and the depreciation charges
are adjusted to consider companies past actual expenditure. Therefore, in effect,
RCVwc,t=RCVowc,t, IRCwc,t=ircowc,t and CCDwc,t=ccdowc,t. This returns the following
equation:
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5.4
In the equation above hwc,t is the ratio between the company’s estimated annual water
demand, demandwc,t,and the regulatory estimate for the company’s demand demandcwc,t.
The regulator ensures that demandcwc,t equals demandwc,t. If it doesn’t, then the
company either gets more or less revenue in the next regulatory period to offset the
difference. This approach is called the ‘revenue correction mechanism’. By assuming
that ht= (demandwc,t/ demandcwc,t)=1, equation 5.4 becomes:
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The company’s operating expenditure is expressed by the decision variable OPEXwc,t in
equation 5.4. OPEXwc,t is given by the sum of the fixed operating expenditure (fixwc,i,j,t)
and the variable operating expenditure. Unit variable costs varwc,i,j,t (pound/m3) are
multiplied by extent of annual use variable Qwc,i,j,t,scen and then weighted over the
demand scenarios (set scen).
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5.6
By including the incentives on costs savings the objective function equation 5.5 we
obtain equation 5.1.
5.5.2 Company Regulatory Capital Value
Companies regulatory capital value (RCVwc,t) is calculated in equation 5.7 for each year
t and company wc.
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5.7
In the first year of each periodic review pr (set Tfpr), RCVwc,t is updated to consider
inflation (term INDwc,t). Term gcwc,t (equation 5.7) represents the company’s grants and
contributions towards the costs on new assets, capwc,i,j is the capital expenditure of
schemes i,j selected by the optimisation mode to maintain/enhance the supply-demand
balance, while swwc,t is the capital expenditure for the sewage service and other purposes
in the water sector (e.g. quality enhancements, customer services, etc.). Term capwc,i,j is
only accounted at the first year of activation of schemes i,j when the difference (ALi,j,t-
ALi,j,t-1) is one. Total depreciation is the sum of a fixed term depwc (depreciation on
existing assets) plus a second term for selected assets i,j (capwc,i,j,t is divided by the
assets’ useful life uli,j).
INDwc,t in equation 5.7 is the indexation term (used to update the RCV values by the
inflation). This is calculated as below:
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Rpit is the retail price index at year t. Placing equation 5.8 into equation 5.7 results in:
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5.9
5.5.3 Incentives on capital expenditure (CIS scheme)
At each periodic review PR, CIS rewards/penalties (variable CISwc,t,pr) are equal to the
difference between the Ofwat allowed capital expenditure and the companies’ actual
capital expenditure. This difference is then multiplied by an efficiency allowance
(effwc,pr) plus an additional income term: addwc,t,pr (equation 5.10).
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Terms allowedwc,t,pr, addwc,t,pr and effwc,t,pr in equation 5.10 are calculated from
companies’ CIS ratios (fwc,t,pr) respectively in equations 5.11, 5.12and 5.13 (Ofwat,
2009b). Term cwwc,pr is the capital expenditure for all purposes (e.g. quality
enhancement, customer service, etc.) excluding those for maintaining the supply-
demand balance (capwc,i,j) which are optimised by the model.
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Δfwc,t,pr is the extra point of CIS ratio behind the 130 upper limit (e.g. if a company has a
150 CIS ratio Δfwc,t,pr is equal to 20) (OFWAT, 2010b).
5.5.4 Opex rolling Incentive Allowance
The opex rolling mechanism allows companies to retain the benefit (IAJwc,t,pr) of
spending less operating costs than allowed by regulators for six years, irrespective of
the timing of those savings. Its calculation is explained below.
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5.5.4.1 The outperformance on the operating expenditure
Companies’ annual outperformance (OUTwc,t, equation 5.14) is first evaluated as the
difference between the Ofwat allowance (opexowc,t) and the company’s actual
(OPEXwc,i,j,t).
, , , , ,
,
, ,wc t wc t wc i j t
i j
OUT opexo OPEX wc WC t T t tmax
 
      
 

5.14
At each periodic review period pr, the outperformance OUTwc,t cannot be higher than
OUTZZwc,t at the last year of the pr and set out in Equation 5.15 (OFWAT, 2010b).
 , , , 5 ,
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In the equations below m is a scalar, while ZZwc,t is a binary variable equal to one if
OUTZZwc,t 0 and equal to zero otherwise. Equations5.16, 5.17, and 5.18 fix variable
OUTZZwc,t equal to zero when ZZwc,t =0 (and OUTwc,t is negative), and equal to OUTwc,t
when ZZwc,t =1 (and OUTwc,t is positive).
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5.5.4.2 Maximum Outperformance
For any year t the highest level of out-performance achieved in all years before (variable
MAXwc,t) is calculated in the following way. MAXwc,t is set equal to zero at the first year
of the planning horizon t1 (equation 5.19) and then equal to OUTwc,t at the second year
t2 (equation 5.20).
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, , , 2wct wc tMAX OUT wc WCt t    5.20
For each remaining year t of the planning horizon (excluding tmax), MAXwc,t is defined
by equations 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23 as the maximum value between variables MAXwc,t-1 and
OUTwc,t-1 at year t-1.
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In the equation above Xwc,t is a binary variable, equal to one if, at year t-1, MAXwc,t-
1OUTwc,t-1 and equal to zero otherwise (equation 5.21). Equations 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23
force together the equality MAXwc,t =MAXwc,t-1 when Xwc,t =1 and MAXwc,t =OUTwc,t-1
when Xwc,t =0
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5.5.4.3 The relative Outperformance
For each company wc and year t, the relative outperformance (variable ROUTwc,t) is the
difference between OUTwc,t and MAXwc,t at year t (equation5.24). Ywc,t is a binary
variable equal to one if ROUTwc,t 0, and equal to zero otherwise (equation 5.25).
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ROUTNZwc,t,pr is a positive continuous variable equal to zero if ROUTwc,t<0 and equal to
ROUTwc,t if ROUTwc,t 0 (equations 5.26 and 5.27).
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5.5.4.4 Incentive Allowance
The incentive allowance IAwc,t,pr at year t is first calculated as the sum of all the relative
annual outperformances (ROUTNZwc,t,pr) recorded no more than six years before t.
ROUTNZwc,t,pr kept for more than 6 years are subtracted from variable IAwc,t,pr at the first
year of each periodic review pr (set Tfpr). This difference is then offset against the value
of IAwc,t,pr over the next four years of the periodic period pr by using variable
IANEGwc,t,pr. (equation 5.28).
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IANEGwc,t,pr is defined by equations 5.30, 5.31, and 5.32. For each year t>t5 (i.e. after
the first periodic review period, pr>1), binary variable Zwc,t=1 (equation 5.29) if IAwc,t,pr
is strictly negative, and Zwc,t=0 otherwise. IANEGwc,t,pr is forced to zero at years Tfpr
(equation 5.29).
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Variable IANEGwc,t,pr =0 at any year t and for any periodic review pr>1, if IAwc,t,pr at the
previous year (t-1) is positive (and therefore Zwc,t=0). Otherwise, IANEGwc,t,pr=IAwc,t,pr at
year t-1 if IAwc,t,pr is negative (and therefore Zwc,t=1), see equations 5.31 and 5.32.
IANEGwc,t,pr values are not carried forward between reviews.
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Variable IAJwc,t,pr (the incentive allowance term included in the objective function
equation 5.1) is set equal to IAwc,t,pr if Zwc,t=0, and equal to zero when Zwc,t=1 (i.e. when
IAwc,t,pr is negative), see equation 5.33 and 5.34.
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Finally IAJwc,t,pr is incremented (see term multwc in equation 5.35) by 50% for companies
at the efficiency frontier (Ofwat, 2009b) and the 25% for companies within 5% of the
frontier. The enhanced benefit is then spread over the five years of the price review, pr.
Equation 5.33 therefore becomes:
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5.5.5 Further constraints
As most i,j schemes have a lower bound capacity equal to zero, the ‘Max profit’ model
might activate schemes (ALi,j,t=1) at zero ‘flow’(Qwc,i,j,t,scen=0) to maximise companies’
profit. To avoid this, a new binary variable BSwc,i,j is introduced, equal to one if option
i,j is used (that is if Qwc,i,j,scen>0 in any year t and scenario scen) and equal to zero
otherwise (equation 5.36).
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Equation 5.37 forces ALi,j,t to zero when BSwc,i,j is zero (i.e. when option i, j is never
used).
 , , , , , , , ,
opt
wc i j t wc i jt tmax
AL BS wc W C i j L t T

     5.37
5.5.6 List of model constraints
The ‘Max Profit’ model here presented has equation 5.1 as objective function equation,
and equations 5.9 to 5.37 as model constraints. Other model constraints are in common
with the ‘Min Cost’ model presented in Chapter 2 and include the mass balances
(equation 2.12), capacity constraints of all companies’ proposed schemes i,j (equations
2.6 and 2.7), constraints in section 2.1.5 and 2.1.5 and the demand reduction approach
for model infeasibilities (section 2.1.7.2). Variable costs of selected schemes are
calculated as in Chapter 2 (equation 2.15).
5.6 Model application
The profit maximisation model introduced in this Chapter is referenced as ‘Max Profit’,
and the EBSD model introduced in Chapter 2 as ‘Min Cost’. The ‘Min Cost’ and ’Max
Profit’ models are solved for a company ‘WC1’ in the South East of England. This
company is a subset from the WRSE network shown in Figure 23 of Chapter 3.
Company’s past expenditures (period 2003-2009) are extrapolated from the June Return
reports. Such values are then interpolated to make an estimate of the company’s future
expenditures over the 2010-2035 planning horizon. The company’ RCV values at the
first year of the planning horizon are taken from the Ofwat website (Ofwat, 2012). The
CIS ratios for year 2010 is from Ofwat (2010b). CIS ratios are hypothesised to be
constant over the planning horizon. The future values for the retail price index are also
interpolated from historical data available on line. The regulatory allowance on the
company’s operating costs is equal to the operating costs in the least-cost solution
(obtained by running model ‘Min Cost’), while the allowance on the capital expenditure
is set accordingly according to the CIS scheme. The company’s CIS ratio found in
Ofwat (2010b). For simplicity, the CIS ratio is hypothesised to be constant over the
planning horizon.
The planning period is composed of 26 years and is divided into five slots of five years
each (price reviews, ‘PR’). The last PR only includes year 2035, due to data availability.
Three demand scenarios (DYAA, DYCP and NYAA) are considered (see Chapter 1 for
their definition). The regulatory assumption on the cost of capital iot and the company’s
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actual cost of capital it are model input data. The difference (iot-it) is initially considered
to be constant over the planning horizon (i.e. Dic=io-i), and sensitivity analysis is used
to check the model response to different values of Dic. The model formulation is then
expanded to examine the cases where a ‘capital bias’ occurs. If a ‘capital bias’ is found
in a specific periodic review period, at the next 5 year review period the gap (iot-it) is set
to a constant negative value -Dic (i.e. the allowed cost of capital is fixed below the
company’s actual cost of capital). Sensitivity analysis is then performed to see if the
‘capital bias’ could be eliminated by decreasing values of –Dic.
Ofwat differentiates costs between expenditures for delivering and maintaining the
existing level of service (referred to as ‘base service’, see Figure 44) and expenditure to
meet new needs or delivering improvements to service (known as ‘enhancement’, see
Figure 44). The ‘base expenditure’ is then divided further into operating and capital
maintenance expenditure; the latter is composed of infrastructure renewal expenditure
IRE and maintenance non-infrastructure. Enhancement investment is instead
categorised as ‘quality’, ‘supply-demand balance’ or ‘enhanced service level’. The
Ofwat regulatory accounting guideline (Ofwat, 2003, Ofwat, 2013b) contains a detailed
classification of the water companies’ expenditure categories.
Figure 44:Ofwat expenditure categories, adopted from (Ofwat, 2008).
The model does not optimise all of the expenditure categories related to the water
service, but only the investment decisions which fall within the category ‘enhanced
supply-demand balance’ (see Figure 44). This is the ‘expenditure to provide water
services for new customers and/or accommodate the increased use of water by existing
customers at the current level of service’(Ofwat, 2003). This includes operating
expenditure and the infrastructure of non-infrastructure expenditure (Ofwat, 2009a).
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Both operating cost (fixed and variable) and the capital expenditure are considered for
supply-side schemes and demand management measures. Negative operating costs
(savings) are generated by leakage options. Such schemes reduce the amount of water to
treat and transport in the network, resulting in savings in energy and chemicals. With
regards to imports from external areas (collectively referred to by set TR), the operating
costs are assigned to the importing company only, whilst capital expenditure is shared
between the importing and the supplying company (Ofwat, 2013a). The ‘Max Profit’
model is applied at a company level, which means that when import schemes are
activated (based on their costs and maximum capacity), the model does not take into
account the supply-demand balance condition in the exporting company.
All schemes in the analysed network are divided into infrastructure (or underground)
and non-infrastructure (or surface) assets. This distinction was made by following the
Ofwat regulatory accounting guidelines (Ofwat, 2003, Ofwat, 2013b) that define
infrastructure assets and the Ofwat’s PR09 Financial Modelling Rule book (Ofwat,
2009a) which show how all the various operating and capital cost items are treated in
the final determination of price limits.
In the model, infrastructure assets include: ‘underground systems of mains and sewers,
impounding and raw water storage reservoirs, dams, sludge pipelines, see outfalls and
information about infrastructure assets (e.g. zonal investigation records’)’. Reservoir
schemes, transfers and active leakage control schemes, which also include zonal
investigations, were therefore considered as infrastructure assets. All remaining
schemes are classified as non-infrastructure.
Non-infrastructure assets are depreciated. The depreciation term is subtracted from the
company’s Regulatory Capital Value. Ofwat calculates companies’ current cost
depreciation based on the ‘Modern Equivalent Asset’ (MEA) value. The ‘Modern
Equivalent Asset’ value of an asset is what it would cost to ‘replace an old asset with a
technically up to date one with the same service capability’ (Ofwat, 2002). When the
asset is new, its capital cost and the ‘Modern Equivalent Asset’ value are the same. As
the asset gets older, there is the need to update its original capital cost figure to obtain
its ‘Modern Equivalent Asset’ value. This is done by allowing for inflation in capital-
items costs and by taking into account technological progress (which may have made an
equivalent asset a lot cheaper to buy now than it was for example 20 years ago). Since
the model considers the activation of new schemes over a planning horizon, the
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schemes’ capital expenditures were considered equivalent to the ‘Modern Equivalent
Asset’ value. Current cost depreciation is therefore calculated by spreading capital costs
over the assets expected useful life (Ofwat, 2002). This depreciated amount is then
summed up to a fixed term (depreciation value in year 2009, from the companies’ June
returns) in order to consider the depreciation on the existing assets. The assets’ useful
life is set equal to 25 years for desalination schemes, 60 years for all remaining assets
(Halcrow, 2005) and 30 for metering schemes based on information from (EA, 2005a).
Infrastructure assets are not depreciated; Ofwat uses for these asset type an average of
the projected renewal spend (infrastructure renewal expenditure or IRE). The
infrastructure renewal expenditure is not directly added to the companies’ Regulatory
Capital Value but is subtracted from the infrastructure renewal charge IRC (i.e. only the
variations in the accumulated pre-payment/accrual of IRC-IRE are considered).
Infrastructure renewal expenditure and network-enhancement are different categories of
capex (see Figure 44) and the model only optimises the latter expenditure type. Given
the definition of infrastructure renewal charges based on past and future renewal
expenditures (Ofwat, 2009a), the difference between the renewal spend additions and
infrastructure renewal charge subtractions was considered equal to zero in the model,
and therefore leave the Regulatory Capital Value at the same level. Only extra or
enhanced infrastructure or non-infrastructure assets increase the company’s Regulatory
Capital Value.
The model considers that, under the PR09 approach, first time spending on
infrastructure assets increases the Regulatory Capital Value and so a return is earned on
this increase. This is done following the Ofwat’s PR09 ‘financial model rule book’
(Ofwat, 2009a) which specifies that all of the capital expenditure to enhance the
network (which is also infrastructure, as specified before) is added to the Regulatory
Capital Value: ‘Capital expenditure to enhance and maintain the network is added to
the RCV. Any capital grants or contributions towards the cost of the new assets are
deducted. Current cost depreciation (based on the MEA value of the assets) is deducted
from the RCV each year’.
Of course, the exact increase in the Regulatory Capital Value and the exact amount of
return depends on the full calculation of the PR09 price setting mechanism. This
includes the Ofwat’s final allowance for the capital expenditure relative to the
company’s Business Plan submission, the outturn (the company’s eventual capex spend
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relative to the allowance, with all the Ofwat adjustments for
shortfalling/logging/inflation) plus the menu-selected proportions (e.g. CIS scheme,
incentive allowances on the operating costs).
5.7 Model statistics and input costs data
5.7.1 Statistics
Both the ‘Max Profit’ and ‘Min Cost’ models are implemented in GAMS (Brooke A et
al., 2010) and solved using the CPLEX MILP solver. The model was in a Windows XP
environment, using a DELL 2.6 GHz machine with 16 GB RAM. Figure 39 provides
statistics for model ‘Max Profit’. Model ‘Max Profit’ converges to a 2% gap in about 40
minutes time.
Model statistics
‘Min Cost’ ‘Max Profit’
Total number of variables 13,212 13,714
Binary variables 3,617 3,769
Table 39: Model statistics for the cost minimising model (‘Min Cost’) and the utility profit maximisation
model (‘Max Profit’).
5.7.2 Capital and operating costs for the analysed network
Figure 45 in panel ‘a’ shows the ratio (in percentage) between the capital cost of
proposed future schemes (grouped by type) and the total capital expenditure from all the
optional schemes. Schemes types are the same as in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.1).
Likewise, panel ‘b’ shows the same ratio but for the operating expenditure. Costs data
are from the company water resources management plan submitted during year 2009
and are extrapolated from aggregated information as explained in Chapter 3 (section
3.4). Since the model optimises decisions (what to build and at what capacity) based on
schemes’ capital expenditures and operating costs, and since the 2010-14 regulatory
process promotes separate incentives for costs savings on the capital and operating
costs, it is important to understand which schemes are capital cost-based or operating
cost-based (as shown in Figure 45). The graph in Figure 45 does not determine in
absolute terms if a scheme type is capital cost or operating cost based, since the cost
data used to generate this graph are approximated. The aim of graph Figure 45 is to
show the cost data for company WC1 and which specific option type, for this case
study, is capital cost intensive or operating cost intensive. For example, from Figure 45
it is clear that reservoir (RES), aquifer storage and recharge (ASR), metering (MET)
and groundwater (GW) schemes are the most capital cost intensive schemes while
imports (TR) are the most operating cost intensive schemes for network WC1.
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Figure 45: Ratio (in percentage) of each asset type cost (capital expenditure in panel ‘a’ and fixed plus
variable operating costs in panel ‘b’) and the total capital (panel ‘a’) or operating (panel ‘b’) costs of all
assets.
5.8 Model results
Solving the ’Min Cost’ and ‘Max Profit’ models provides the year of activation for new
options and the extent of annual use in Ml/d of existing and new schemes under the dry
year annual average, dry year critical period (DYCP) and normal year annual average
demand scenarios.
Table 40 and Table 41 show the total costs of selected schemes grouped by asset type
and their optimal extent of use in Ml/d under the DYCP scenario, respectively. Costs in
Table 40 are split into capital expenditure, fixed operating expenditure and variable
costs. Variable operating costs are weighted over the demand scenarios (see section
2.1.4 in Chapter 2).
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Costs [M£]
‘Min Cost’ ‘Max Profit’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
RES / / / 909 -16 0.16
TR 142 56 90 88 28 5
ASR 93 12 14 108 14 13
ER 27 2 1.28 27 2 1
GW 23 8 0.32 24 8 0.29
DESAL 13 27 6 24 15 3
MET 297 18 / 349 4 /
SW 4 0.36 0.52 4 0.36 1
LEAK 25 -28 / 25 -28 /
WEFF 40 -2 / 40 -2 /
TOTAL 664 92 113 1597 23.9 23.7
Table 40: Discounted costs in M£ for activated optional schemes aggregated by option type under the
‘Min Cost’ and ‘Max Profit’ runs. All data refers to company WC1 only. Columns may not add up due to
rounding.
Optimal extent of use [Ml/d]
‘Min Cost’ ‘Max Profit’
RES / 2799
TR 2716 328
ASR 547 511
ER 113 113
GW 271 240
DESAL 882 529
MET 1975 1975
SW 72 72
LEAK 1320 1320
WEFF 185 185
TOTAL 8080 8073
Table 41: Total extent of use for existing and optional nodes aggregated by option type, under the three
demand scenarios, for the ‘Min Cost’ and ’Max Profit’ runs. All data refers to company WC1 only.
Columns may not add up due to rounding.
By comparing the least-cost solution (model ‘Min Cost’) with the solution provided by
the utility profit maximising model (‘Max profit’), the following differences are noticed.
The extent of use of import schemes from external areas (TR) decreases from 2716 Ml/d
in ‘Min Cost’ to 328 Ml/d in ‘Max Profit’ (see Table 41), over the planning period.
Reservoir schemes, not activated in ‘Min Cost’, are used at a total capacity of 2799
Ml/d in ‘Max Profit’ (see Table 41).
The capital expenditure increases from M£ 664 in ‘Min Cost’ to M£ 1597 in ‘Max
Profit’ (see Table 40) mainly due to the activation reservoir options. Fixed operating
costs decrease from M£ 92 in ‘Min Cost’ to M£ 23.9 in ‘Max Profit’ due to: 1.
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activation of less import schemes TR (this reduces the operating costs from M£ 56 in
‘Min Cost’ to M£ 28 in ‘Max Profit’); 2. environmental benefits (negative operating
costs, M£ -16) related to reservoir schemes and 3. activation of a ‘change of occupancy’
metering scheme in ‘Max Profit’ in place of a ‘targeted compulsory’ metering (TCM) in
‘Min Cost’. The ‘change of occupancy’ metering scheme has lower operating costs (M£
17) than the TCM scheme (M£ 1). Weighted variable operating costs decrease from M£
113 in ‘Min Cost’ to M£ 23.7 in ‘Max Profit’ (see Table 40) mainly due to a lower
utilisation of imports TR from external areas.
Table 42 shows, for each periodic review period, the company’s return on the asset base
(∑ΔictRCVt), the outperformance on the operating expenditure (Δopex), CIS 
rewards/penalties and the rolling incentive allowance IAJ for outperformances on the
operating costs. All data in Table 42 are in M£. The sum ∑ΔictRCVt+Δopex+CIS+IAJ 
gives the company’s profit. Term Δict=(iot-it) is the difference between the regulatory
estimate of the cost of capital (iot) and the company’s actual costs of capital (it).
Δict=(iot-it) is constant (Δict=Δic) over the planning period and equal to 0.001.  
 ∑ΔictRCVt Δopex IAJ CIS 
PR09 (2010-2014) 36 4 / /
PR14 (2015-2019) 29.5 16 7 66
PR19 (2020-2024) 23 42 15 -36
PR24 (2025-2029) 16 45 9 99
PR29 (2030-2034) 12 43 0.5 86
PR34 (2035) 2 9.5 / 71
TOTAL 119 159.5 31.5 286
Table 42: Return on the asset base (∑ΔictRCVt), outperformance on the operating expenditure
(Δopex), rolling Incentive Allowance (IAJ) and CIS scheme (CIS) for each periodic review period, 
under model ‘Max Profit’.
Since under the CIS scheme both rewards and penalties are allowed (term CIS in Table
42 can be positive or negative), a company may opt to maximise the size of its
regulatory capital value (by increasing term ∑ΔictRCVt) through a combination of
rewards/penalties that balance out over time. In Table 42, even with a penalty of M£ -
36, the sum of the undiscounted CIS incentives is positive and equal to M£ 286.
Table 43 shows the undiscounted capital expenditure under the ‘Min Cost’ and ‘Max
Profit’ models runs, for each periodic review period. A capital cost expenditure of M£
1371 appears in PR14 under the ‘Max profit’ model due to the activation of a reservoir
scheme. This creates an undiscounted CIS penalty M£ 36 at the subsequent periodic
review period PR19 (see Table 42).
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PR09 PR14 PR19 PR24 PR29 PR34
‘Min Cost’ 505 204 35 20 84 10
‘Max Profit’ 486 1371 35 37 105 181
Table 43: Undiscounted capital expenditure in M£ under the least-cost model ‘Min Cost’ and the utility
profit maximising ‘Max Profit’ model, under each periodic review period.
Table 44 shows, for each periodic review period, the operating expenditure (fixed plus
variable operating costs) under the ‘Min Cost’ and ‘Max Profit’.
PR09 PR14 PR19 PR24 PR29 PR34
‘Min Cost’ 0.7 24 86 128 160 49
‘Max Profit’ -4 2 15 33 48 20
Table 44: Undiscounted operating expenditure in M£ under the ‘Max profit’ and the ‘Min Cost’ model,
for each periodic review period.
The operating cost profile in ‘Max Profit’ is lower than the one in ‘Min Cost’. Negative
operating cost values in ‘Max Profit’, at the first periodic review period PR09, are
mainly due to savings associated to leakage reduction schemes and to a reservoir option
activated under the ‘Max Profit’ run only.
5.8.1 Sensitivity analysis on the model results
Results in the previous section reveal that a ‘capital bias’ may occur for company WC1.
This is because the ‘Max Profit’ model replaces some of operating cost-based schemes
identified in the least-cost plan (see transfers TR, in model ‘Min Cost’) with capital
cost-intensive solutions (such as reservoirs).
In this section sensitivity analysis is applied to obtain a higher level of understanding
about model ‘Max Profit’. ‘Max Profit’ is run without allowing the company to retain
any outperformance on the operating cost, without any of the incentives for costs
savings (CIS rewards/penalties, rolling incentive allowance) and for different values of
the outperformance on the cost of capital Δic.  
Table 45 shows results, over the whole planning horizon, from all model runs which
includes the company’s profit (‘Profit’), total costs (‘Total Cost’), costs split into
operating (‘Opex’) and capital (‘Capex’) expenditure, CIS incentive rewards/penalties
(‘CIS’) and rolling incentive allowance for the operating costs (‘IAJ’). The operating
costs (‘opex’ in Table 45) include both the fixed and variable operating expenditures.
The return on the company’s regulatory capital value is also shown (see column
Δic∑tRCVt in Table 45). For the model runs in Table 45, the outperformance on the cost
of capital Δic is constant over the planning horizon and is set equal to 0.001. Column 
‘Δopex’ in Table 45 shows the difference between the regulatory allowance on the 
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operating expenditure and the company’s actual operating cost (optimised by the
model).
Profit Cost Opex Capex CIS IAJ Δopex Δic∑tRCVt
‘Min Cost’ / 870 205 664 / / / /
‘Max Cost’ / 10615 8116 2499 / / / /
‘Max Profit’ 596 1645 48 1597 286 31.5 159.5 119
‘Profit_noIAJ’ 564.5 1645 48 1597 286 / 159.5 119
‘Profit_noINC’ 275 1852 53 1799 / / 154.5 121
Table 45: The utility maximising profit model (‘Max profit’) is run without allowing the company to
retain any outperformance on the operating costs (model ‘Profit_noIAJ’),without any of the incentives on
capital and operating costs (‘Profit_noINC’). In ‘Min cost’ the cost of future capacity expansions are
minimised, while in ‘Max Cost’ costs are maximised. All costs are discounted to the base year 2010.
When an asset is selected under the utility profit maximising model ‘Max profit’, the
company’s regulatory capital value is increased by the asset’s capital expenditure and
reduced annually by the depreciation for non-infrastructure assets only. In order to
demonstrate that the ‘Max profit’ model is not simply maximising the company’s
capital expenditure, an additional model (‘Max Cost’) is run. This model is equivalent
to ‘Min Cost’ with the difference that the net present value costs are maximised. Capital
costs in ‘Max Profit’ (M£ 1597 in Table 45) are lower than in ‘Max Cost’ (M£ 2499 in
Table 45).
If the ‘Max Profit’ model is run without including the rolling incentive allowance on the
operating expenditure (model ‘Profit_noIAJ’), than the solution (schedule of schemes)
remains unchanged. The company’s profit decreases from M£ 596 in ‘Max profit’ to
M£ 564.5 in ‘Profit_noIAJ’, which is exactly the amount of the incentive allowance IAJ
(M£ 31.5 in ‘Max Profit’ in Table 45) not included in model ‘Profit_noIAJ’. This means
that the rolling incentive allowance scheme IAJ does not contribute to reducing the
company’s operating expenditure.
If the utility profit maximising model (‘Max Profit’) is run without including the IAJ
and CIS incentive schemes (model ‘Profit_noINC’), the profit equation becomes
Δic∑tRCVt +Δopex. Under the ‘Profit_noINC’ run, capital costs increase from M£ 1597 
(in ‘Max Profit’) to M£ 1799 (see Table 45). Therefore, the CIS scheme contributes in
decreasing capital costs.
In addition to the considerations above, the extent to which a company can out-perform
the cost of capital (Δic) can also contribute towards biased solutions. This is shown by 
running model ‘Profit_noINC’ for different values of Δic (see Table 46).  Table 46 
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shows that the capital expenditure increases for higher values of Δic. All terms in Table 
46 are in M£.
‘Profit_noINC’
Profit Cost Capex Opex Δopex Δic∑tRCVt
Δic=0 176 1617 1588 29.5 175 / 
Δic=0.005 788 2160 2111 49 156 632 
Δic=0.01 1421 2230 2176 54 151 1270 
Table 46: Changing the values of the outperformance on the cost of capital, for model ‘Profit_noINC’.
The data are in M£ and are discounted to year 2010.
Since companies accrue any out- or under- performance on the operating expenditure
(term Δopex), they may have the incentive to lower their operating expenditure below 
the value in the least-cost solution: the operating costs in the ‘Min Cost’ run is equal to
M£ 205, while opex in the ‘Max Profit’ run decreases to M£ 48 (see Table 45). This can
contribute to a ‘capital bias’ in the sense that a company may opt to replace opex-based
solutions by capital-based ones. Even when the outperformance on the cost of capital is
zero (see Δic=0 in in Table 46) and no return can be earned on the capital expenditure 
(Δic∑tRCVt =0), capital costs are higher in the ‘Max profit’ (M£ 1597 in Table 46)
solution than in the ‘least-cost’ solution (M£ 664 for ‘Min Cost’ in Table 45).
5.8.1.1 Changing the gap between the allowed and the actual cost of capital
In this section, the ‘Max Profit’ model formulation was extended to examine the case in
which the gap, Δic, between the allowed and the actual costs of capital is set equal to a
negative value when there is a ‘capital bias’ occurring at any periodic period PR. This is
done by introducing the following formulation.
First, a new variable is introduced, BIASpr, which is equal to the difference between the
capital baseline and the company’s actual capital costs (optimised by the model).
RORwc,pr is a binary variable and is equal to one when BIASwc,pr is negative at the
previous periodic review period (i.e. there is a ‘capital bias’) and equal to zero
otherwise. This is done by introducing the following set of constraints:
, 1 , , 1(1 ) , 1,wc pr wc pr wc prm ROR BIAS mROR pr PR pr wc WC         5.38
Variable RCV_RORwc,pr,t is equal to zero if there is a ‘capital bias’ (variable RORwc,pr is
equal to one) and equal to RCVwc,t otherwise. On the contrary, variable
RCV_ROR_Bwc,pr,t is equal to RCVwc,t if a bias occurs and equal to zero otherwise
(equations 5.41 and 5.42).
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, 1 ,
wc t wc pr wc pr t wc t wc prRCV m ROR RCV ROR RCV m ROR
pr PR pr wc WC
     
   
5.39
, , ,_ , 1,wc pr t wc prRCV ROR m ROR pr PR pr wc WC     5.40
, , , , , ,_ _
, 1,
wc t wc pr wc pr t wc t wc prRCV m ROR RCV ROR B RCV m ROR
pr PR pr wc WC
     
   
5.41
, , ,_ _ (1 ) , 1,wc pr t wc prRCV ROR B m ROR pr PR pr wc WC      5.42
In the equations above, m is a scalar. Term [(iot-it)×RCVt]=(Δic×RCVt) in the profit
equation 5.1, is now replaced by the following expression: (Δic×RCVwc,t|pr=1+
Δic×RCV_RORwc,pr,t|pr>1-Δic_n× RCV_ROR_Bwc,pr,t|pr>1). This parenthesis is referred
to as (Δic×∑tRCVt)* in Table 47 below. Term Δic_n is the difference between the
allowed and the expected cost of capital. Δic_n is a negative number, while Δic is
positive and set equal to 0.001 for the following model runs. This model run is referred
to as ‘Profit_neg_Δic’.
Profit Cost Opex Capex CIS IAJ Δopex (Δic×∑tRCVt)*
Δic_n=-0.01 480.5 1534 98 1436 248 46 107 99
Δic_n=-0.1 424 869 205 664 346 - - 103
Table 47: Results from model ‘Profit_neg_Δic’. Data are in M£ and are discounted to year 2010.
Results show that, if Δic_n is set to 0.01, the capital bias persists, due to the activation
of a reservoir scheme in periodic review period PR19. The bias incurs in the periodic
review PR14 and the company’s return on the regulatory capital value becomes negative
at the subsequent periodic review period PR24. This decreases the return on the asset
base by M£ 18.5 without eliminating the bias. Only by decreasing Δic_n to -0.1, the
capital bias is eliminated and the model returns the least-cost solution.
It is important to notice that, according to the formulation introduced in this section, Δic 
is set to a negative value every time a capital bias occurs (BIASpr<0) independently from
the entity of the bias itself. As future work, a step function can be introduced in order to
assign decreasing values of Δic_n (e.g. -0.001, -0.005, -0.01, -0.1, etc.) when the entity
of the capital bias increases. Under such a formulation, the model may decide to reduce
the bias without eliminating it completely (i.e. through the selection of lower-cost
capital costs intensive schemes other than the reservoir schemes selected in this
Chapter).
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5.8.1.2 Exclusion of reservoir schemes
Since the 56% of the capital bias in ‘Max Profit’ is driven by the activation of reservoir
schemes, their binary variables are now set to zero, in order to check how this would
influence the capital bias. This model run is referred to as ‘Profit_noRES’.
Results show that capital costs are still higher than in the least-cost solution (by M£
132) but lower than those (M£ 1597) in ‘Max profit’.
Profit Cost Opex Capex CIS IAJ Δopex (Δic×∑tRCVt)*
‘Profit_noRES’ 545 991 195 796 411 15 10 108.6
Table 48: Results from model ‘Profit_noRES’. Data are in M£ and are discounted to year 2010.
The model selects a change of occupancy metering scheme, which accounts for the 44%
of total discounted capital costs (see Table 49) and increases the extent of use of aquifer
storage and recharge schemes compared to the least-cost plan. Furthermore, an import
scheme (set TR) is selected in place of a lower capital cost scheme of the same type,
which was instead implemented in the least-cost plan (model ‘Min Cost’).
Costs [£M]
‘Profit_noRES’
Capital Fixed
operating
Weighted
Variable
operating
TR 179 67 83
ASR 136 13 14
ER 27 2 1
GW 23 8 0
DESAL 13 27 6
MET 349 4 -
SW 4 0 1
LEAK 25 -28 -
WEFF 40 -2 -
TOTAL 796 89 106
Table 49: Discounted capital, fixed and variable operating costs of schemes selected under model
‘Profit_noRES’.
5.9 Discussion
The ‘Max profit’ model has limitations, which relate to the formulation itself and its
application as listed below:
1. The company regulatory capital value (RCV) calculation is approximated. ‘Grants
and contributions’ are included in the RCV as input data obtained from interpolation of
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historical data. The ‘infrastructure renewal charge’ and the depreciation for the existing
infrastructure assets are also estimated through projections of historical trends. The
retail price index, used to adjust at each periodic review the RCV by the inflation, is
also estimated. Only non-infrastructure assets (e.g. reservoirs, transfers) are depreciated
(by dividing their capital expenditure by their useful life, as explained in the Ofwat
report ‘The approach to depreciation for the periodic review 2004-A consultation
paper’). The model only optimises the capital and operating expenditure to maintain and
enhance the network (i.e. it returns the portfolio of supply-side schemes and demand
management measures that meet forecast demand levels). The difference between the
infrastructure renewal expenditure and the infrastructure renewal charge is hypothesised
to be equal to zero.
2. The calculation of the CIS incentives is approximate: the allowance on the capital
expenditure (the ‘baseline’) is estimated from companies’ June returns. The CIS ratios
are from (OFWAT, 2010b) and are considered constant over the planning horizon.
3. Not all costs (e.g. quality enhancement, customer service) are optimised by the ‘Max
Profit’ model, but only those relative to the capacity expansion problem (i.e. to enhance
the network). The ‘non-optimised’ costs are introduced as input parameters, obtained by
interpolation of historical data from the June Reports. This however does not change the
model concept, as the scope of this work is to show, based on schemes’ costs, which
kind of expenditure (if capital-cost based or operating-cost based) is selected by the
model in order to maximise companies’ profit.
4. There are other mechanisms used by Ofwat to incentivise companies to manage costs
that are not represented in the model formulation. These include: ‘shortfalling’
according to which companies’ revenues are further reduced in case of non-delivery of
the required outcomes (e.g. quality and legal obligations), ‘interim determination’ and
‘logging-up’ (or ‘logging-down’) to account for any reasonable additional (or
reduction) in cost caused by changes in the sector legal obligations. This means that the
regulatory process is dynamic: changes are allowed in between review periods, and this
is not represented in the model. Also, there are regulatory incentives concerning the
quality of the service (customer service, environmental performance such as pollution
incidents, water quality, etc.), referred to as the OPA and SIM incentives, that are not
represented in the model. However these can only impact companies’ revenues by the
0.5% to -1% (OFWAT, 2010b).
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5. The conservatism or risk aversion behaviour of companies (some investment choices
by decision makers are based on “gut feelings” about what works in the field or is more
politically acceptable) is not represented in this work; this may also contribute to a
‘capital bias’, as explained subsequently. Water companies may see operating costs
solutions as ‘more risky’ than capital based ones because of the different certainty of
delivery of the two cost types (for example the success of a water efficiency programme
depends on customers’ habits and reactions, which may be difficult to predict). Water
companies may also have a preference to use their own assets, such as reservoirs, in
place of operating based solutions like imports from neighbouring areas. Also, water
companies and investors may focus on the growth of the regulatory capital value as a
metric that represents the company’s growth (Ofwat, 2011). This is because the RCV
provides a measure of the company’s ability to remunerate investors for the investment
programmes on long-life assets. Finally, the ‘relative efficiency scheme’ on the
operating costs may also contribute to form a ‘capital bias’; Ofwat publishes each year
‘league tables’ setting out information about the relative performance of each company.
Such estimates are incorporated in the operating expenditure allowance included in
price limits. This incentive is applied to the operating costs only, since the CIS scheme
is used for the capital costs in order to set expenditure assumptions. Under the ‘relative
efficiency incentive’ scheme, companies may see an increase in the operating
expenditures as something that would worsen their position in the Ofwat’s ‘league
table’ (Ofwat, 2011). For this reason, in order to decrease the operating costs, they may
opt to replace operating cost intensive solutions with capital cost based ones.
6. The utility profit maximising model ‘Max profit’ is applied to individual water
companies without considering exports. Imports are allowed but do not take account of
the supply-demand balance situation in the exporting company. Future work could be
done to address this limitation and introduce interactions between companies, using
decentralised optimisation (Yang et al., 2009, Berger, 2001, Berger et al., 2007) or
game theory methods (Mahjouri and Ardestani, 2010, Wang et al., 2003, Wang et al.,
2008).
7. The ‘Max profit’ model uses public data from company water resources management
plans (WRMPs). Since costs in the WRMP tables are in net present value, several
hypotheses were made to extrapolate the undiscounted cost figures from the net present
values. The approximate cost estimates are why the study results cannot be used to
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evaluate specific infrastructure investment decisions but can only give insight about
what scheme types are selected based on their declared capital and operating costs.
8. Finally the model does not include taxes in the estimates of companies’ revenue
requirement, i.e. its does not consider the fact that companies need to pay corporation
tax on profits. The tax allowance includes the so-called ‘capital allowances’ available
under UK tax law. According to the ‘capital allowances’ scheme, when any company
spends on certain types of capital assets (e.g. long life assets, industrial building
allowances, etc. (see (Ofwat, 2009a) for a complete list), it can use a part of that cost to
lower its taxable-profits in the early years. This means that the company can claim the
cost as a tax allowance early in the life of the asset instead of only getting that tax relief
later and over the whole life of the asset through a depreciation amount. This reduces
the company early years’ corporation tax bills and brings forward the profile of
shareholder-profits expected to be earned on the capital expenditure. If the investors
prefer early profit to later profit, the tax allowances may have an incentive effect to
make investments in the capital expenditures. The ‘financial model rule book’ (Ofwat,
2009a) shows in detail how Ofwat models taxes including the ‘capital allowances’
scheme.
Given the limitations listed above, the model presented in this Chapter does not claim to
be able to precisely quantify the ‘capital bias’. The model is meant to investigate if,
under the current set of regulatory incentives, a ‘capital bias’ effect could occur and
why. Such bias is revealed by running the ‘Max Profit’ model and by comparing its
results (schedule of schemes) with those obtained if companies were simply minimising
the cost of future capacity expansions (model ‘Min Cost’). The ‘Max Profit’ model
presented here cannot embed all of the complexity of the regulatory framework,
however it does represent how companies can make profit under the current set of
regulatory incentives. This can occur by companies outperforming the regulatory
assumptions of the costs of capital and on the operating costs, and through
rewards/penalties for out- or under-performances on the operating and capital
expenditures.
As future work, further changes to the model formulation could be made to investigate
how different regulatory practices impact the ‘capital bias’. Such changes could include
a cost recovery approach that eliminates the distinction between the capital and the
operating expenditures. The 2015-20 regulation in England is already considering this
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by allowing a determined ratio of companies’ total costs (capital plus operating
expenditure) to be remunerated through the companies’ regulatory capital value. The
remaining portion of the companies’ total costs will be recovered in the year the costs
are incurred. Also additional incentives will be introduced to encourage water
companies to trade (Ofwat, 2013d). Another different regulatory practice could be to
allow a return on the operating expenditures in addition to the return on the regulatory
capital value. Then if, as a result of this option, costs are still higher than the one in the
least cost solution, the rate of return on the operating expenditure could be adjusted to
leave the two returns in neutral present value terms (Ofwat, 2011). Such a strategy could
be implemented by setting the allowed rate of return on the operating costs as a decision
variable optimised by the model. In addition, incentives on the total expenditure could
be allowed rather than separate incentive schemes on the capital and operating costs.
This could be implemented by setting term Δopex equal to zero (so that out- or under-
performances on the operating costs do not affect the company’s profit), and by
replacing the CIS scheme (for capital expenditure) and the rolling incentive allowance
scheme IAJ (for the operating expenditure) by a new incentive scheme on total costs
(capital plus operating costs). Finally the model can also be used to test whether
incentives with rewards and penalties or penalties only should be allowed.
5.10 Conclusions
A capacity expansion optimisation model was formulated to simulate how the 2010-
2014 price cap regulation (referred to as PR09) influences natural monopoly water
utility investment plans in England. The model identifies the annual schedule of scheme
implementations (supply, demand management, and transfer options) that meet future
demands and maximise companies’ profits under social, environmental and regulatory
constraints. English water companies can make profits by outperforming the cost of
capital and lowering the operating expenditures below the regulatory allowance. When
companies invest in capital schemes, the associated expenditure is added to their
regulatory capital value increasing the return that they can earn on it; no such return is
earned on operating expenditures. All of this is represented in the model formulation
together with the regulatory incentives for costs savings. Such incentives include the
CIS scheme for the capital expenditure and the rolling incentive allowance for the
operating expenditure (opex). The model formulation also considers the length of the
price control period: the planning horizon is split into slots of five years; decisions
(what to activate, when and at what capacity) are optimised over the whole planning
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horizon, however the regulatory incentives (the rolling incentive allowance and CIS
rewards/penalties) are optimised based on the periodic review period.
Results from the utility profit maximising model are then compared with the least-cost
capacity expansion plan (social optimum). This plan represents the ideal scenario of the
cost efficiencies that could be achieved if, under the 2010-14 regulatory constraints,
companies are incentivised to minimise the total cost of future capacity expansions. The
comparison shows that under the utility profit maximising model, capital cost based
schemes, such as reservoirs, are activated in place of some of the operating cost based
schemes, such as transfers, selected in the least-cost solution. This shows that under the
current set of regulatory incentives (utility profit maximising model) companies make
profit by increasing the capital expenditure over the operating costs. Such phenomenon
is known in the English water sector as ‘capital bias’. Sensitivity analysis is applied to
the utility profit maximising model to gain insights about the causes for the capital bias.
The fact that companies accrue one hundred percent of any underperformance on the
operating expenditure, may induce them to replace opex-based solutions with options
that are capital-based ones. This distortion could be reduced through financial penalties
by using the CIS scheme. However, since the CIS scheme allows for a symmetric
treatment of the capital expenditure (both rewards and penalties are allowed for out- and
under-performances), a company may still opt to increase the size of its regulatory
capital value (by incurring capital expenditure), through a combination of CIS
rewards/penalties that balance out over time. Furthermore, the extent to which a
company can outperform the regulatory assumptions on the cost of capital can also
increase the ‘capital bias’ effect. Results show that by increasing the gap between the
regulatory allowed and the company’s actual cost of capital from 0.001 to 0.01 the
capital expenditure in the model solution increases.
The model formulation was extended to examine the case in which the allowed cost of
capital is lowered below the actual cost of capital, for any periodic review period after
the one where a ‘capital bias’ is recorded. Sensitivity analysis is conducted where
different values were assigned to the negative difference between the allowed and the
actual cost of capital (i.e. the return on the company’s regulatory capital value). Results
show that by decreasing the company’s rate of return, the ‘capital bias’ could be
removed. Since the return on the asset base is given in input to the model independently
on the entity of the capital bias, the model identifies solutions where the capital-bias
persists or is eliminated. As future work, a step function could be introduced in the
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model formulation in order to assign decreasing values to the return on the asset base as
the entity of the capital bias increases. Under this formulation, the model will have the
incentive to identify solutions where the capital-bias is reduced without being
eliminated. Results show that the return on the asset base plays a significant role in
generating or decreasing the capital bias. However, this leads to the following question.
To what extent can the regulator can the allowed cost of capital below the company’s
actual cost of capital, in order to reduce (or remove) the bias? This is because when
setting this vale, the regulator has to ensure that the water company will be able to
finance its investment programme.
This Chapter also discussed elements of the PR09 regulatory systems which are not
represented in the model, but that may still contribute generating a ‘capital bias’. For
example, the companies’ conservatism and risk adverse behaviour, not represented in
our model, can also contribute generating a ‘capital bias’. Finally, it discusses the UK
tax allowance system that includes the so-called ‘capital allowances’ according to which
any time a company spends on certain types of capital, it can use a part of that cost to
lower its taxable-profits in the early years. This could also contribute towards capital-
biased solutions. No such allowance is designed for the operating expenditure.
The Chapter concludes by analysing potential changes in the 2010-14 regulation to
address the ‘capital bias’ effect. Such changes include incentives on total costs rather
than on the operating and capital expenditures. In general, the least cost solution (see
model ‘Min Cost’) is given by a determined ratio of capital and operating costs and the
relative strength of the incentives that the regulator placed in the two cost types (capital
and operating expenditures) may induce companies towards bias preferences for capital
cost intensive solutions. Benefits and limitations of the proposed model formulation and
its application are also discussed.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
6 Research statement
The expectation of reliable water supplies to support economic development and social
stability is growing worldwide. In England some regions will likely face intermittent
and increasing water scarcity due to risings population and possibly climate changes.
Maintaining the supply-demand balance is a priority for the nation’s private water
companies and their financial and environmental regulators. Water companies face the
challenge of scheduling new supply infrastructure investments to maintain the supply-
demand balance at minimum cost. Regulators are also interested in minimum cost
capacity expansion planning, as this is one way they evaluate and regulate proposed
water company schemes. Since over a decade water companies in England follows the
‘Economics of Balancing Supply and Demand’ (EBSD) framework for capacity
expansion (UKWIR, 2002a, UKWIR, 2002b); The EBSD framework has some clear
benefits that explain its wide application to the English water sector such as its
applicability to large scale systems with complex interdependencies and institutional
appropriateness (the framework provides the output that regulators require).
Furthermore, EBSD determines the least-cost combinations of schemes to meet future
demands but also the least-cost investment scheduling over a multi-year planning
horizon. Given the challenges faced in real-word capacity expansion problems (Fiering
et al., 1986), the fact that EBSD is used to justify infrastructure investments nation-
wide, is a demonstration of its success. However, as any modelling, the EBSD
framework and its application in practice are not exempt from limitations. These have
motivated this thesis research which is summarised in the following section.
6.1 Thesis contributions
Past applications of the EBSD framework did not consider, or not in a sufficient detail,
demand management measures (water conservation). Because demand management
may be a cost effective and environmentally beneficial way to establish the supply-
demand balance, it is recommendable to expand EBSD models to represent such
options.
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Many EBSD models do not deal rigorously with infeasibilities which inevitably arise in
real-word applications when the available supply is lower than forecast demands. This
might result from unexpected imposed reductions on supply for environmental
protection reasons, or due to constraints on the availability of new resources. Work in
Chapter 2 addressed both of these issues. An optimisation model formulation following
the EBSD framework was proposed and applied to a large-scale regional system in the
South East of England (the WRSE area). Demand management schemes were included
in the capacity expansion portfolio model and ad-hoc constraints were introduced to
allow for user-defined saving profiles accounted from the schemes’ first year of
activation. A two-step optimisation procedure was also implemented to eliminate model
infeasibilities. The procedure reduces demands at infeasible areas just enough to ensure
a feasible supply-demand balance condition can be restored (and informs analyst to
which supply zone the demand had to be manipulated so that more options can be added
in these zones). Model infeasibilities could also be removed by injecting flow at
infeasible areas at high penalty costs. However, penalty costs can make the model less
sensitive to real schemes costs and lead to sub-optimal results.
The model in Chapter 2 was further expanded in Chapter 3. A new formulation was
presented that allows incorporating a generic capital cost estimate through a concave
cost curve approximated by a piecewise linear function. This allows expanding the
WRSE network with additional nineteen potential inter-company transfers not proposed
in company plans. Model results showed that a potential net present value cost saving of
about £1 billion could be achieved over a 26 year planning horizon from increasing the
level of water supply interconnectivity in the region. This was achieved primarily
because several supply-side sources or expensive demand management options were
replaced by relatively lower-cost interconnections.
Work in Chapter 4 was conducted to overcome difficulties faced by the English water
sector around the application of a stochastic version of the EBSD approach, called the
‘intermediate framework’. The ‘intermediate framework’, by re-evaluating companies’
headroom values, has led to some confusion which has generally discouraged its
application. This is because companies’ headroom estimates follow an already
established regulatory guideline (UKWIR, 2002a, UKWIR, 2002b). Furthermore the
‘intermediate framework’, by adjusting companies’ headroom values, may create
network infeasibilities if the increased level of demand (distribution input plus the new
headroom values) becomes higher than the available existing and new supplies. In this
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case the ‘intermediate framework’ cannot be run to completion. Furthermore, since
increasing the headroom values triggers the EBSD model to activate new schemes, the
‘intermediate framework’ can overlook lower cost solutions that are still reliable. This
may discourage its application in a regulatory context where water companies must
justify to the regulators that their plans are at least-cost. These limitations were
overcome by the proposed approach. This approach does not modify the headroom
values, but uses ad-hoc constraints to exclude unreliable solutions identified in previous
iterations. The ‘CUT-strategy’, contrarily to the ‘THR-strategy’, returns the lower-cost
reliable solution. An extension of the ‘CUT-strategy’ is also presented that allows
identifying a diverse set of reliable portfolios in addition to the least-cost one. Since
EBSD models are single-objective (i.e. it require monetising all aspects of system
performance) and given the uncertainty of scheme projected costs, the least-cost
solution may not be the ‘best’ solution to a problem. It is therefore important to provide
company decision makers with a set of reliable near-optimal solutions in addition to the
least-cost one (see also Appendix II).
Work in Chapter 5 presented a modified capacity expansion formulation that maximises
water company profits under constraints on their allowed rate of return and the
maximum price that can be charged to customers. The regulatory incentives for costs
savings were also represented; these included the CIS scheme for capital expenditure
and the incentive allowance schemes for the operating costs. The aim of this work is to
help understand how companies’ investment decisions could be influenced by the
current regulatory regime, and explore the causes for what the sector calls the ‘capital
bias’ effect, i.e., companies’ preference to capital based solutions in lieu of more cost-
effective schemes that are operating expenditure based. The model’s results were
compared with the least-cost solution obtained by running, for the same company, the
social optimum EBSD model introduced in Chapter 2. The comparison showed that a
‘capital bias’ effect can be generated mainly because the regulator places separate
incentives on capital and operating expenditures. Since companies are liable for one
hundred percent of any under-performance on the operating expenditure, they may be
encouraged to reduce the operating costs and opt for schemes that are more capital cost-
based. The ‘capital bias’ may also depend on the extent to which a company can finance
its investments at a rate below the allowed cost of capital. Results showed that by
increasing the out-performance on the cost of capital, the capital bias effect increases.
CIS rewards/penalties can reduce the capital-bias, however a company may still opt to
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maximise the size of its regulatory capital value (on which a return is earned), through a
combination of rewards/penalties that balance out over time. If the difference between
the allowed and actual cost of capital (i.e. return on the company asset base) is lowered
to a negative value, for any periodic review period after the one a capital-bias occurs,
then the capital bias may persist of be removed. This depends on the extent by which
the return on the company asset base is decreased. However, this raises the question of
whether such strategy could be applied to remove the bias, given the fact that the
regulator has the duty to set an allowed cost of capital so that the company will be able
to finance its investment programme.
Further extensions to the EBSD framework are presented in Appendix I and II. In
Appendix I the EBSD model in Chapter 2 is extended to allow scheme costs to be
accounted over their whole useful life, beyond the 25 to 30 year planning horizon. This
is done to avoid biased comparison of schemes with varying economic lifetime. In
Appendix II the EBSD model in Chapter 2 is expanded to generate multiple near-
optimal solutions. It is argued that, since EBSD models are single-objective (all aspects
of system performance are monetised) a ‘nearly’ optimal plan may be preferred by
company decision makers and regulators if it presents non-monetary benefits that
cannot be represented in EBSD models. The near-optimal solutions are displayed in
parallel axis plots to show their diversity in terms of frequency of selection, extent of
use, and timing of scheme activation. The near-optimal plans are diverse; for example,
the optimal capacity of reservoir schemes and imports varies as much as 520% and
415% respectively. Results show that by allowing costs to deviate by just a few
percentage points from the least-cost plan, solutions can be found with a high diversity
in terms of schemes’ selection and extent of use. For example, a plan 6% more
expensive than the least-cost one is identified that uses reservoir schemes at a 24%
higher extent and import options at a 30% lower extent than in the least-cost plan. For a
decision-maker not trusting the potential gains of imports and demand management
schemes, this would be a tempting plan to adopt. Generating near-optimal solutions also
allow identifying schemes that possibly represent low-regret decisions (if selected in
many of the near optimal plans). Finally, near-optimal solutions can be identified that
allow company decision-makers to avoid or delay the implementation of schemes that
present political or environmental challenges.
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6.2 Discussion of limitations of each technical Chapter and future
work
There are still issues related to the EBSD framework that needs to be further explored.
Some of these relate to the underlying structure of the capacity expansion problem as
formalised by the EBSD planning framework and are listed below:
1. The problem of non-convex cost functions in capacity expansion is overcome by a
significant compromise: fixing capacities and costs into proposed discrete schemes
rather than using continuous cost functions. Given each discrete option generates a
computationally expensive binary variable, inevitably too few discrete possible
capacity and costs values are included, a limitation which necessarily leads to the sub-
optimality of suggested ‘least-cost’ plans. This limitation is partially mitigated by the
fact that water companies and regulators prefer costing discrete schemes as they are
unwilling or unable in many instances to generate continuous cost curves, which in
practice for large systems are not always easy to generate reliably. In Chapter 3 the use
of non-convex costs curves is allowed for a set inter-company transfers.
2. In EBSD models, yields of all schemes are estimated separately by water companies
by running a simulator under historical drought conditions. This may work well for
hydrologically independent supplies like desalination, but ignores possible interactions
between schemes (such as stream-aquifer interaction or combinations of demand
management schemes) which could imply that the yields (‘deployable outputs’ of
sources) are inaccurate, particularly under stressed conditions where hydrological
systems tend to act non-linearly;
3. In areas where over-year storages plays a significant role in water supply, it may be
inappropriate to assume each year supplies are unrelated to previous year’s storage
levels and that there is no hedging in consumption in response to low storage in multi-
year storage facilities. In this case more complex formulations that track storage levels
and other water management variables, e.g. at the monthly level, can be necessary
(Loucks et al., 1981);
4. The EBSD model is single objective, whereas real water supply systems are managed
according to several criteria (such as reliability, energy use, etc.). Generating multiple
near-optimal solutions (see Appendix II) gives an idea of what alternative plans are
available in addition to the least-cost one. This increases the freedom for planners to
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consider un-modelled factors and other strategic priorities in the decision making
process. However, even if multiple near-optimal solutions are considered, no
quantitative approach is provided to assess how these solutions perform with respect to
other non-monetary criteria (e.g. resilience, environmental performance, etc.) that may
be important to decision makers. A multi-objective model formulation would allow
optimising other societal/water company objectives and generating multiple plans
whose performance can be assessed against the optimised objectives.
5. The ‘intermediate framework’ uses Monte Carlo simulation to test the reliability
(probability of failure) of the EBSD model solution if the deterministic supply and
demand estimates are subject to uncertainty. There are however uncertainties that
cannot be analysed by Monte Carlo simulation. The root cause of this type of
uncertainty is not the random variation of parameters, but a more fundamental lack of
knowledge or understanding of complex dynamic interactions involving non-linear
feedbacks within the system, or unpredictable system responses to unknown future
conditions (e.g. the effect of climate change on the system hydrology or the impact of
future socio-economic forces). In presence of unreliable predictions due to deep
uncertainty (Lempert et al., 2003) decision makers could seek ‘robust’ actions that are
stable under a wide range of future conditions. Robust optimisation could be used to
identify solutions that are less sensitive to data variations and remain stable under
different possible scenarios, but this is not considered in the EBSD framework.
In addition to the limitations above, the extensions proposed in each Chapter have their
own limitations which are discussed below.
In Chapter 3 a non-convex cost curve was used for inter-company transfers that are not
yet proposed by water company plans. The curve was approximated by a piecewise
linear function which increased the model computational burden.
In our application, the ‘branch and bound’ commercial solver did not converge to global
optimality, but returned a solution that may distance from it by up to 28% in cost. Also,
since the model is applied at a regional level, it cannot accurately represent companies’
willingness to engage into transfers with neighbour water companies. Because the
companies are independent, the effect or inefficiency of institutional rules and
transaction costs would also need to be considered to approximate the gains that are
possible from regional inter-connections.
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In Chapter 4 a new modelling approach was proposed in order to overcome limitations
of the stochastic version of the EBSD framework called the ‘intermediate framework’.
The new approach was applied to a pilot network composed by three water resource
zones. A limitation of this approach is that it may require a higher number of iterations
to converge to a solution compared to the ‘intermediate framework’. The number of
iterations possibly increases with the dimension of the network. This means that, if the
new approach was applied to a larger network, composed by a higher number of
schemes, the total run time could possibly increase considerably.
In Chapter 5 a new EBSD-based model formulation was developed to analyse the
impact of the English 2010-14 price-cap regulation on companies’ investment decisions.
The proposed model only optimises investment decisions that are related to the capacity
expansion problem. Other expenditures, such as costs for quality enhancement or to
improve customer service, were obtained by interpolation of historical data. This means
that the regulatory incentives placed on the non-optimised expenditures (the OPA and
SIM schemes), could not be represented in the proposed model formulation. However,
such incentives can only influence companies’ revenue by the -0.5% to 1% (OFWAT,
2010b). Furthermore, the model does not represent companies’ risk adverse behaviour
(some investment choices are based on gut feelings about what works in the field or is
more politically acceptable), as well as companies desire to engage in transfers (the
model is run at a company level and imports from external areas are considered through
discrete schemes). Given these limitations, the model results probably cannot yet be
used to fully explain ‘capital bias’ in the regulated system. The model does however
represent how companies in England are allowed to make profits: by out-performing the
regulatory allowance on the rate of return and through a system of rewards/penalties for
out/under-performances on the capital and operating expenditures. The model can
therefore be used to help explain how the current regulatory system of incentives may
motivate a ‘capital bias’ on water company investments. Future work could test how
different regulatory practices impact the ‘capital bias’. For example, the new 2015-20
regulation could be modelled and compared with other possible regulatory practices.
The 2015-20 regulation in England will allow companies to remunerate a determined
ratio of their total costs (capital plus operating expenditure) through the regulatory
capital value. An alternative regulatory practice could be to allow companies to earn a
separate return on the operating expenditure, in addition to the return on the regulatory
capital value (that only includes the capital expenditures). In order to leave the company
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neutral towards the two cost types, the rate of return on the operating expenditure could
be adjusted to leave the two returns in neutral present value terms. In addition to this,
incentives on companies’ total expenditure (capital plus operating costs) could be
applied rather than separating the two cost types. We leave these investigations to future
work.
Despite several limitations, the benefit of the applied model and EBSD framework are
their relative simplicity and applicability to large systems with complex
interdependencies. Although water supply planning of large populous regions is
complex, this framework parsimoniously boils the problem down to its most essential
components to cost-effectively address the regional supply-demand planning problem
for real-world systems. Not only does the model find the least-cost mix of schemes, but
recommends the least cost implementation schedule to meet projected demands as
well. The fact that the model formulated here is being used in a regulator-led effort to
optimise investments for South East England with 17.6 million inhabitants is a
testament to its ability to help plan real systems.
6.3 Discussion on results obtained from applying the capacity
expansion models to the South East of England
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the capacity expansion model developed in this thesis, was
applied to identify regional least-cost investment decisions in the South East of
England. The networks in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 refer to the South East area, however
they differ in their topology and input data. Specifically, the one in Chapter 2 uses
private data from the 2013 water company resources management plans, while the one
in Chapter 3 uses water companies’ public data available online.
Results obtained from running the model in Chapter 2 show that the inclusion of
demand management schemes reduce costs by 6% (£M 68) over the 25-year planning
horizon. In Chapter 2, water company proposed transfers (referred to as LFT), reduce
total discounted costs by 67% (i.e. from £M 1445 if no transfer is allowed to £M 981
otherwise). Similarly, in Chapter 3, discounted costs decrease by 1.2%, i.e. from £M
2259 if no company proposed transfer is allowed, to £M 2232 otherwise. The lower
reduction in costs in Chapter 3 (1.2%), compared to the 67% reduction in Chapter 2, is
due to the lower number of transfers (i.e. 21) compared to Chapter 2 (i.e. 215).
Furthermore, out of the five selected schemes in Chapter 3, four of these represent
extensions in time of existing bulk transfers and do not have capital costs associated.
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When 19 additional transfers are included in the network in Chapter 3 (to interconnect
water resource zone in surplus to the neighbouring ones in deficit), total discounted
costs decrease by 47% (i.e. from £M 2232 to £M 1178, which corresponds to a total
saving of £M 1053). If the number of transfers is increased from 19 to 92 (to
interconnect all neighbouring water resource zones belonging to different water
companies), only a 28% relative gap solution can be achieved in 14 days run. The 28%
gap solution, however, has M£ 147 total discounted costs, considerably lower than £M
1178. The 92 transfers allows therefore identifying convenient chains of
interconnections within the network (these also include intermediate interconnections
between water resource zones in surplus, or from a zone in deficit to another in surplus).
A better solution can therefore be achieved, than if 19 transfers only were considered,
even if this has 28% relative gap.
Results also show that the 43% (Case 2, Chapter 2) and 43% (‘full-INT’, Chapter 3) of
total costs in the South East of England are due to the activation of schemes in the
London water resource zone, the one with the highest deficit in the whole network.
Results from Chapter 3 suggest the implementation of imports from areas with a higher
extent compared to other scheme types. For example, a bulk sea import from Norway is
activated that generates the 20% to total discounted capital costs in the London area. In
contrast, Chapter 2 suggests the activation of two effluent reuse schemes in the London
zone, which generate the 27% of the total discounted capital costs. Specifically, one has
a maximum annual capacity of 150 Ml/d (i.e. it provides 33% of total supply from
selected schemes in the dry year critical period scenario), the other one of 60 Ml/d. No
import scheme is available in the London zone that can provide 150 Ml/d.
The selection of effluent reuse schemes or imports depends therefore on the zone level
of deficit and availability of schemes. For example, in Chapter 3, the import from
Norway provides a maximum annual capacity of 214 Ml/d. The scheme with the second
highest level of supply in the London area is an effluent reuse option with a 100 Ml/d
capacity (apart from another import that is mutually exclusive to the selected one). If the
100 Ml/d effluent reuse scheme were selected in place of the import from Norway, the
activation of another option would have been necessary to reach a total capacity of 214
Ml/d. This would have increased the total cost of the solution.
Even if in Chapter 2 effluent reuse schemes provide the highest level of supply amongst
selected supply-side options in the London area, the second largest volume (368 Ml/d
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over the planning horizon, i.e. 10% of supply from selected supply-side options) is
generated by an import scheme. This confirms, once again, that imports from external
areas represent an important solution to the supply-demand planning problem. When the
major effluent reuse schemes in the London area are deactivated, then a surface water
scheme is selected which provides 18% of supply from all optional schemes (i.e. 1006
Ml/d in the dry year annual overage scenario). Therefore, surface water schemes also
represent an important solution for the capacity expansion problem.
Finally, in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, demand management options highly
contribute to the supply demand balance (i.e. by 25% in Chapter2 and 23% in Chapter
3, under the dry year critical period scenario). Amongst these, leakage schemes are the
one that provide the highest level of savings (i.e. 85% in Chapter 2 and 95% in Chapter
3).
6.4 Assessment of the methodological approach
This thesis developed capacity expansion optimisation models by using mathematical
programming techniques (i.e. mixed integer linear programming, MILP). The MILP
models are solved with CPLEX. CPLEX uses the branch and bound algorithm which
adopts an iterative procedure to find a solution to the capacity expansion problem. At
each iteration (‘node’), the algorithm identifies an upper bound solution (integer
solution in the case of cost minimisation, also referred to as ‘incumbent’) and lower
bound one (where all binary variables are ‘relaxed’ to continuous values). The
algorithm stops it search when the difference between the upper and lower bound
solutions divided by the incumbent (i.e. the relative gap), is lower than the user pre-
defined tolerance (i.e. 5%).
The capacity expansion model developed in this thesis returns solutions with relative
gaps lower than 5% when applied to small networks (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). When,
however, the network dimension increases (e.g. South East of England in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3), the computational burden also increases. Specifically, in Chapter 2, the
model reaches a 2.76% relative gap in 30 hours if demand management options are not
included, and a 5.9% relative gap in 45 hours, when 511 demand management schemes
are considered. The 511 demand management options add 12,775 binary variables (i.e.
511 multiplied by the 25 years of the planning horizon) and 76,650 constraint
equations.
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Inter-regional transfers are the one that affect more than other scheme types the model
computational burden. When all transfers are excluded from the network a 1.93%
relative gap in reached in 3.5 hours in Chapter 2 and a 1.5% one in less than 20 minutes
for Chapter 3. The computational burden considerably increase when the network is
expanded with additional transfers not proposed yet in water companies’ resources
management plans. For these transfers, capital costs were represented through a
piecewise linearised non-convex function, using a set of variables called ‘special order
set of type 2’.
When additional 19 transfers are considered (to interconnect water resource zones in
surplus to those in deficit only), the model cannot reach a relative ‘gap’ lower than 5%
in 12 hours (without the 19 additional links, a 3.3% relative ‘gap’ is reached in the first
30 minutes). Increasing the network by 19 transfers corresponds to including additional
475 binary variables (19 multiplied by 25 years), 76 SOS2 variables (19 multiplied by
the 4 breakpoints of the piecewise linear problem) and 19000 new continuous extent of
use variables (19 multiplied by 25 years and by 4 as the number of demand scenarios).
If then, the number of links is increased from 19 to 92 (to interconnect all neighbouring
water resource zones belonging to different water companies), the model can only
converge to a 28% relative gap in fourteen days. With a fully interconnected network
(i.e. 137 links are added to interconnect all neighbouring water resource zones), the
branch and bound algorithm cannot even identify an integer solution. Considering 137
links raises a hard combinatorial problem that requires an exhaustive enumeration. For
any additional link, the binary variable can be either zero or one at any year t of the
planning horizon. For any of these combinations, a convex optimisation problem is
created. With 137 links and 25 years, the number of possible problems is prohibitively
high (i.e. 25 2137).
Initial solutions were given in input to the models in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, without
being able to improve the models convergence. This implies that setting the initial
solutions to aid convergence may not be appropriate for EBSD models.
In general, the analysis of the upper and lower bound solutions in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 reveals that the branch and bound algorithm has a fast convergence only at
the beginning of the running time. For example, in Chapter 2, when demand
management schemes are not included in the optimisation problem, the upper bound
solution decreases from £M 103 to £M 100 after 4.5 hours and a second improvement
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from £M 100 to £M 981 is recorded after 13 hours. Then, the upper bound solution does
not improve considerably over the remaining running time. Similarly, the lower bound
solution increases from 947 to 1005 within 1.3 hours, but then it does not improves
considerably over the remaining running time. A similar trend is observed when
demand management schemes are included, and for the models in Chapter 3.
In all runs, the closure of the gap between the lower and upper bound solutions recorded
towards the beginning of the running time, is not repeated afterwards: the upper and
lower bound solutions do not improve significantly as the running time increases.
Specifically, the amount by which the difference (gap) between the upper and lower
bound solutions is decreased at the beginning of the running time, is greater than the
gap that remains afterwards. This suggests that there is no reason for increasing the
running time once the gap is reduced by an extent that cannot be further repeated.
6.5 Conclusion
This thesis has developed and applied a capacity expansion model formulation to
support investment decisions in the water supply sector. The starting point was the
‘Economics of Balancing Supply and Demand’ (EBSD) framework used by water
utilities in England since 2002. Several extensions to the EBSD framework were
presented with the objective of assessing and improving upon some of its limitations.
Firstly, user-defined savings profiles for demand management schemes were allowed
and a two-step optimisation process was developed to manage network infeasibilities
that inevitably arise in real word applications. Then, a new model formulation was
proposed that allowed expanding companies’ networks with additional inter-company
transfers. Costs for such transfers were described by a non-convex curve approximated
by a piecewise linear function. Subsequently, an extension was proposed to improve the
application of the ‘intermediate framework’. The proposed approach consists of running
the EBSD model iteratively and testing the reliability of the solutions with Monte Carlo
simulation. To ensure that different supply-demand schedules were generated at each
run, special constraints were used to eliminate unreliable solutions identified at previous
iterations. Next, a new EBSD based capacity expansion model was presented that
maximises companies’ profit under the 2010-14 regulatory framework in England. The
aim is to understand if the current set of regulatory incentives may be causing a ‘capital
bias’, i.e., a preference towards capital based solutions in lieu of more cost effective
schemes that are operating expenditure based. Finally Appendix I presents an extension
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of the model formulation that allows scheme costs to be accounted for over the
schemes’ lifetime when they extend beyond the planning horizon. In Appendix II
multiple near-optimal solutions are generated in addition to the least-cost plan.
Generating multiple near-optimal plans allow decision-makers to more easily consider
non-monetised criteria and strategic priorities that cannot be represented in EBSD
models.
Future research could be focused on improving the EBSD models to represent
interactions between companies, such as transfers. In this thesis, the EBSD model was
applied to individual companies or to a regional system where all water companies are
combined (a single regional objective function is used). Results therefore represent the
best case scenario of the cost efficiencies that can be achieved. However, because
companies are independent, the inefficiencies of institutional rules and transaction costs
would need to be considered to approximate the gains that are possible.
Further work is also needed for the regulatory model presented in Chapter 5. Further
analysis will be carried out to understand how changes to the 2010-14 regulatory
framework presented in Chapter 5, could impact the ‘capital bias’. Regulatory changes
include replacing the current set of incentives for cost savings on capital and operating
expenditures with incentives on the total costs (capital plus operating). The new 2015-
20 regulation may also be represented, by allowing companies to recover a determined
ratio of the total expenditure (operating plus capital costs) through their regulatory
capital value.
Finally, general EBSD framework limitations were identified that need further
exploration. EBSD models are single objectives, i.e., all aspects of system performance
are monetised which means that important non-monetary metrics of system performance
(such as resilience, environmental performance, etc.) cannot be represented in the
model. Also, EBSD uses hydrologically independent estimates of supplies, i.e., firm
yields are estimated through external simulators based on historical drought conditions.
This means that complex interactions between schemes cannot be represented, which
can be significant for groups of schemes working together, using various operational
triggers (such as stream-aquifer options). In addition to this, EBSD models do not
consider over-year storage levels, i.e., supply in each year is assumed to be unrelated to
previous year storage levels. This means the EBSD approach is not appropriate for
regions where reservoirs are used to store water from one year to another. Finally, the
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stochastic version of EBSD uses Monte Carlo Simulation to test, under random
variations of supply and demand data, the reliability (frequency of failure) of the
supply-demand schedules selected by the model. However, when the cause of
uncertainty is not limited to the random variation of parameters but is due to a lack of
understanding of the system behaviour and unpredictable responses to future conditions
(global change, future socio-economic drivers), stochastic optimisation could be used to
identify plans that are robust as remain stable under a wide range of possible scenarios.
The conclusion Chapter also provides an assessment of the methodological approach
used in the dissertation and a broad analysis of the results obtained by applying the
proposed models to the whole South East of England.
Because the EBSD framework is a relatively simple approach for supply-demand
planning that has been applied nationally in England for over a decade, it will likely
continue to be used for some time; therefore, this thesis has made a substantial
contribution to the field by investigating its limitations and possible extensions.
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Appendix I- Extension: accounting costs over their useful life
EBSD models typically make investment decisions over a 25 to 30 year time horizon
(UKWIR, 2002a, UKWIR, 2002b), with costs also accounted within that period. This
means that the assets’ residual costs, i.e. the costs to keep the assets functional beyond
the planning period, are not accounted; this may create biased comparisons among
schemes (see also section 1.6.2.6). Recent guidelines from the Environment Agency
(EA et al., 2012a, EA et al., 2012b) requires companies to account costs over the assets’
lifetime. This Appendix presents an extension to the EBSD model formulation
introduced in Chapter 2 in order to address the new regulatory requirements.
In the new model formulation, the planning horizon (set T) is extended by a number n of
years (set FF). The model makes investment decisions over set T. No supply-demand
balance modelling occurs over set FF, but just a continuation of the capital and
operating costs over the scheme’s lifetime. The capital and operating expenditure for
each option i,j are accounted as one unique cash flow that occurs at the first year of
activation of the optional schemes (investment decisions are made over set T only).
Since the operating costs (sfixi,j) are per year, their present worth value (fopexi,j) is
calculated as below (see also section 1.3 of Chapter 1):
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In the equation above, uli,j is the lifetime of the optional assets (set OPTSOU), ic is the
cost of capital, while CON is the connectivity matrix which defines the network
topology. Variable operating costs are accounted annually, over both set T and set FF,
as their value depend on the schemes’ optimal annual extent of use. Variable operating
costs over set T are calculated as in Chapter 2 (equations 2.14 and 2.15). Variable
operating costs over set FF are calculated using equations I.2 to I.6 below.
If tmax is the last year of the planning horizon (set T) a new continuous variable
QQi,j,ff,scen is introduced for each scheme i,j. QQi,j,ff,scen is equal to Qi,j,t,scen at year tmax:
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A new continuous variable is then introduced (QQQi,j,ff,scen). QQQi,j,ff,scen is defined over
set FF and is equal to QQi,j,ff,scen between year tmax (excluded) and the last year of the
asset’s lifetime (see equation I.3). In the equation below, set FFF is an ‘alias’ of set FF,
i.e., it refers to different time indexes that belong to set FF.
, , , , , ,
( , ) , ,
i j fff scen i j ff scenfff FF ff FF
QQQ QQ
i j CON ff fff scen SCEN
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
    I. 3
Equation I.2 is not linear. In order to keep the model stated as a mixed integer linear
program, a new continuous variable QLi,j,t,scen is introduced:
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In the equation above, m is a scalar, i.e., the upper bound value for Qi,j,t,scen. If asset i,j is
not selected at year t (AL i,j,t -AL i,j,t-1)=0, then equation I.4 becomes
QLi,j,t,scen (Qi,j,t,scen|t=tmax -m). Since the model is minimising costs and Qi,j,t,scen is a
positive variable then QLi,j,t,scen=0. If asset i,j is selected at year t, (AL i,j,t -AL i,j,t-1)=1 and
equation I.4 becomes QLi,j,t,scen Qi,j,t,scen|t=tmax. Since costs are minimised
QLi,j,t,scen=Qi,j,t,scen|t=tmax. Equation I.5 is obtained by replacing QLi,j,t,scen in equation I. 2:
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Equations I.3, I.4, and I.5 are the model constraints. The weighted variable costs are
over set FF are calculated in equation I.6:
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If f’ is the objective function equation in Chapter 2 (see equation 2.1), the new objective
function f becomes:
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In equation I.7 term (ALi,j,t - ALi,j,t-1) identifies the first year of activation of selected
schemes i,j. Figure 46 shows the calculation of capital and operating costs over time set
T and set FF, if an asset lifetime of 80 years is considered.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2040 1 2 3 4 5 6 78 79 8077
80years
QQQi,j,ff,scen=Qi,j,'2038/39' ...Qi,j,'2040',scen QQi,j,ff,scen=Qi,j,'2038/39'
QQi,j,ff,scen=0 ... QQQi,j,ff,scen=Qi,j,'2038/39'
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Figure 46: procedure to discount assets’ annual costs over 80 years.
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Appendix II - Generating near- optimal solutions
Least-cost optimisation can be used by water utilities to build long-term annual plans of
new supply and demand management schemes. However it is likely that solutions that
are near least-cost but have other benefits will be preferred by decision-makers. The
study presented here argues for using a ‘modelling to generate alternatives’ (MGA)
approach in supply-demand planning. MGA identifies a set of nearly optimal solutions
with different decision variables. In England water planners use least-cost supply-
demand optimised planning to defend their plans to regulators. MGA is applied to South
East England, for the same network presented in Chapter 3 (see Figure 23), where £2.65
billion (Critchley and Marshallsay, 2013) are to be invested by private utilities over a 25
to 30 year planning horizon. 240 near-optimal solutions are examined within 10% of the
optimum and 30 within 5%. The near-optimal plans are diverse; for example the
optimal capacity of reservoir schemes and imports vary as much as 520% and 415%
respectively. This diversity amongst the nearly least-cost plans suggests that, for the
case-study system and others like it, other factors should be considered in addition to
the economic cost, when designing portfolios of new supplies and demand management
measures. The set of solutions generated using MGA are displayed in parallel axis plots
in order to display the diversity in the frequency of scheme selection, extent of use over
the planning horizon, and timing of asset activation. It is argued that exploring a diverse
set of nearly optimal solutions is more appropriate than only considering the single
least-cost solution or even the optimum under a few scenarios.
This Appendix is structured as follows: section II.1 introduces the literature review.
Sections II.2 and II.3 describe the ‘modelling to generate alternatives’ approach and its
application to the case study. Section II.3 presents the model results and is followed by
discussion and conclusions in sections II.5 and II.6 respectively.
II.1 Literature review and context
Water planners usually use least-cost optimisation to ensure they cost-effectively
expand their supply-demand systems. The ‘optimal’ solution helps water decision
makers and regulators to coalesce around one plan amongst the many available ones.
However, when applied to real-world planning problems, optimisation techniques can
be limited due to complexities such as non-linearity and discontinuity present in the
system (Zechman and Ranjithan, 2007) or due to the presence of knowledge, such as
preferences of decision-makers, difficult to monetise and incorporate into the model.
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This can translate into vague constraints and objectives and make the optimisation
model ill-posed (Liebman C. J., 1976).
This issue gets amplified for large-scale problems where the introduction of an
increased number of variables and uncertain factors multiplies the possibility for errors
in the model structure and results (Harrington Joseph J and Gidley James S, 1985). Lee
(1973) made a list of the main limitations of optimisation models for large-scale
systems and analysed the planning context in which these have failed rather than
evolved. Hobbs and Hepenstal (1989) applied Monte Carlo simulation to water
resources problems and showed, for the case study, that the estimated solution (benefit)
of the optimisation model can overstate the system’s true performance.
Large scale problems may also present many alternative solutions with the same value
of the objective function in the optimal solution, or that lie in the vicinity of the optimal
solution (Rogers and Fiering, 1986). This phenomenon was examined by (Hopkins et
al., 1982, Chang et al., 1982, O'Laoghaire T. D. and D., 1974) for a variety of water
resource planning problems. Harrington and Gidley (1985) also found, for a water
resource planning problem, many solutions whose value was within a few percent (1 to
5 %) of the global optimum.
Since a complex real word planning problem cannot be fully represented by an
optimisation model, the ‘optimal’ solution does not necessarily coincide with the ‘best’
solution for the problem (Chang et al., 1982, Liebman C. J., 1976). The ‘best’ solution
most likely lies in the inferior region in the objective space if there are one or more un-
modelled objectives (Brill et al., 1990). Optimisation models can therefore be most
valuable when used as a tool to generate alternatives for evaluation, allowing other
criteria not included in the model to be considered in the decision making process
(Chang et al., 1992, Brill, 1979b, Hopkins et al., 1982). This can provide a deeper
understanding of the problem itself and help planners and decision makers in their final
decision (Yeomans and Huang, 2003).
Alternatives can be generated through methods designed to produce solutions
significantly different from previously designed solutions, as proposed in a series of
papers authored or co-authored by E. D. Brill and S. J. Chang (Brill, 1979b, Brill et al.,
1982, Brill et al., 1990, Chang et al., 1982, Chang et al., 1983, Hopkins et al., 1982,
Chang and Liaw, 1984, Kshirsagar and Brill, 1984). This approach, called as ‘modelling
to generate alternatives’ (MGA) is based on the hypothesis that alternative solutions
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perform better when the degree of difference among them higher. The argument for this
is that, in order to include knowledge that cannot be embedded into the model, the
decision maker has to consider a small set of alternatives that are perceived as different
as possible compared to the problem optimal solution (Hopkins et al., 1982). Practice
also dictates that good alternative solutions should not be more than 10% worse of the
initial optimal solution to the problem (Yeomans and Huang, 2003). MGA techniques
have been widely applied to water resource system planning problems and examples can
be found in Hopkins et al. (1982), Uber et al. (1992) and Zechman and Ranjithan
(2007).
II.2 Modelling to Generate Alternatives
A formal definition of MGA is provided by Brill (1979a) and is presented below. The
first step consists of running the model presented in Chapter 2 and finding an optimal
solution referred to as SOL. In the second step (step 2) the objective function equation
2.1 is replaced by equation II.1. Then, equation II.2 is introduced as model constraint.
All other model constraints in Chapter 2 also included.
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In the equation above, K is the set of all non-zero binary variables ALi,j,t in solution
SOL, while f is used to denote the objective function equation of the original
optimisation model (equation 2.1). T* is an upper bound which sets the maximum
amount by which target costs can deviate compared to costs in the original model
solution SOL. If this model is run, it returns a new solution (schedule of scheme
activation) which is referred to as SOL1. The third step consists of repeating step 2
where that the non-zero variables in the objective function II.1 (set K) includes all the
non-zero variables in previous solutions (solution SOL and SOL1). This procedure is
repeated many times until when a user-defined number of alternative solutions is
obtained.
II.3 The MGA implementation
For this case study, the CPLEX solution-pool feature was used within GAMS. The
solution-pool feature implements an extension of a branch and cut algorithm that allows
to generates multiple nearly-optimal solutions. The user can adjust the number of
solutions within the near-optimum solution pool by selecting how close, in percentage,
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the objective function values in the near-optimal solution must be to the optimal
solution, given the capacity expansion model presented in Chapter 2. The user can also
control the level of difference among the alternative solutions using a ‘diversity’ filter.
This analysis was applied to the WRSE network in Figure 23 and does not use
confidential cost dataset used in other efforts (Padula et al., 2013, P. H. von Lany, 2012,
R. Critchley and D. Marshallsay, 2013). The WRSE network used here has different
input data than those presented in Chapter 3: scheme costs (extrapolated from the net
present value figures in water company plans) were later improved returning the
network in Figure 23.
II.4 Model results
II.4.1 The optimal solution
The total net present cost of the solution is £ 1.09 billion; the optimal programme
(annual schedule of options and extent of use) is dominated by investments on imports
TR from areas outside the network. TR schemes provide a total of 1,217 103 Ml/d
equivalent to the 30% of the total water supplied. The second highest volume is from
metering (MET) schemes (1,113 103 Ml/d, which corresponds to the 27.6% of the total
supply). Table 50 shows the total extent of use (in 103 Ml/d and in %) and the total
discounted costs (capital expenditure, fixed and variable operating costs) for selected
schemes aggregated by type. Scheme types are listed in Chapter 2.
Total water
supplied
[103 Ml/d]
Percent of
network’s
total water
supply
Capital
[103 £]
Fixed
operating
[103 £]
Weighted
variable
operating
[103 £]
MET 1,113 28% 377 6 0.3
TR 1,217 30% 568 19 6
RES 181 4.5% 202 77 0.8
DESAL 402 10% 230 3 0.2
GW 293 7% 2156 7 0.3
LEAK 265 7% 016 196 8
ASR 213 5% 150 1.4 0.06
ER 58 1% 162 15 0.6
NI 116 3% 043 349 0.01
WEFF 82 2% 053 1 0.01
SW 73 2% 084 3 0.1
WTW 21 0.5% 017 2 0.06
Table 50: Total extent of use in [103 Ml/d] and discounted costs in [103 £] for the least economic cost
solution. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
Table 50 shows that the plan’s impact would be substantial; nearly a third of water
coming from inter-regional transfers would lead to a large carbon footprint from energy
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use and a high environmental footprint. The second largest water volume comes from
metering options which are typically regarded in the sector as uncertain and regionally
variable. For various strategic, political and environmental reasons it is reasonable that
before implementing this plan, planners would investigate other portfolios of options of
similar cost but with different mixes of new supply and demand management schemes.
II.4.2 Near-optimal results
A set of solutions within 10% of the least-cost supply-demand plan is generated. The
margin of error on the model input data reaches or surpasses 10% in many cases and so
it is reasonable to consider plans within 10% of the least-cost solution (Yeomans and
Huang, 2003).
The CPLEX diversity filter feature is used to obtain solutions as diverse as possible
from each other. This resulted in 240 near-optimal solutions. Figure 47 shows the near-
optimal solutions (darker grey lines indicate proximity to optimal solution) and the
least-cost solution (dotted red line) in a parallel coordinate plot (Meeks L. and
Rosenberg D.). The darker the grey line, the closer are (in cost) the near-optimal
solutions to the least-cost plan (dashed red line).
Figure 47: Total water supply over the whole planning horizon from supply-side and demand
management options grouped by type over the 240 near-optimal solutions within 10% of the least-cost
plan.
Graphing the 240 solutions on a parallel axis plot (Figure 47) shows the diversity of the
near-optimal plans across the different scheme types. Over all the 240 near-optimal
solutions it is possible to find near-optimal plans whose cost is within a few percent of
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the least-cost plan, and that present a high diversity of scheme selection and extent of
use. For example portfolio ‘A’ in Figure 47 is only 6% more expensive than in the least-
cost solution, but has a 30% lower extent of use of TR imports (imports decrease from
Ml/d 1217 103 in the least-cost plan to Ml/d 356 103 billion in plan ‘A’), and a 24%
higher extent of use of reservoir RES schemes (supply from RES schemes increases
from 181 103 Ml/d in the least-cost plan to Ml/d 757 103 Ml/d in plan ‘A’).
Using the solution pool CPLEX feature, 30 near-optimal solutions are found within
2.5% of the optimal plan (see Figure 48). The number of solutions presented in Figure
48 is small enough that decision-makers can more easily consider each individual
alternative plan and its un-modelled advantages and disadvantages.
Figure 48: Total water supply over the planning horizon from supply-side and demand management
options grouped by type over the 30 near-optimal solutions within 2.5% of the least-cost plan.
II.4.2.1 Analysis of reservoir schemes
Parallel axis plots can also be used to show results for individual schemes that are
selected over the near-optimal plans. We show this for reservoir (RES) options and TR
imports (section II.4.2.2), which are the one that vary mostly over the near-optimal
solutions.
Figure 49 shows the RES schemes that are selected over the 240 near-optimal solutions
within 10% of the least-cost plan. The darker the grey line, the closer are (in cost) the
near-optimal solutions to the least-cost plan (dashed red line). Ordering from left to
right is made by frequency of selection (higher frequency on the left, lower frequency
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on the right). This ordering is useful to identify which scheme selections are likely low-
regret decisions. For example reservoir schemes P064, P014, P021 and HV are selected
in each of the 240 near-optimal solutions, while scheme P065 is selected in just three
near-optimal solutions.
Figure 49: Diversity in the frequency of RES selection amongst the 240 near-optimal solutions within
10% of the optimum. Each line represents one of the 240 solutions.
Figure 50 displays the percentage level of utilisation (options optimal yield divided by
their maximum capacity) of selected reservoir options, over the near-optional solutions.
In Figure 50, the reservoir schemes on the left have a higher extent of use than those
listed on the right.
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Figure 50: Extent of use, in percentage, of reservoir schemes selected over amongst the 240 near-optimal
solutions within 10% of the optimum. As the objective function value (cost) in the near-optimal plans
decreases the solution colour darkens.
Figure 50 shows that the extent of use of asset HV varies between 50% and 100%. RES
option P021 instead is used at 100% of its capacity over all of the 240 near-optimal
solutions. This indicates that building this asset is a cost-effective decision. RES scheme
M5 has a maximal usage of just 61% which indicates that this option is likely over-
sized.
Figure 51 shows the year of activation of reservoirs schemes over the planning horizon
(y-axis). Reservoirs along the x-axis are arranged by order by year of activation
(schemes on the left are activated earlier than those on the right). The analysis of Figure
49 showed that reservoir schemes P064, P014, P021 and HV are likely low-regret
decisions (these schemes are selected over all the 240 near-optimal plans), while Figure
51 shows that there is some diversity among the near-optimal solutions regarding the
year in which these schemes are selected.
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Figure 51: Diversity in year of activation, for reservoir schemes selected over the 240 near-optimal
solutions within 10% of the optimum. As the objective function value (cost) in the near-optimal plans
decreases the solution colour darkens.
II.4.2.2 Analysis of transfer schemes
An examination of selected imports (TR) within the near-optimal solutions reveals
diversity in the selection, timing and usage. Figure 52 is a parallel axis plot like the one
in Figure 49: for each of the 240 near-optimal solutions, a line is drawn that shows the
composition (schemes types) of all 240 portfolios in one plot.
Figure 52: Diversity in the frequency of transfer scheme selection amongst the 240 near-optimal solutions
within 10% of the optimum. Each line represents one of the 240 solutions. As the objective function value
(cost) in the near-optimal plans decreases the solution colour darkens.
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The transfers along the horizontal axis are ranked by frequency of selection (the most
selected transfers are on the left, the lower selected one on the right). Among the 240
near-optimal solutions within 10% of the global optimal solution, only 46 near-optimal
plans include the asset nrARK which is selected in the least-cost plan. Scheme nrARK is
also not selected in any of the 30 near-optimal solutions within 2.5% of the least-cost
plan. This suggests that the implementation of this asset could be avoided if it presents
any special technical risk or political challenge.
Figure 53 shows the percentage level of utilisation of selected transfer options (options
optimal yield divided by their maximum capacity) over all near-optional solutions. By
comparing Figure 53 with Figure 50, it appears that there is more diversity in the usage
for transfer schemes than for reservoirs. The extent of use of some transfer schemes,
vary considerably over the near-optimal schemes. For example, transfers P068 is used
between 21% and 88% of its capacity over the near-optimal solution.
Figure 53: Percentage of maximum extent of use over the planning horizon for each transfer node over
the 240 near-optimal solutions within 10% of the optimum. Each line represents one of the 240 solutions.
As the objective function value (cost) in the near-optimal plans decreases the solution colour darkens.
Figure 54 shows that there is also variability among near-optimal plans in the year
which the transfers are activated. Such a plot could be used by the decision-maker to
investigate whether the year of implementation of some problematic investments could
be delayed over the planning horizon.
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Figure 54: Diversity in year of activation, for transfer schemes selected over the 240 near-optimal
solutions within 10% of the optimum. Each year of the 29 year planning horizon is represented on the y-
axis. As the objective function value (cost) in the near-optimal plans decreases the solution colour
darkens.
II.5 Discussion
In this Appendix, an optimisation technique called ‘modelling to generate alternatives’
is applied to a water supply capacity expansion planning problem. This allows
generating 240 near-optimal solutions within a 10% (in cost) of the least-cost plan, and
30 near-optimal solutions within a 2.5% of the least-cost plan. Parallel axis plots are
used to show the diversity of the near-optimal set of interventions with regards to extent
of use (least-cost quantity) of selected asset types (Figure 47 and Figure 48) or specific
assets (Figure 50, Figure 53), in the frequency of activation of specific assets (Figure 49
and Figure 52), and with regard to the timing of activation for selected schemes (Figure
51, Figure 54). The contribution of the information provided by the parallel axis plots
and the policy significance of this work is reflected below.
II.5.1 Content and use of near-optimal parallel axis plots
Figure 47 and Figure 48 show the total capacity expansion (in Ml/d) for each scheme
type across the near-optimal solutions within the 10% and 2.5% of the least-cost plan
respectively. If planners consider certain asset types being less reliable or less politically
or socially beneficial, these results show the potential for planners to limit the use of
schemes from one or more types.
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Figure 50 and Figure 53 show the frequency of selection of specific optional assets
(reservoirs or transfers) over the 240 near-optimal plans within 10% of the least-cost
solution. These graphs allow planners to visualise how frequently certain investments
are part of a near-optimal mix and can help planners to choose plans that include or
exclude particular schemes. Assuming that the modelling to generate alternatives
algorithm has enforced diversity in the near-optimal solutions, the fact that a particular
asset appears in most solutions indicates that it is more likely to be appropriate under a
wide range of designs and can be considered a low-regret investment.
Figure 49 and Figure 52 show the diversity of the near-optimal solutions with regards to
the maximum level of utilisation (in percentage) of selected reservoirs and transfers.
These plots help planners to quickly assess which schemes are used intensively and
therefore what are the most cost-effective schemes to operate.
Finally, Figure 51 and Figure 54 show the diversity of the first year of activation of
selected schemes over the planning horizon. These plots allow planners to understand
how urgent some schemes are to enable a cost-effective expansion, or to potentially
delay the implementation of controversial schemes. For example, options RA75, RA150
and RA3z represent four possible implementations of the Upper Thames reservoir
(UTR) in the Thames Company area. UTR can be built with a maximum capacity of 75
Mm3 (RA75) or with a maximum capacity of 150 Mm3 (RA150). In the latter case the
UTR can serve three water recourse zones (option RA3z) or only two (option RA150).
Options RA75, RA150 and RA3z are mutually exclusive. The UTR scheme is perceived
to be controversial with groups trying to block its implementation due to local landscape
and heritage issues. Therefore if the planner decides to build the UTR, than he can opt
for adopting one of the near-optimal solutions (see Figure 51) which allow delaying its
implementation over the planning horizon.
The parallel axis plots represent an initial exploration of the near-optimal solution set.
Further analysis would involve tracking promising schemes and identifying ranges
considered desirable for whatever reason (e.g. ‘solutions with at least 20% increase in
leakage reduction are considered desirable from a policy perspective). Especially if the
near-optimal set if large, this work could be tedious and specialty software would likely
be helpful, e.g. software that would allow filtering the parallel axis plot by conditions
and labelling. AeroVis1 can be used for this scope. AeroVis is a visual platform that
1 https://www.decisionvis.com/products/aerovis/
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enables ‘brushing’ solutions to display only those that fit specific criteria defined by the
user.
II.5.2 Policy implications and conclusive remarks
The policy implications of the South East England regional water supply system
planning case-study are significant. This work shows that allowing a 2.5% or 10%
economic deviation away from the least-cost plan leads to substantially different plans.
For example plan ‘A’ showed in Figure 47 shows a very different mix of schemes (more
reliant reservoir options rather than on imports from zones external to the network) and
is only within 6% of the least-cost design.
This exercise reveals that only reporting the least-cost schedule of supply upgrades and
water demand management schemes, gives an incomplete picture of the options
available to both regulators and company decision-makers. Considering near-optimal
plans drastically increases the freedom of planners to consider un-modelled factors and
other strategic priorities and would allow them to recommend more appropriate and
beneficial mixes of new supply and demand management options.
II.6 Conclusion
The modelling to generate alternatives application presented in this Appendix included
the detailed analysis of near-optimal solutions within a 10% distance of the least-cost
solution. The set of near-optimal solutions are displayed in parallel axis plots in order to
show the diversity in the frequency of scheme selection, extent of use over the planning
horizon, and timing of asset activation. These plots show that the near-optimal set of
alternative plans presents significant levels of diversity. For example, a plan with a 24%
greater usage of reservoirs and 30% lower usage of imports is only 6% more expensive
than the least-cost solution plan. Also, certain plans including controversial assets were
nearly the same cost as other plans without them.
The case study provides a basis to argue that exploring a diverse set of nearly optimal
solutions is more appropriate than only considering the single least-cost solution or even
the optimum under a few scenarios. This diversity amongst nearly least-cost plans
suggests that, for the case-study system studied and others like it, other factors should
be considered in addition to economic cost when designing portfolios of new supplies
and demand management measures.
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Ideally England will transition to a multi-criteria planning framework where other
objectives can be quantified and used to assess options. The current work shows
considering non-monetary criteria is needed because the different plans are
insufficiently distinguishable by economic criteria alone and therefore systematic
adoption of the least-cost solution is to some extent arbitrary and unlikely conducive to
the socially optimal plans. This inability of economic criteria alone to justifiably select a
preferred plan points to a larger question: whether economic cost-benefit analysis alone
is sufficient to justify large investments of public funds in complex infrastructure
systems such as regional water supply where each plan involves a mix of monetisable
and non-monetisable consequences.
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